- Side constraints and the structure of commonsense ethics.Theresa Lopez, Jennifer Zamzow, Michael Gill & Shaun Nichols - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):305-319.details
|
|
The moral requirement in theistic and secular ethics.Patrick Loobuyck - 2010 - Heythrop Journal 51 (2):192-207.details
|
|
Is there a real nexus between ethics and aesthetics?John Miles Little - 2010 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7 (1):91-102.details
|
|
Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.details
|
|
The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple.Max Lewis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12963-12984.details
|
|
Is consciousness intrinsically valuable?Andrew Y. Lee - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):1–17.details
|
|
The Strong-Tie Requirement and Objective-List Theories of Well-Being.William A. Lauinger - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):953-968.details
|
|
Reductivism, Nonreductivism and Incredulity About Streumer’s Error Theory.N. G. Laskowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):766-776.details
|
|
Epistemic modesty in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1577-1596.details
|
|
The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 1 (8):1-15.details
|
|
An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Value of Envy.Jens Lange & Sara Protasi - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.details
|
|
The Archangel Delusion. Descriptive Ethics and Its Role in the Education of Ethicists.Jarosław Kucharski - 2021 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 57 (2):35-49.details
|
|
The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.details
|
|
Species-Being and the Badness of Extinction and Death.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 1 (1):143-162.details
|
|
The uncomfortable truth about wrongful life cases.Hyunseop Kim - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):623-641.details
|
|
Meaningful Lives, Ideal Observers, and Views from Nowhere.Jason Kawall - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:73-97.details
|
|
Moral Knowledge Without Knowledge of Moral Knowledge.David Kaspar - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):155-172.details
|
|
Respecting Value.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):341-365.details
|
|
Beyond sacrificial harm: A two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology.Guy Kahane, Jim A. C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Lucius Caviola, Nadira S. Faber, Molly J. Crockett & Julian Savulescu - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (2):131-164.details
|
|
When Moral Talk Becomes Profitable.Mario I. Juarez-Garcia - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-19.details
|
|
What’s Personhood Got to Do with it?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):557-571.details
|
|
Rule Following, Standards of Practice, and Open-mindedness.James Scott Johnston - 2009 - Paideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 18 (1):17-25.details
|
|
Rawls on Kantian Constructivism.Nathaniel Jezzi - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (8).details
|
|
What to Enhance: Behaviour, Emotion or Disposition?Karim Jebari - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (3):253-261.details
|
|
On Being Perfect and Doing the Right Thing.Tracy Isaacs - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):55-64.details
|
|
Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals.Stan Husi - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):375-401.details
|
|
Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals.Stan Husi - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):375-401.details
|
|
Right act, virtuous motive.Thomas Hurka - 2010 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 58-72.details
|
|
Moore in the middle.Thomas Hurka - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):599-628.details
|
|
Zum Status von Intuitionen in Gedankenexperimenten.Jakob Huber - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (5):689-704.details
|
|
Problems for Broome’s Cognitivist Account of Instrumental Reasoning.Jeppe Berggreen Høj - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):299-316.details
|
|
What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?Sharon Hewitt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):331 - 349.details
|
|
Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture.Paul Henne, Jennifer Semler, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):131-139.details
|
|
An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Paul Henne, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):283-290.details
|
|
Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.details
|
|
Desire and Goodness.Allan Hazlett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):160-180.details
|
|
Happiness, the self and human flourishing.Daniel M. Haybron - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (1):21-49.details
|
|
Demandingness and Boundaries Between Persons.Edward Harcourt - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):437-455.details
|
|
Book review. [REVIEW]Sven Ove Hansson - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):419-422.details
|
|
Making good choices: toward a theory of well-being in medicine.Alicia Hall - 2016 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37 (5):383-400.details
|
|
Confessions of an ethics committee chair.Christine Halse - 2011 - Ethics and Education 6 (3):239 - 251.details
|
|
Sufficient Reasons to Act Wrongly: Making Parfit’s Kantian Contractualist Formula Consistent with Reasons.Mattias Gunnemyr - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):227-246.details
|
|
Intellectual Honesty.Louis M. Guenin - 2005 - Synthese 145 (2):177-232.details
|
|
Dialogue Concerning Natural Appropriation.Louis M. Guenin - 2003 - Synthese 136 (3):321-336.details
|
|
‘Pure’ Time Preferences Are Irrelevant to the Debate over Time Bias: A Plea for Zero Time Discounting as the Normative Standard.Preston Greene - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):254-265.details
|
|
Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh.Alexander Greenberg & Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:128-145.details
|
|
Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua D. Greene - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):695-726.details
|
|
Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism. [REVIEW]Kurt Gray & Chelsea Schein - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):405-423.details
|
|
Avoidable Harm.Peter A. Graham - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):175-199.details
|
|
Toward a foundational normative method in business ethics.Lester F. Goodchild - 1986 - Journal of Business Ethics 5 (6):485 - 499.details
|
|