- First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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How autistics see the world.Francesca Happé & Ulta Frith - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):159-160.details
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Incarnational anthropology.John Haldane - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:191-211.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Sampling and information processing.Edward Gruberg - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):381-382.details
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The nervous system/behavior interface: Levels of organization and levels of approach.Paul Grobstein - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):380-381.details
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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On strangerism and speciesism.J. A. Gray - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):756-757.details
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In this best of all possible monkey worlds?Harold Gouzoules - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):158-159.details
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The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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The compleat visual system: From input to output.M. A. Goodale - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):379-380.details
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Second person intentional relations and the evolution of social understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-130.details
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The multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems perspective on group cognition.Robert L. Goldstone & Georg Theiner - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):334-368.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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Misinformation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):533-550.details
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The Anthropological Difference: What Can Philosophers Do To Identify the Differences Between Human and Non-human Animals?Hans-Johann Glock - 2012 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:105-131.details
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Perception theory and the attribution of mental states.Philip A. Glotzbach - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):157-158.details
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Who owns what? Some reflections on the foundation of political philosophy.Lloyd P. Gerson - 2012 - Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):81-105.details
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Does mentality entail consciousness?Rocco J. Gennaro - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.details
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Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.details
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The belief-desire law.Christopher Gauker - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):121-144.details
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Understanding the Immediacy of Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Alois Pichler - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1305-1326.details
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The future of social cognition: paradigms, concepts and experiments.Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):655-672.details
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Social and nonsocial intelligence in orangutans.Biruté Galdikas - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):156-157.details
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Theory of society, yes, theory of mind, no.Hans G. Furth - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):155-156.details
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Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief.Eric Funkhouser - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):809-831.details
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Mind, State, and Metaphor.Richard Floyd - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):406-424.details
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Animal mentality: Canons to the right of them, canons to the left of them ….Aurelio J. Figueredo - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):154-155.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Thought insertion and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.details
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More than meets the eye.Russell D. Fernald - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):378-379.details
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Ethological invariants: Boxes, rubber bands, and biological processes.John C. Fentress - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):377-378.details
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Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism.Tyler K. Fagan - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):189-208.details
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Toad's prey-catching: A complex system with heuristic value.Jörg-Peter Ewert - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):389-405.details
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Neuroethology of releasing mechanisms: Prey-catching in toads.Jörg-Peter Ewert - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):337-368.details
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Humans' use of animals: On the horns of a moral dilemma.Brian Everill - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):756-756.details
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Networks, intentionality and multiple realizability: Not enough to block reductionism.Markus I. Eronen & Laura F. Bringmann - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.details
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Interventionism for the Intentional Stance: True Believers and Their Brains.Markus I. Eronen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):45-55.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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The Importance of Disambiguating Adaptive States in Development Theory and Practice.Laura Engel - 2017 - Hypatia 32 (3):540-556.details
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Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity.Ronald P. Endicott - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):101-22.details
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Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.details
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Erroneous gambling-related beliefs emerge from broader beliefs during problem-solving: a critical review and classification scheme.Anastasia Ejova & Keis Ohtsuka - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (2):159-187.details
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