Photographic representations of women living with or beyond breast cancer have gained prominence in recent decades. Postmillennial visual narratives are both documentary projects and dialogic sites of self-construction and reader-viewer witness. After a brief overview of 30 years of breast cancer photography, this essay analyzes a collaborative photo-documentary by Stephanie Byram and Charlee Brodsky, Knowing Stephanie , and a memorial photographic essay by Brodsky written ten years after Byram’s death, “Remembering Stephanie” . The ethics of representing women’s postsurgical bodies and (...) opportunities for reader-viewers to engage in “productive looking” are the focal issues under consideration. (shrink)

We explore briefly Foucault's ideas about the care of the self, creating ourselves and what he meant by ethics. We then examine the work of five artists–Mark Rothko, Cindy Sherman, Helena Hietanen, Samuel Beckett, and Betty Goodwin–to help us begin to think very differently about illness and human suffering. Taking our lead from Beckett, we regard reason as being given too much responsibility for the work of a caring knowledge, and that it is through the arts that new ideas about (...) bioethics can emerge. (shrink)

Images share a common feature with all phenomena of imagination, since they make us aware of what is not present or what is fictional and not existent at all. From this perspective, the philosophical approach of Kendall Lewis Walton—born in 1939 and active since the 1960s at the University of Michigan—is perhaps one of the most notable contributions to image theory. Walton is an authoritative figure within the tradition of analytical aesthetics. His contributions have had a considerable influence on a (...) broad range of topics, such as the role of categories in the understanding of the arts (Walton, “Categories of Art”. Philosophical Review, 79(3): 334–367, 1970), the ambiguous nature of emotions in the experience of fictional stories (Walton, “Fearing Fictions”. The Journal of Philosophy, 75(1): 5–25, 1978), the transparency of photographic images compared to other depictions (Walton, “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism”. Noûs, 18(1): 67–72, 1984) and, above all, the development of a general theory of fiction as imaginative activity. His 1990 book Mimesis as Make-believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts collects and re-elaborates articles Walton published on the subject since the 1970s. Though he does not attempt to give a definitive answer for what imagination is, Walton thoroughly investigates its role in all cases of representational works, describing depictions as a specific case of “make-believe” activity: images, in short, are specific props of a visual and perceptual “make-believe” game. (shrink)

This article draws from Adriana Cavarero’s considerations on the role of the body in diverse contemporary modalities of violence. We propose a conceptual path along some ideas from Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler and Kaja Silverman in order to state, on the one hand, an onto-epistemological turn that understands the body as the effect of social norms and, on the other, an ethical and political reflection about the levels of violent exposure that suffer those bodies that are excluded from the cultural (...) frames that make a life livable. The concave mirror—as a possibility for other alternative ways of representing the body—is postulated as an alternative to the hegemonic ways in which the representation operates in the configuration of the body as a totality and unity: those that theory links to the flat mirror. (shrink)

Can literature make it possible to represent histories that are otherwise ineffable? Making use of the Deleuzian concept of “the powers of the false,” Doro Wiese offers readings of three novels that deal with the Shoah, with colonialism, and with racialized identities. She argues that Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated, Richard Flanagan’s Gould’s Book of Fish, and Richard Powers’s The Time of Our Singing are novels in which a space for unvoiced, silent, or silenced difference is created. Seen through (...) the lens of Deleuze and his collaborators’ philosophy, literature is a means for mediating knowledge and affects about historical events. Going beyond any simple dichotomy between true and untrue accounts of what “really” happened in the past, literature’s powers of the false incite readers to long for a narrative space in which painful or shameful stories can be included. (shrink)

ArgumentThe new English term “empathy” was translated from the GermanEinfühlungin the first decade of the twentieth century by the psychologists James Ward at the University of Cambridge and Edward B. Titchener at Cornell. At Titchener's American laboratory, “empathy” was not a matter of understanding other minds, but rather a projection of imagined bodily movements and accompanying feelings into an object, a meaning that drew from its rich nineteenth-century aesthetic heritage. This rendering of “empathy” borrowed kinaesthetic meanings from German sources, but (...) extended beyond a contemplation of the beautiful to include a variety of experimental stimuli and everyday objects in the laboratory. According to Titchener's structural psychology, all higher thought could be reduced to more elemental aspects of mind, and experimental introspection showed empathy to be constituted of kinaesthetic images. The existence of kinaesthetic images, Titchener argued, formed an incisive critique of the view that thought could take place without images, held by one of Titchener's major psychological rivals, the school of thought-psychologists in Würzburg, Germany. The new term “empathy” in early American academic psychology therefore delineated a kinaesthetic imaginative projection that took place on the basis of ontological difference between minds and things. (shrink)

In this paper I distil a concept of the imaginary with which to make good the claim that our mode of embodied subjectivity is an imaginary embodiment in an imaginary world. The concept of the imaginary employed is not one in which imaginary worlds are contrasted with the real, but one in which imagination is a condition of there being a real for us. The images and forms in terms of which our imagined bodies and worlds are constituted carry, in (...) an interdependent way, cognition and affects. Imagined configurations have a resilience which makes their displacement more than a matter of appealing to considerations of truth or falsity. It involves encounters with alternative imagined configurations which can be recognized as making both cognitive and affective sense. (shrink)

This article proposes that cosmetic minimally-invasive procedures – Botox injections, soft-tissue fillers, microdermabrasion, chemical peels and laser treatments – are an under-researched area and provide a number of promising paths for skin studies research. I argue that cosmetic minimally-invasive procedures collapse the difference between the surfaces of the photograph and the skin – the primary surfaces of cosmetic surgery – more successfully than cosmetic surgical procedures. More precisely, I maintain that the difference between photograph and skin is collapsed in two (...) ways: first, through narrating the transformation of the skin’s surface in a way that more closely matches the photographic promises of the cosmetic surgery industry; and, second, by depicting the surgical penetration of the skin through advertising photography. The article concludes by suggesting that further investigation into cosmetic minimally-invasive procedures could offer a new way to think about relationships between ‘normative’ and ‘non-normative’ skin modification practices. (shrink)

My essay incorporates Irigaray's notion of the sensible transcendental, a dynamic attempt to reconstitute the body/mind dualism which founds Western thought, into a reading of the practice of European concert dance. I contend that Irigaray's efforts toward articulating a language of the body as active agent have much to offer analyses of dance practice, and develop this claim through a reading which reflects philosophically on the changing nature of my own dance activity.

This article reassesses the concept of identification in line with the increased importance phenomenology has taken on in film-philosophy of the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1970s and 1980s, a Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretation of identification dominated film theory and criticism, and spectatorial engagement with elements of films was understood as what psychoanalysis calls secondary identification – the identification with stable subject-positions (characters) in the film-text. But non-Lacanian psychoanalysis and Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology offer film-philosophy a very different understanding of identification as (...) a non image-based, ‘blind’, bodily affective tie that is established between spectators and what Vivian Sobchack describes as ‘the sense and sensibility of materiality itself’ (Sobchack 2004, 65). By first exploring how this more bodily (for psychoanalysis, primary ) identification is theorized by psychoanalysts (Freud, Paul Schilder, Henri Wallon) and by film theorists (Kaja Silverman), the article proposes that film criticism make greater use of it in order to engage more meaningfully with the visible cultural specificities – size, skin colour, age, sex – of the images of bodies viewed on cinema screens. It is not just ‘the’ body that needs bringing back into thinking about film spectatorship, but culturally differentiated bodies , both on the screen and in the auditorium. A psychoanalytic and phenomenological film criticism of embodied cultural identity, one that attends to the materiality of the film and of the body-images and objects on the screen, may be the most culturally and politically useful successor to ‘screen’ theory of the 1970s and 1980s. (shrink)

In this article we argue that our present-day mode of looking at bodies expresses a cosmetic gaze, that is, a gaze already informed by the techniques, expectations and strategies of bodily modification and a way of looking at bodies as awaiting an improvement. The cosmetic gaze, as we see it epitomized in contemporary media phenomena like reality makeover shows on television, is also a physiognomic gaze in that it creates a short-circuit between inside and outside beauty. Our article traces some (...) of the history of the present short-circuit between an inside and an outside and analyzes how different visual media have informed and shaped the gaze in historically specific ways, but also how aspects of that history inhere in media practices today. More specifically, we will analyze John Caspar Lavater’s hand-drawn portraits, Francis Galton’s photographical composites, the anthropometrically defined but still intuitively discovered ideals of the ‘Aryan body’ in Nazi Germany, and today’s reality television makeover shows in order to understand some of the continuities and discontinuities of the cosmetic gaze. (shrink)

This essay places the recent academic fascination with trauma and victimhood in a psycho‐social context within which identifications with pure victimhood hold sway. The essay takes as its starting point Freud's description, in Civilisation and its Discontents, of the formation of the super‐ego via the small child's negotiation of ambivalence towards its first authority figure. It is argued that this process lacks secondary re‐inforcement in western urban postmodernity, where authority has become diffuse, all‐pervasive and unavailable as a point of identification. (...) In this context, aggression becomes harder to acknowledge and manage resulting in a tendency towards Manicheanism and the attenuation of ambivalence. Taking as its case‐study Marianne Hirsch's writings on the ethical aesthetics of postmemorial photography, the essay concludes that recent work on trauma and testimony fails to acknowledge that identifications may straddle victimhood and perpetration. This acknowledgement is only possible where some containment of aggression feels possible. (shrink)

In her book Life on the Screen, Sherry Turkle assumes that the new computer technologies materialize “postmodern theory and bring it down to earth”. Turkle is not the only “cyber-theorist” defining the new technologies as a kind of materialization or visualization of something previously invisible. But in doing so, such theorists erase important differences: that of a topological and a descriptive notion of the unconscious, between the Other and the other, between the body and its unconscious image, and between gender (...) and sexual difference. Various examples of cybertheories and practice demonstrate this impulse to erase these differences. But when an equation is made between the unconsciousness and the cyberspace, a crucial difference is lost, namely that which constitutes the space of the subject. (shrink)