Although common sense and literature support the possibility of moral dilemmas, many traditional and contemporary philosophers deny this possibility because of several arguments. Probably the strongest argument against the possibility of moral dilemmas can be called the argument from ought and ought not. Various versions of this argument have been presented by McConnell, Hare, and Conee. Its basic form can be outlined as follows.If any agent is in any moral dilemma, then that agent ought to adopt each of two alternatives (...) but cannot adopt both.If any agent ought to adopt any alternative, but that agent cannot adopt that alternative together with another alternative, then that agent ought not not to adopt that other alternative.Therefore, if any agent is in any moral dilemma, then that agent both ought and ought not to adopt each alternative.It is not possible that any agent both ought and ought not to adopt any alternative.Therefore, it is not possible for any agent to be in any moral dilemma. (shrink)

Overview of fundamental work in deontic logic.

This paper argues for contrastivism about the deontic modals, 'ought', 'must', and 'may'. A simple contrastivist semantics that predicts the desired entailment relations among these modals is offered.

The crucial feature of obligation sentences to which the puzzles point is that such sentences, and evaluative sentences more generally, are defeasible. They may be warranted, given some information, only to be defeated by further information. A theory that recognizes this no longer needs to see conditional obligation as anything more than a simple combination of unary obligation and the conditional.

The present paper investigates the question of whether right-libertarians must accept easements by necessity. Since easements by necessity limit the property rights of the owner of the servient tenement, they apparently conflict with the libertarian homestead principle, according to which the person who first mixes his labor with the unowned land acquires absolute ownership thereof. As we demonstrate in the paper, however, the homestead principle understood in such an absolutist way generates contradictions within the set of rights distributed on its (...) basis. In order to avoid such contradictions, easements by necessity must be incorporated into the libertarian theory of property rights and the homestead principle must be truncated accordingly. (shrink)

In “Gentle Murder, Or The Adverbial Samaritan”, James William Forrester presents what he describes as “the most powerful version yet put forward” of Lennart Åqvist's Good Samaritan paradox in deontic logic. Forrester suggests that the paradox may make it necessary to reject the standard deontic inference principle. This desperate conclusion, as Forrester acknowledges, would imply that all of standard deontic logic “must be in a bad way”. But Forrester's “paradox” is not nearly so deep or intractable as he maintains.

James Wm. Forrester, Being Good and Being Logical. Philosophical Groundwork for a New Deontic Logic. Armonk and London, M.E. Sharpe, 1996. Pp.x+332.

The paper is devoted to the problem of formal representation of prescriptive obligation, i.e., the obligation concerning the way in which an action is to be performed. Improper representation of prescriptive obligation leads to Forrester's Paradox. In the paper I first present a new version of Forrester's Paradox that generalizes the observation on which the original version is based. Then I challenge the two existing solutions to the paradox. I reject the solution of H.-N. Castañeda and analyze problems to which (...) the solution of W. Sinnott-Armstrong leads. I conclude the paper with a proposal for how to improve Sinnott-Armstrong's solution. (shrink)