John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is the most influential methodology in contemporary ethics.This paper argues that this influence is undeserved, for two reasons. First, reflective equilibrium fails to accomplish two tasks that give us reason to care about methodology. On the one hand, it fails to explain how (or whether) moral knowledge is possible.This is because the method is explicitly oriented towards the distinct (and less interesting) task of characterizing our moral sensibilities. On the other hand, the method fails (...) to provide an informative way of adjudicating central methodological debates in ethics. Second, where Rawls’ method –and the background methodology he uses to motivate it –do have substance, that substance is implausible. The role of dispositions in the method entails that it endorses obviously irrational inferences. Further, the method makes substantively implausible distinctions between the dispositions that are allowed to play a methodological role. Rawls' background methodology appeals to the idea of a psychology in ‘wide reflective equilibrium’. However, both formal and empirical path-dependence considerations strongly suggest that there is nothing even minimally determinate that is someone’s psychology in ‘wide reflective equilibrium’. I close by exploring salient attempts to salvage the spirit of reflective equilibrium by abandoning elements of Rawls’ approach. I argue that none of these attempts succeed. I conclude that appeal to the method of reflective equilibrium is not a helpful means of addressing pressing methodological questions in ethics. In a slogan, reflective equilibrium is methodologically irrelevant. (shrink)

Whereas epistemology is the philosophical theory of knowledge, its nature and scope, metaepistemology takes a step back from particular substantive debates in epistemology in order to inquire into the assumptions and commitments made by those who engage in these debates. This entry will focus on a selection of these assumptions and commitments, including whether there are objective epistemic facts; and how to characterize the subject matter and the methodology of epistemology.

Normativni teoretičari pogreške nastoje braniti teoriju pogreške koja kaže da normativni sudovi pripisuju normativna svojstva, a takva svojstva, uključujući razloge za vjerovanje, nikada nisu instancirana. Mnogi filozofi su iznijeli prigovore obrani teorije koja podrazumijeva da ne možemo imati razloga vjerovati u nju. Spencer Case prigovara da teoretičari pogreške jednostavno ne mogu izbjeći samopobijanje. S druge strane, Bart Streumer tvrdi da ne možemo vjerovati u normativnu teoriju pogreške, ali da to, pomalo iznenađujuće, pomaže njenim zagovornicima da je obrane od ovih prigovora. (...) Smatram da, ako je Streumerov argument uspješan, on omogućuje teoretičarima pogreške izbjegavanje Caseovog prigovora o samopobijanju. Međutim, nadograđujem i poboljšavam Caseov argument kako bih pokazao da nikada ne bismo mogli uspješno obraniti normativnu teoriju pogreške, bez obzira na to možemo li vjerovati u nju ili ne. Dakle, samopobijanje ostaje. Rad zaključujem nudeći neke razloge za mišljenje da naša nesposobnost da obranimo normativnu teoriju pogreške znači da bismo je trebali odbaciti, što bi posljedično značilo da je ona neistinita. (shrink)