Economists tend to view ignorance as ?rational,? neglecting the possibility that ignorance is unintentional. This oversight is reflected in economists? model of ?information search,? which can be fruitfully contrasted with ?information browsing.? Information searches are designed to discover unknown knowns, whose value is calculable ex ante, such that this value justifies the cost of the search. In this model of human information acquisition, there is no primal or ?radical? ignorance that might prevent people from knowing which information to look for, (...) lacking omniscience. Unlike ignorance that is rationally chosen on the basis of an accurate cost/benefit calculation, radical ignorance can explain human error. An account of error as grounded in radical ignorance bypasses the need to appeal to irrationality in order to explain economic (and other) mistakes. (shrink)

This paper develops a political economic explanation of the 2007–9 US subprime crisis which focuses on one of its central causes: the transformation of racial exclusion in US mortgage-markets. Until the early 1990s, racial minorities were systematically excluded from mortgage-finance due to bank-redlining and discrimination. But, then, racial exclusion in credit-markets was transformed: racial minorities were increasingly given access to housing-credit under terms far more adverse than were offered to non-minority borrowers. This paper shows that the emergence of the subprime (...) loan is linked, in turn, to the strategic transformation of banking in the 1980s, and to the unique global circumstances of the US macro-economy. Thus, subprime lending emerged from a combination of the long US history of racial exclusion in credit-markets, the crisis of US banking, and the position of the US within the global economy. From the viewpoint of the capitalist accumulation-process, these loans increased the depth of the financial expropriation of the working class by financial capital. The crisis in subprime lending then emerged when subprime loans with exploitative terms became more widespread and were made increasingly on an under-collateralised basis – that is, when housing-loans became not just extortionary but speculative. (shrink)

The Efficient Market Hypothesis often seems to suggest only that most people cannot outguess the financial markets. But the originator of the hypothesis, Eugene Fama, made the stronger claim that people cannot outguess the financial markets because financial-market prices are correct: They incorporate all known information accurately. This view omits the role that human traders’ interpretations of information must play if the information is to prompt them to buy or sell. Buyers and sellers disagree about the meaning of current information, (...) so at least half of them must be wrong. Bringing in many more (but equally fallible) people to predict the future does not somehow make their (collective) answer “right.” This is a logical disproof of the Fama hypothesis, but the inherently speculative nature of financial markets makes its empirical falsification (or verification) ambiguous if not impossible. The hypothesis must therefore be considered an unscientific article of faith. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Imagine, as most economists do, that financial-market participants understand the basic structure of the world: While they cannot predict the future with certainty, they are endowed with knowledge of the possible outcomes of their actions and the probability that each of those outcomes will occur. Given these assumptions, if bankers, regulators, investors, and rating agencies were rational, we may conclude that the financial crisis was caused by poor incentives: These actors must have knowingly jeopardized their institutions and the global (...) economy to pursue private gain. Alternatively, market participants, caught up in the mania of crowds, may have irrationally ignored risks of which they were aware and of which they knew the correct probability. Neither of these explanations for the financial crisis stands up to the evidence, since both explanations assume that the participants knew the U.S. housing market was about to crash. A fresh look at the data five years later suggests that they were ignorant of this fact, and that they acted rationally (or at least reasonably) in light of what they (thought that they) knew. This allows a more nuanced understanding of how financial institutions ended up in bedlam, why credit markets collapsed, and why they took so long to recover. (shrink)