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  1. Internalism, externalism, and epistemic source circularity.Ian David MacMillan - unknown
    The dissertation examines the nature and epistemic implications of epistemic source circularity. An argument exhibits this type of circularity when at least one of the premises is produced by a belief source the conclusion says is legitimate, e.g. a track record argument for the legitimacy of sense perception that uses premises produced by sense perception. In chapter one I examine this and several other types of circularity, identifying relevant similarities and differences between them. In chapter two I discuss the differences (...)
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  • A defense of reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs.Tomoji Shogenji - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
    This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people’s (...)
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  • Why worry about theory‐dependence? Circularity, minimal empiricality and reliability.Matthias Adam - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):117 – 132.
    It is a widely shared view among philosophers of science that the theory-dependence (or theory-ladenness) of observations is worrying, because it can bias empirical tests in favour of the tested theories. These doubts are taken to be dispelled if an observation is influenced by a theory independent of the tested theory and thus circularity is avoided, while (partially) circular tests are taken to require special attention. Contrary to this consensus, it is argued that the epistemic value of theory-dependent tests has (...)
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  • 哲学の一般的方法としての「最良の説明への推論」.Ryo Ogawa - 2022 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 55 (1):1-1.
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  • On argument strength.Niki Pfeifer - 2012 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Bayesian Argumentation – The Practical Side of Probability. Springer. pp. 185-193.
    Everyday life reasoning and argumentation is defeasible and uncertain. I present a probability logic framework to rationally reconstruct everyday life reasoning and argumentation. Coherence in the sense of de Finetti is used as the basic rationality norm. I discuss two basic classes of approaches to construct measures of argument strength. The first class imposes a probabilistic relation between the premises and the conclusion. The second class imposes a deductive relation. I argue for the second class, as the first class is (...)
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  • Explaining the Reliability of Moral Beliefs.Tersman Folke - unknown
    This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book "Ethics and Explanation", edited by Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz due for publication in 2016.
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  • A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):207-236.
    We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect'' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This (...)
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  • Interpretation, Constraint, and the Prospects of Scientific Realism.Harold Brown - 2009 - Human Affairs 19 (2):153-168.
    Interpretation, Constraint, and the Prospects of Scientific Realism I explore the interaction between theory-based interpretations of scientific evidence and constraints on theories provided by that evidence. Interpretation is often viewed as a source of error and a reason for scepticism about scientific results. But, I argue, while interpretation does generate epistemic risk, it also points to new sources of evidence that can constrain our theories. This is especially clear in the development of instrumentation that increases the range of our interactions (...)
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  • A Normative Theory of Argument Strength.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (1):1-24.
    In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.
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  • Intuitional Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):639-659.
    Some think that recent empirical research has shown that peoples' moral intuitions vary in a way that is hard to reconcile with the supposition that they are even modestly reliable. This is in turn supposed to generate skeptical conclusions regarding the claims and theories advanced by ethicists because of the crucial role intuitions have in the arguments offered in support of those claims. I begin by trying to articulate the most compelling version of this challenge. On that version, the main (...)
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  • Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
    What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches (...)
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  • Introduction: The Providential Bad Luck of Justification.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):483-491.
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  • Beyond circularity and normativity: Measurement and progress in behavioral economics.Michiru Nagatsu - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):265-290.
    This article assesses two major conceptual arguments against theories of choice.The first argument concerns the circularity of belief-desire psychology, on which decision theory is based. The second argument concerns the normativity arising from the concept of rationality. Each argument is evaluated against experimental practice in economics and psychology, and it is concluded that both arguments fail to establish their skeptical conclusion that there can be no science of intentional human actions.
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  • What is wrong with epistemic circularity?Frederick F. Schmitt - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):379–402.
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