The essay provides an interpretation of the specific concept of ”ruinance” (Ruinanz), as this is introduced and developed by Heidegger in his 1921/22 lecture series on ”Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle” (GA 61). Instead of accepting this subsequently abandoned concept as a marginal excursus on Heidegger’s part, the interpretation uses it as a lever to explore the interconnectedness of intentionality, falling, destruction, history and finitude, and also the proclaimed necessity of so called ”formally indicative concepts”, of which ruinance itself is a (...) supreme example. (shrink)

The basic concepts 'person' (Person), I/self (Ich) and 'subject' (Subjekt) structuring the Russian discourse of personhood (Personalität) developed during the philosophical discussions of the 1820s-1840s. The development occurred in the course of an intense reception of German Idealism and Romanticism. Characteristic of this process is that the modern meaning of personhood going back to the theological and natural-law interpretations of the person in Western Europe does not exist in the Russian cultural consciousness. Therefore the Russian concepts of personhood demonstrate the (...) influence of the semantic innovations of Romanticism. Correspondingly, the semantic core of the Russian discourses on personhood is not the idea of an 'autonomous person' but that of an 'unique individuality'. Here, personhood is not the indefeasible attribute of every man, but the mark of inimitable individuality. Accordingly, the basic distinction underlying the discourse on personhood in Russia is not the differentiation between 'person' and ' thing' as in the European tradition, but the distinction between 'individual' and (anonymous) 'community'. Also, in the meaning of the concept of I/self the dominant differentiation is not that between I/self (Ich) and not-I/not-self (Nicht-Ich), but that between I and We. This discourse on personhood centring on the idea of individuality took form in Russia starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, in particular in aesthetics, psychology, and educational theory, as well as in the philosophy of history. The comparative intercultural analysis of the history of concepts pertaining to personhood in the German-Russian cultural transfer brings to light the dialectic of European modernity in which a degree of tension is visible between the idea of personal autonomy and individuality. (shrink)

Este artículo es un análisis de tres relatos periodísticos de la filtración de documentos de la Agencia Nacional de Seguridad de Estados Unidos, llevada a cabo por Edward Snowden: un libro, una película y una entrevista. El objetivo es sacar a la luz algunos dilemas éticos y políticos que subyacen al caso. Primero, una tensión paradójica entre la exigencia de transparencia frente al secreto estatal y la necesidad del secreto personal para el derecho a la privacidad, que refleja en nuestros (...) tiempos la dialéctica publicidad / secreto en la modernidad temprana. Segundo, la ética hack-activista enfrenta los conflictos entre anonimato y visibilidad. Tercero, los periodistas en que Snowden confía afrontan el dilema entre los deberes de la información y la protección de la confidencialidad de las fuentes. El asunto Snowden es, pues, una oportunidad para extraer algunas lecciones sobre la ética de la comunicación en la era digital. (shrink)

In the Marxist tradition, capitalism is understood as a commodified society based on markets. The article argues that the ultimate justification of this position does not lie in any ‘materialistic’ approach, but in the disembedding of markets that was the result of the historical ‘Great Transformation’ analysed by Karl Polanyi. Disembedded markets are not an economic subsystem within society but take the place of the most encompassing social system, which Durkheim had reserved for religion. The article distinguishes between spatial, social, (...) material and temporal dimensions of disembedding, thereby elaborating and correcting the analysis of Karl Polanyi. As a genuine form of society, disembedded markets give rise to the epistemological dilemma, which, as Luhmann had shown, is fundamental to any encompassing social theory: Society as a whole cannot be viewed by any observer. According to this viewpoint, economic theories take on ‘theological’ functions, as they provide rationality and legitimacy to a reality that is unknowable. (shrink)

This article is a continuation of “Mobility and Solidarity. Paper One”. Solidarity is considered from the point of view of co-intended meaning, as an additional motive accompanying the main motivation of participants of interaction, and at the exhaustion of the initial motive, replacing this motive. An example of such a motive in elementary interactions is fidelity. Fidelity, according to Georg Simmel, enables participants to make logical induction from the facts of the current behavior to the expected behavior of partners. Other (...) type of communication concerning solidarity is civil friendship, as described, in particular, by Aristotle. However any friendship presupposes too narrow and too specific circles of contacts, it can be only a prototype of modern solidarity. Religious ethics of fraternal affection and ethics of military brotherhood compete with friendship and often force it out. The more friendships are free from “world orders”, the more they come nearer to the type of pure solidarity. The exchange of gifts can be considered as another type of solidarity, though in modern societies it has only limited potential of universality. The most important phenomenon of modern mobile society is pure togetherness. Here solidarity is present as an imputed motive, one of the accepted vocabularies of motives, and often invoked post hoc to explain why those who aren’t forced to it by power, money, or value commitments stay together. (shrink)

The ethics of Ortega y Gasset is described in the historiography as an imperative of his philosophical idea on human vocation. Ortega’s ethics is being analyzed as part of his philosophy of life or in other words as a part of his concepts such as human destiny, happiness and vocation. The contention of this article is that Ortega’s ethics can be better understood together with the reflections he had in regard to the Bourgeoisie culture. Emphasizing the importance of the moral (...) characteristics of the individual is meant to counterweigh what Ortega conceived as the bourgeoisie morality. The attention of Ortega was given to what he conceived as the necessity to acknowledge the importance of the qualities of human characteristics. He criticized the way in which modern culture depreciated the importance of the value of individual characteristics and maintained that money economy led to the historical decline of the ideal of noble distinction. Ortega believed that the decline of the historical ideal of noble distinction was caused by the fact that the possession of money became the final goal for human life. The quantitative criterion of money culture outweighed the qualitative criterion of assessment of the individual characteristics. In the 20th century culture, making money became the central goal (faena central) of human life. Ortega argued that too much attention to money possession overshadowed the moral imperative to improve one’s interior virtues (virtudes interiores). Following this line of interpretation of money culture as it was presented by Ortega can enable us to reconsider his ethics, his alternatives to the Bourgeoisie culture and also the way he evaluated the ethical theories of his time. (shrink)