In a recent commentary, John-Stewart Gordon points to the need for further elaboration of the pragmatic approach to moral status that I have defended. On the one hand, Gordon points to the need for a clearer account of when individualist and relational deliberative strategies should be employed. On the other hand, he observes that the pragmatic account appears to conflate two theoretical tasks that are typically understood as distinct: the task of determining the grounds of moral status, and the subsequent (...) task of ethical decision-making. This article offers a reply to Gordon’s critical remarks. (shrink)

This commentary critically evaluates Showler’s pragmatic approach to moral status, which integrates moral individualism and moral relationalism to address the moral complexities surrounding non-human entities, especially social robots. Showler proposes a unified methodology that delineates distinct roles for each theory—moral coordination problems for moral individualism and moral transformation for moral relationalism. However, my commentary identifies key methodological ambiguities and potential conflation of moral status determination with broader ethical reasoning. It argues for clearer application guidelines and further theoretical refinement to enhance (...) the framework’s robustness and practical applicability, suggesting this model as an interesting starting point for further debates on moral status. (shrink)