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  1. (1 other version)Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-Body Debate, 2nd Edition.Erik Ostenfeld - 2018 - Baden-Baden, Germany: Academia Verlag, Baden-Baden.
    Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-Body Debate offers an overview of Platonic-Aristotelian thought on man with a view to considering what its alternative conceptual framework may contribute to the modern debate which is dominated by the scepticism confronting modern reductionism. The mind-body problem is central to the modern philosophical and cultural debate because we cannot understand what man is until we understand what consciousness is and how it interacts with the body. Although many suggestions have been offered, no convincing (...)
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  • Does the Soul Weave? Reconsidering De Anima 1.4, 408a29-b18.Jason W. Carter - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):25-63.
    In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.
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  • Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism.Alain E. Ducharme - unknown
    Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism is a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology in light of certain presuppositions he holds about the living animal body. The living animal body is presumed to be sensitive, and Aristotle grounds his account of cognition in a rudimentary proprioceptive awareness one has of her body. With that presupposed metaphysics under our belts, we are in a position to see that Aristotle in de Anima (cognition chapters at least) has a di erent explanatory aim in view than that (...)
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  • II—Christopher Shields: The Peculiar Motion of Aristotelian Souls.Christopher Shields - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):139-161.
    Aristotle has qualms about the movement of the soul. He contends directly, indeed, that ‘it is impossible that motion should belong to the soul’ (DA 406a2). This is surprising in both large and small ways. Still, when we appreciate the explanatory framework set by his hylomorphic analysis of change, we can see why Aristotle should think of the soul's motion as involving a kind of category mistake-not the putative Rylean mistake, but rather the mistake of treating a change as itself (...)
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  • (1 other version)La forma como sujecto: ¿un desliz de Aristóteles? Eidos como sujecto y garante de la identidad.Claudia Patricia Carbonell Fernández - 2013 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 48:49-72.
    En este texto argumento a favor de la consideración de la forma como sujeto y, por tanto, como responsable de la identidad del objeto a través del movimiento. Se consideran sucesivamente la prioridad de la forma como sustancia, su carácter particular y los distintos sentidos en los que algo puede ser sujeto, para concluir por qué en Z, 3, la forma es el mejor candidato no sólo para ser sustancia, sino para ser sujeto en sentido principal. El objeto del texto (...)
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  • The Status of Souls as Hupokeimena in Aristotle.Christopher Hauser - 2024 - Metaphysics 7 (1):16-36.
    Many scholars have claimed that a well-known, allegedly ‘Rylean’ passage in DA I.4 shows that Aristotle does not think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. However, other scholars have argued against this and invoked other texts to support their rival claim that Aristotle does think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. This article articulates and defends an original interpretation of Aristotle’s position vis-à-vis this issue. In particular, this article argues that Aristotle thinks the souls of living (...)
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  • Colloquium 1: Thought and Body in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras1.Patricia Curd - 2010 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 25 (1):1-41.
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  • Aristotle on action: The peculiar motion of aristotelian souls.Christopher Shields - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):139–161.
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  • Content and cause in the aristotelian mind.Michael V. Wedin - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (S1):49-105.
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