The study examined the level of moral reasoning of first-year university students in Papua New Guinea; 583 students participated by answering one of the exercises or dilemmas formulated by Kohlberg. The analysis of data primarily focused on what the general level of moral reasoning of the students might be and whether there were differences in their levels of moral reasoning on the basis of gender, culture and religious affiliation. The study showed that around 50 per cent of both male and (...) female students came within the first level, but in the second stage of moral reasoning. Around 25 per cent of both genders came under the stage 4, that is, the law and order stage. A t-test comparison revealed no significant difference between the genders in their moral reasoning. The ‘faculty’ that the students belonged to is the only variable that indicated a statistically significant effect F = 2.159, p = 0.030, est η2 = 0.014923 on the level of moral reasoning. All other variables such as age, religion and the province that the students came from did not show a significant effect. Two new dimensions, ‘reference to God’ and the ‘need for negotiation’, in moral reasoning emerged from the study. (shrink)

Social psychologists have found that stereotypes correlate with moral judgments about agents and actions. The most commonly studied stereotypes are race/ethnicity and gender. But atheists compose another stereotype, one with its own ignominious history in the Western world, and yet, one about which very little is known. This project endeavored to further our understanding of atheism as a social stereotype. Specifically, we tested whether people with non-religious commitments were stereotypically viewed as less moral than people with religious commitments. We found (...) that participants’ moral appraisals of atheists were more negative than those of Christians who performed the same moral and immoral actions. They also reported immoral behavior as more consistent for atheists, and moral behavior more consistent for Christians. The results contribute to research at the intersection of moral theory, moral psychology, and psychology of religion. (shrink)

This paper presents moral and epistemological objections to the twin theories of karma and rebirth. It not only considers whether there is any evidence that a principle of karmic rebirth actually operates, but asks whether a karmic principle could provide us with a solid moral education, a comprehensive explanation of evil, or a sufficient reason to do good to others. More fundamentally, how would the law of karma evaluate us, and who or what would be doing the evaluating? It also (...) takes stock of the broader social ramifications of accepting the doctrine, such as whether its widespread acceptance has promoted or hindered societal well-being. -/- 1. Evidence -- 2. Evaluation -- 3. Education -- 4. Explanation -- 5. Ethics -- 6. Elaboration -- 7. Elucidation? -- 8. End. (shrink)

Sam Harris’ new book “The Moral Landscape” is the latest in a series of attempts to provide a new “science of morality.” This essay argues that such a project is unlikely to succeed, using Harris’ text as an example of the major philosophical problems that would be faced by any such theory. In particular, I argue that those trying to construct a scientific ethics need pay far more attention to the tradition of moral philosophy, rather than assuming the debate is (...) simply between a scientific ethics and a “supernatural” ethics provided by religion. (shrink)

Most theory in business ethics is still steeped in rationalist and moral-realist assumptions. However, some seminal neuroscientific studies point to the primacy of moral emotions and intuition in shaping moral judgment. In line with previous interpretations, I suggest that a dual-system explanation of emotional-intuitive automaticity and deliberative reasoning is the most appropriate view. However, my interpretation of the evidence also contradicts Greene’s conclusion that nonconsequentialist decision making is primarily sentimentalist or affective at its core, while utilitarianism is largely rational-deliberative. Instead, (...) I propose that current research on the human brain, in conjunction with converging experimental evidence, hints at moral subjectivism and its evolutionary basis as the most persuasive explanation of morality. These anti-realist conjectures have far-reaching implications for a wide range of topics in business ethics, as illustrated with the specific case of corporate social responsibility as a potentially tribal conception of the good. (shrink)

I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and (...) include at least some prescriptions that include ineliminable indexicals. I argue that there are no rational means of bridging the gap between the two types of theories; nevertheless this does not necessitate skepticism about the moral—we might instead opt for an ethical relativism in which the truth of moral statements is relativized to the perspective of moral theories on either side of the schism. Such a relativism does not mean that any ethical theory is as good as any other; some cannot be held in reflective equilibrium, and even among those that can, there may well be pragmatic reasons that motivate the selection of one theory over another. But if no sort of relativism is deemed acceptable, then it is hard to avoid moral skepticism. (shrink)