The role of microaggressions has gained increasing philosophical attention in recent years. However, microaggressions only tell part of the story. An often-overlooked component of inequality is the uneven and unjust distribution of microaffirmations. In this paper, I give a new definition of microaffirmations as signals that a recipient belongs to some valued or high-status class. Microaffirmations can—but need not—lead individuals to gain a sense of confidence, belonging, and merit. I then explain the harms of microaffirmations, arguing that when microaffirmations are (...) distributed inequitably, they can have larger ramifications for injustice, harming some vulnerable groups more than others. In addition, microaffirmations can lead individual actors to make choices based on who gives them microaffirmations and where they receive them, and thus can have outsized influence over the direction of an individual’s life because individuals tend to migrate to where they feel valued, appreciated, and included. I then turn to solutions to the problems I raise. I argue we should attend to and attempt to rectify inequalities in microaffirmations because doing so can help ensure not just the absence of negative attention, but also that the presence of positive attention is flowing in a just and equitable way. (shrink)

The paper presents different approaches to the relationship of life and death among selected authors as a review of their articles within the last volume of the Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe) journal. The resource of the review is an article by Peter Singer The challenge of brain death for the sanctity of life ethics. Firstly, I try to analyze the issue when death occurs and when we can talk about death as a phenomenon that each and every living (...) human being must come to terms within the course of their lives. Ethics of social consequences is used to analyze different approaches and states a conclusion defending the principles of humanity and human dignity within the scope of this ethical theory applied to various problem cases. I strive to support the question of the quality of life through the paternalistic approach of physicians influenced by their humane and dignified understanding of their relationship towards the patients. Ethics of social consequences offers many solutions to the discussed issues throughout the reviewed articles. (shrink)

Animal advocates cannot allow the idea to take hold that only the great apes and certain other “higher” animals are fit to be “persons.” Working to change the moral status of the great apes or sea mammals; for example; is a legitimate and important undertaking; but it should not be done at the expense of other animals. Such thinking is not only disconnected from real animals in the real world; it perpetuates the view that beings belonging to species deemed “nonpersons” (...) or “merely conscious” are of lesser; or no; moral significance until or unless; through an institutionalized system of painful; stressful; and demeaning experiments over decades or centuries; some of them might “prove” themselves worthy of being called persons or semi-persons or sort-of-persons entitled to whatever privileges such designations may confer. (shrink)

Within contemporary philosophy of religion there are three main ways in which God is conceptualised in relation to personhood:God is a person and so personal. God is non-personal, and so is not a person. God is a personal non-person. The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and mainly by those who are pantheists., however, is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it (...) was the view of great philosophical theologians from the past. However, within recent times has become more popular. On the face of it, it might not be clear what the difference between and is, and whether debate had between the two positions is substantive. The goal of this paper is therefore to clarify the debate and assess whether the many claims advocates of make as to why God cannot be a person stand up to scrutiny or are persuasive. My suggestion will be that on the whole they do and are not. As such, defenders of will either need to defend these reasons in more detail or focus on the area I suggest the debate really rests on. (shrink)

The Groningen Protocol, introduced in the Netherlands in 2005 and accompanied by revised guidelines published in a report commissioned by the Royal Dutch Medical Association in 2014, specifies conditions under which the lives of severely ill newborns may be deliberately ended. Its publication came four years after the Netherlands became the first nation to legalize the voluntary active euthanasia of adults, and the Netherlands remains the only country to offer a pathway to protecting physicians who might engage in deliberately ending (...) the life of a newborn. In this paper, I offer two lines of argument. The first is a positive argument for the Protocol, grounded in the good of the newborn as unanimously determined by those in a position to determine it. The second addresses the widely shared belief that the killing of newborns is morally prohibited, where I offer two arguments—one grounded in the fact that the kinds of cases the Protocol is meant to govern are very rare and highly unusual, and the other focused more broadly on the role of pre-theoretical beliefs in moral reasoning—meant to undermine the strong role that the critic of the Protocol affords this belief. I argue that, given this second line of argument, the beliefs underlying my positive argument for the Protocol are in fact more secure than the widely shared belief underlying the critic’s position. (shrink)

I was in manufacturing for over thirty years and a manager for nearly twenty-five. During that time it never occurred to me that the consequentialist, utilitarian framework I used was inadequate as a conceptual framework for making decisions to ensure organisational viability and success.1 The framework gave three criteria which enabled me to construct a rational approach to issues associated with my role as a manager: To show that this framework is adequate as a basis for managerial decision making I (...) want to spell out the logical implications of the three criteria and show that they are necessary and jointly sufficient to provide an epistemically sound framework for managerial decisions. I will argue that we can look to managerial practice for examples which can serve as paradigms for constructing a pragmatic approach to management decision making, one that — when employed correctly — will result in the best moral outcome for all those affected by a decision.2 This approach is derived from, and ultimately justified by, the primary role responsibility of a manager to create and implement a healthy work environment. This is one designed to be viable so that the organisation can compete successfully in the marketplace and meet the morally minimal standard that we ought not to cause unnecessary and avoidable harm to innocent people. Because the approach is goal directed, it is teleological and consequential in nature. I maintain that a workplace, or organisation, is healthy when all the components that constitute it are working coherently together to achieve legitimate organisational goals designed to ensure the best chances of being viable and competitive. Such an organisation is what I term optimally functional.3. (shrink)

Traditionelle Personenbegriffe der abendländischen Philosophie rekurrieren oft auf rationale Fähigkeiten wie Vernunft- bzw. Moralfähigkeit oder reflexives Selbstbewusstsein als Grundlage von individuellem moralischem Status bzw. der korrelierenden moralischen Verpflichtung. Dem steht die Erfahrung besonderer moralischer Verpflichtungen etwa gegenüber Kindern, Menschen mit besonderen Bedürfnissen oder Tieren entgegen, die durch ratiozentristische Engführungen aus dem Blick zu geraten drohen. Die gegenwärtigen Diskurse um die Begriffe der Vulnerabilität und Anerkennung sind deshalb eine wichtige Ergänzung, um einerseits die Selektivität klassischer moralphilosophischer Konzeptionen zu mindern, indem sie (...) auf eine universal geteilte Bedürftigkeit statt auf Kompetenzen als Anker der Moralität hinweisen, sowie andererseits auch positive Fürsorgepflichten für angewiesene Wesen zu begründen. Allerdings bedarf diese Ergänzung, wie argumentiert wird, ihrerseits einer Erweiterung, weil sie erstens von der kontingenten Anerkennung der Vulnerabilität in einem jeweiligen Ethos abhängt, ohne selbst hinreichende normative Kriterien an die Hand zu geben, zweitens von geteilten, jedoch nicht singulären Ansprüchen und Bedürfnissen ausgeht und drittens den Motivationsgrund der Verpflichtung nicht klärt, weil sie von Allokationsstrukturen und nicht von konkreten Begegnungen ausgeht. Eine Korrektur von der Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit her, deren Implikationen für moraltheoretische Fragestellungen in den folgenden Ausführungen skizziert werden, scheint daher angezeigt. (shrink)

There are questions about how ethics is best taught to undergraduate business students. There has been a proliferation in the number of stand-alone ethics courses for undergraduate students but research on the effectiveness of integrated versus stand-alone mode of delivery is inconclusive. Christensen et al. :347–368, 2007), in a comprehensive review of ethics, corporate social responsibility and sustainability education, investigated how ethics education has changed over the last 20 years, including the issue of integration of these topics into the core (...) course offerings. We use Brenner and Molander’s :57–71, 1977) situational ethics survey instrument to examine the effect of the mode of delivery of business ethics education on undergraduate student responses. We found a significant difference on mode of delivery. Studies have also found interesting results in respect of the effect of cultural differences and gender on the effectiveness of business ethics instruction. While not the primary focus of this study, we also looked at the influence of gender and culture on students’ responses. Our results indicate significant differences in respect of mode of delivery and culture. In contrast to other studies, we found that gender was not significant. We did test for any interactive effects of gender, culture and mode of delivery. However, no significant differences were found. (shrink)

This series of articles argues for a different relationship between investigators and subjects of clinical research based on partnership in shared aims and recognition, by each, of their duties within this partnership. This second essay describes how those duties arise and explores the basis on which, and by and to whom, they are owed. The conclusion that patients have duties in research raises a number of moral issues which, ultimately, question the concept of consent. Discussion of these will be continued (...) in future articles. (shrink)

Talisse and Maloney seem to think that professors, not ordinary citizens, are the key to a more deliberative democracy. Yet these professors fail to appreciate the reasonableness of the pro‐life activists and thinkers they disagree with. For example, they falsely charge even the most deliberative groups with resurrecting an obsolete debate and framing conversations in a fallacious way. They further place an unreasonable justificatory burden on pro‐life activists and hold them culpable for framing the debate around the ontology of the (...) embryo . In drawing such a hard line between academics and activists, they also miss what has been an unavoidable partnership between academics and social movements in our imperfect deliberative republic. (shrink)

The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in Aristotle’s Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics. Here “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate objection. It begins by suggesting why this claim matters and then gives a brief outline of Aristotle’s method. The main argument is made (...) in three stages. First, it is argued that Aristotelian method is credible because it compares favourably with alternatives. In this section it is shown that Aristotelian method is not vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that give a primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those that eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science approaches). As such, it compares favourably with these other approaches that are vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms. Second, the appropriateness of Aristotelian method is indicated through outlining how it would deal with a particular case. Finally, it is argued that the success of Aristotle’s philosophy is suggestive of both the credibility and appropriateness of his method. (shrink)

Is the Nazi euthanasia program a useful analogy for contemporary discussions of euthanasia? This paper explores the logic of slippery slope arguments with the Nazi analogy as a test case.

The author takes up three metaphysical conceptions of morality — realism, projectivism, constructivism — and the account of justification or reason that makes these pictures possible. It is argued that the right meta-ethical conception should be the one that entails the most plausible conception of reason-giving, rather than by any other consideration. Realism and projectivism, when understood in ways consistent with their fundamental commitments, generate unsatisfactory models of justification; constructivism alone does not. The author also argues for a particular interpretation (...) of how “objective moral obligation” is to be understood within constructivism. (shrink)

An experimental survey was undertakento explore the links between thecharacteristics of a moral issue, the degree ofmoral intensity/moral imperative associatedwith the issue, and people'sstated willingness to pay for policy toaddress the issue. Two farm animal welfareissues were chosen for comparison and thecontingent valuation method was used to elicitpeople's wtp. The findings of the surveysuggest that increases in moral characteristicsdo appear to result in an increase in moralintensity and the degree of moral imperativeassociated with an issue. Moreover, there was apositive link (...) between moral intensity/moralimperative associated with an issue andpeople's stated wtp for policy to address theissue. The paper discusses the relevance of thefindings of the survey in the context of thedebate concerning the relationship betweenmoral and economic values and the use of thecontingent valuation method to estimatepeople's wtp of policy options with moraldimensions. (shrink)

I argue that factory farming should be abolished consistent with the principles of classical liberalism. To make my case, I first argue that anti-cruelty is a commitment of classical liberalism. In Section 3, I explain how the commitments of classical liberalism, including a commitment to anti-cruelty, give us weighty reasons to abolish factory farming. Then, I consider and respond to the objection that the property rights of factory farmers override the strength of reasons for the abolition of factory farming. Finally, (...) I conclude by flagging some other possible implications of taking seriously a liberal commitment to anti-cruelty. (shrink)

The diachronic question of persons deals with personal identity over time: “In virtue of what conditions is a person, P1, at t1, the same person, P2, at t2?” To answer the question, I suggest expanding the constitution theory from a static definition to a dynamic definition. ‘Life’ is an event and the stream of consciousness is an event too. Reflective self-consciousness—which I take to be definitive of persons—is an event. Persons are irreducible constituted events who remain the same through time (...) while they undergo change. This idea faces neither the problem of substance dualism nor the fission problem. (shrink)

The expansion of research on deep brain stimulation (DBS) and adaptive DBS (aDBS) raises important neuroethics and policy questions related to data sharing. However, there has been little empirical research on the perspectives of experts developing these technologies. We conducted semi-structured, open-ended interviews with aDBS researchers regarding their data sharing practices and their perspectives on ethical and policy issues related to sharing. Researchers expressed support for and a commitment to sharing, with most saying that they were either sharing their data (...) or would share in the future and that doing so was important for advancing the field. However, those who are sharing reported a variety of sharing partners, suggesting heterogeneity in sharing practices and lack of the broad sharing that would reflect principles of open science. Researchers described several concerns and barriers related to sharing, including privacy and confidentiality, the usability of shared data by others, ownership and control of data (including potential commercialization), and limited resources for sharing. They also suggested potential solutions to these challenges, including additional safeguards to address privacy issues, standardization and transparency in analysis to address issues of data usability, professional norms and heightened cooperation to address issues of ownership and control, and streamlining of data transmission to address resource limitations. Researchers also offered a range of views on the sensitivity of neural activity data (NAD) and data related to mental health in the context of sharing. These findings are an important input to deliberations by researchers, policymakers, neuroethicists, and other stakeholders as they navigate ethics and policy questions related to aDBS research. (shrink)

In the debate about the moral status of human beings at the margins of life, arguments of species membership are often considered to be the least plausible ones. Against this backdrop, this article explores two possible ways to formulate feasible arguments of species membership. The first is an (in the broadest sense of the word) Aristotelian or neo‐Aristotelian argument; the second is an argument from the intrinsic logic of human rights, which Robert Spaemann refers toas a ‘transcendental‐pragmatic’ argument. On these (...) grounds, the article proposes a philosophical justification for an at least moderate speciesism. (shrink)

Many familial and cultural traditions rely on animals for their fulfillment - think of Christmas ham, Rosh Hashannah chicken soup, Fourth of July barbeques, and so forth. Though philosophers writing in animal ethics often dismiss interests in certain foods as trivial, these food-based traditions pose a significant moral problem for those who take animals’ lives and interests seriously. One must either turn one’s back on one’s community or on the animals. In this paper, I consider the under-theorized area of intra-cultural (...) critique. My focus is how we should think about and seek to resolve inter-animal conflicts of interest that arise within our own communities and cultural or religious groups. How should a theory that takes animals seriously approach a conflict between animals’ interests and culturally important human interests in the context of one’s own cultural, ethnic, or religious group? How, for example, should we think about the person staring down at a bowl of her grandmother’s chicken soup while recognizing the moral impermissibility of slaughtering chickens for human consumption? In contrast to traditional approaches that fail to take these robust, food-based, interests into account, I offer an ecofeminist approach that highlights the importance of respecting animals’ interests while also undertaking the work of moral repair to address damage done to relationships of love and care in the process. (shrink)

Preference utilitarians are concerned to maximize the autonomous choices of individuals; for this reason, they argue that nurses ought to advocate for those patients who desire assistance with ending their lives. This approach prompts us to consider, then, the moral validity of nursing involvement in measures intended to end the lives of patients. In this article, the terms of preference utilitarianism are set out and considered in order to determine whether this approach offers sufficient philosophical support for sanctioning a role (...) for nursing in euthanasia. Ultimately, it is found that preference utilitarianism is lacking in this respect, as well as in its fitness for guiding nursing activity in general. In particular, it is found that nurses are required to exchange a handmaiden relationship with the medical profession for an equally undignified relationship with patients. If nursing involvement in measures intended to end the lives of patients is to find sufficient philosophical support, then we need to look elsewhere. (shrink)

Considerations of ethical questions regarding pets should take into account the nature of human-pet relationships, in particular the uniquely combined features of mutual companionship, quasi-family-membership, proximity, direct contact, privacy, dependence, and partiality. The approaches to ethical questions about pets should overlap with those of animal ethics and family ethics, and so need not represent an isolated field of enquiry, but rather the intersection of those more established fields. This intersection, and the questions of how we treat our pets, present several (...) unique concerns and approaches for focused examination. (shrink)

This essay explores the two main objectives of Bishop’s book, which he analyzes in the context of the care for the dying: the medical metaphysics underlying medical science and biopolitics as governance of the human body. This essay discusses Bishop’s claims in view of newer developments in medicine, especially the turn to the construction of life, and confronts the concept of the patient’s sovereignty with an alternative model of vulnerable agency. In order to overcome the impasses of contemporary bioethics, the (...) essay argues that practical reason requires a two-fold ethics: first, it must develop a new hermeneutics of illness and disease, and second, in order to protect the individuals in the process of dying, moral claims concerning death must be based on the concept of human rights. (shrink)

First responders to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) events face decisions having significant human consequences. Some operational decisions are supported by standard operating procedures, yet these may not suffice for ethical decisions. Responders will be forced to weigh their options, factoring-in contextual peculiarities; they will require guidance on how they can approach novel (indeed unique) ethical problems: they need strategies for “on the spot” ethical decision making. The primary aim of this paper is to examine how first responders should (...) approach on the spot ethical decision-making amid the stress and uncertainty of a CBRN event. Drawing on the long-term professional CBRN experience of one of the authors, this paper sets out a series of practical ethical dilemmas potentially arising in the context of a large-scale chemical incident. We propose a broadly consequentialist approach to on the spot ethical decision-making, but one which incorporates ethical values and rights as “side-constraints”. (shrink)

According to ‘global institutionalism,’ individuals who do not share a state have duties of justice to one another, and this is explained, in part, by the institutional connections that obtain between them. In this chapter, I defend this view against two challenges. First, I consider challenges raised by ‘non-institutionalists,’ who deny that facts about global institutional interaction bear on the nature of duties of justice that arise between particular individuals. Second, I address challenges posed by ‘domestic institutionalists,’ who accept the (...) claim that facts about institutional interaction bear upon the scope of justice but deny that the right sort of interaction necessary to ground duties of justice is found in the global domain. (shrink)

Critically examining what most people take for granted is central to philosophical inquiry. Philosophers who accept positions on policy making commissions, tasks forces, or committees cannot, however, play the same uncompromisingly critical role in this capacity as they do in the classroom or in their personal research or writing. Still, philosophers have much to contribute to such bodies, and they can do so without compromising their integrity or betraying themselves as philosophers. Keywords: compromise, critical reflection, embryo research, integrity, organ transplantation, (...) policy development, Warnock Committee CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The British writer John Wyndham (1903–1969) explored societal effects of surprising or mystical events. A paradigmatic example is _The Midwich Cuckoos_ (1957), which portrays identical-looking children born without sexual intercourse. I propose a reading strategy that focuses on the fictional spatial order and analyses how the construction of the children’s otherness interferes with the village’s demarcation. Furthermore, I interpret the mysterious pregnancies as a reference to basic embryo research in the 1950s – cloning. Finally, I scrutinize Wyndham’s negotiation of utilitarianism (...) throughout the novel and his critique of truly utilitarian decisions that are based on constructions of Otherness. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to investigate changes and continuities of human moral systems from an evolutionary and socio-historical perspective. Specifically, I will argue that these systems can be approached through the lens of non-genetic inheritance systems and niche construction. I will examine morality from a comparative socio-historical perspective. From this, I suggest that these inheritance systems are cognitively scaffolded, and that these scaffolds are part of the nucleus of the historical Mesoamerican cosmovision.

A salient if under researched feature of the new age of global inequalities is the rise to prominence of entrepreneurial philanthropy, the pursuit of transformational social goals through philanthropic investment in projects animated by entrepreneurial principles. Super-wealthy entrepreneurs in this way extend their suzerainty from the domain of the economic to the domains of the social and political. We explore the ethics and ethical implications of entrepreneurial philanthropy through systematic comparison with what we call customary philanthropy, which preferences support for (...) established institutions and social practices. We analyse the ethical statements made at interview by 24 elite UK philanthropists, 12 customary and 12 entrepreneurial, to reveal the co-existence of two ethically charged narratives of elite philanthropic motivations, each instrumental in maintaining the established socio-economic order. We conclude that entrepreneurial philanthropy, as an ostensibly efficacious instrument of social justice, is ethically flawed by its unremitting impulse toward ideological purity. (shrink)

We can distinguish two kinds of moral universalization tests for practical principles. One requires that the universal practice of the principle, i.e., universal conformity to it by all agents in a given world, satisfies some condition. The other requires that conformity to the principle by any possible agent, in any situation and at any time, satisfies some condition. We can call these universal practice and universal applicability tests respectively. The logical distinction between these tests is rarely appreciated, and many philosophers (...) systematically confuse them with each other. In practice, UP tests are more frequently used to defend deontological norms, while UA tests are used to defend consequentialist norms. Both conceptual argument and practical examples of their applications will show that UA tests are decisively superior to UP tests for grounding moral norms, casting greater doubt upon deontological theories which rely upon the latter unless they can reformulate their arguments using some version of a UA test. (shrink)

In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty explains to Alice, “When I use a word … it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” When Alice questions this license, Humpty Dumpty replies, “The question is … which is to be master — that’s all.” The present article offers a lexicon of words that are used by human beings, however unintentionally or ingenuously, to maintain their mastery or prerogatives over other animals. A motivating (...) assumption of the article is that putting on display the verbal menagerie in animal agriculture, animal experimentation, and the rest of the industries and institutions that use nonhuman animals, could go a long way toward eliminating these enterprises, since they are built as much on equivocation as on exploitation. (shrink)

This article integrates empirical and normative discussions about why global economic inequalities matter in critically examining an approach known as derivative global egalitarianism (DGE). DGE is a burgeoning perspective that opposes excessive global economic inequality not based on the intrinsic value of equality but inequality's negative repercussions on other values. The article aims to advance the research agenda by identifying and critically evaluating four primary varieties of DGE arguments from related but distinct literatures, which span a number of disciplines, including (...) economics, international relations, and political philosophy. Overall, DGE offers a number of persuasive arguments as to why current levels of global inequality are of concern, but aspects of DGE beg further philosophical and empirical examination. By situating DGE within the wider theoretical and empirical contexts, this article provides resources for its critical assessment and theoretical development. (shrink)

This paper explores the debate between personists, who argue that the concept of a person if of central importance for moral thought, and personists, who argue that the concept of a human being is of greater moral significance. On the one hand, it argues that normative naturalism, the most ambitious defense of the humanist position, fails to identify moral standards with standards of human behavior and thereby fails to undermine the moral significance of personhood. At the same time, it contends (...) that a more focused attention on the morally relevant features of human life may indeed play a crucial role in enhancing our moral understanding. (shrink)

This contribution deals with the issue of the professional autonomy ofthe medical doctor. Worldwide, the physician's autonomy is guaranteedand limited, first of all, by Codes of Medical Ethics. InItaly, the latest version of the national Code of MedicalEthics (Code 1998) was published in 1998 by the Federation ofprovincial Medical Associations (FnomCeO). The Code 1998acknowledges the physician's autonomy regarding the scheduling, thechoice and application of diagnostic and therapeutic means, within theprinciples of professional responsibility. This responsibility has tomake reference to the following (...) fundamental ethical principles:(1) the protection of human life; (2) the protection of thephysical and psychological health of the human being; (3) therelief from pain; (4) the respect for the freedom and the dignityof the human person, without discrimination; (5) an up-to-datescientific qualification (Art. 5). The authors underline that autonomyis an anthropological – and consequently ethical –characteristic of the human person. Different positions on autonomy inbioethics (individualistic, evolutionistic, utilitarian andpersonalistic models) are explained. The relation between theprofessional autonomy of the physician and the autonomy of the patientand of colleagues is discussed. In fact, the medical doctor isobliged: (1) to respect the fundamental rights of the person,first of all his/her life; (2) to ensure the continuity of thecare, even if he can only relieve the patient's suffering; (3) tomaintain, except under certain circumstances, professional secrecy andconfidentiality regarding patients and their medical records. Moreover,the physician cannot deny the patient correct and appropriateinformation. He/she should not perform any diagnostic or therapeuticactivity without the informed consent of the patient and the medicaldoctor must give up medical treatment in case of documented refusal ofthe individual. Furthermore, the medical doctor has the right to raiseconscientious objections if he/she is requested to perform medicalactions that are contrary to his/her conscience or medical opinion,unless this attitude would seriously and immediately harm the patient.Regarding the relationships with colleagues, the physician is obliged tosolidarity, mutual respect, and care of sick colleagues. Finally, theauthors discuss the Italian legislation affecting the physician'sprofessional autonomy: (1) the SSN health care Acts; (2) theso-called Charter for Public Health Care Services; (3) the Acts onprivacy; (4) Good Clinical Practice. (shrink)

In this paper I outline an approach to managerial decision making that incorporates the important role that metaphors and moral imagination play in our moral reasoning coupled with an organisational moral concept I call the Health of the Organisation. I have used this concept in my managerial (and philosophical) career to interpret and evaluate potential, and actual, courses of action. I have concluded that this concept fits in nicely with Mark Johnson’s analysis of the metaphor of morality is health, which (...) he argues is one of the central moral metaphors in the conceptual framework that we use to interpret and evaluate actions from a reasonable moral point of view. He argues that metaphors are the essential components in defining the rational mental framework utilised in interpreting, evaluating, predicting likely outcomes from various alternatives, and choosing morally acceptable courses of action. I argue that the metaphor morality is health explicated as the Health of the Organisation can serve as an antidote to the unimaginative moral decision making processes that Patricia Werhane has shown can result in bad moral decisions. I do this by demonstrating that a healthy organisation is one that is optimally functional. This means that the components that make up the organisation are so structured that there is no better possible organisational arrangement available for achieving the goals designed to ensure successful performance in the marketplace. (shrink)

Rescher is a key figure in ‘new American pragmatist philosophy’. His work shares many commonalities with critical realism and engaging with it is always a rewarding experience. In this paper I set out the key features of his work on evolution and intelligent design, Productive Evolution: On Reconciling Evolution with Intelligent Design, and then address the weaknesses in the argument. The central strength of the argument is its innovative approach to the meaning of intelligent design in its relation to evolution. (...) I use an analysis of the text to then consider what this suggests in terms of the nuance of immanent critique as realist concept. (shrink)

The current voluntary posthumous organ donation policy fails to provide sufficient organs to meet the demand. In these circumstances xenografts have been regarded as an expedient solution. The public perception seems to be that the only impediments to this technology are technical and biological. There are, however, important ethical issues raised by xenotransplantation that need to be considered as a matter of urgency. When the ethical issues raised by using non-human animals to provide replacement organs for human beings are considered (...) in a wider context and the possible alternatives to xenotransplantation are taken into account, a new dimension is added to the debate. In this broader context it is argued that a less ethically problematic solution is to adopt a presumed consent or opt-out organ procurement policy to regulate posthumous organ harvesting from humans. If there are still too few organs available, then the whole question of transplantation must be reassessed. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with ethical factors surrounding germline gene therapy. Such implications include intergenerational responsibility, human dignity, moral status of embryos and so on. I will explore the relevance of the above mentioned issues to discuss the ethical implication of human germline gene therapy (HGLT). We will see that most of arguments claimed by bioethicists do not provide valid reason to oppose HGLT. I will propose an alternative view, based on personal identity issues, to discuss the ethics of (...) human inheritable gene modification. (shrink)

Choosing for whom to work is one of the most difficult ethical questions public relations practitioners have to address. This article attempts to examine the issue of client choice in the philosophical context of universalism versus ethical relativism. In this article, while acknowledging that differences between cultures exist, I argue public relations practitioners should take a universalistic approach in choosing their clients because ethical relativism itself is seriously flawed.

Janet E. Smith; I Knit You in Your Mother's Womb, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 8, Issue 2, 1 January 2002, Pages 125–.

The aim of the present thesis is twofold: first, to analyse some practical ethical problems that stem from the workplace and the working environment and to offer guidelines concerning how such problems can be solved; second, to illuminate how the specific nature of work and the working environment is intimately connected to the relation between the employee and the employing entity, as set forth in an employment contract, and how the form and content of such contracts are, among other things, (...) determined by culturally and socially established ideas. The normative question to be addressed is thus: which of these ideas should be maintained? This can be seen as a second-order, or more fundamental, ethical question whose answer depends on determining which normative principles are right. An additional aim of this thesis is thus to illuminate that the contract relation has relevance to practical ethical problems in the workplace context in this second-order mode. The thesis consists of an Introduction and five papers. In Paper I we argue that employees have a prima facie right to privacy, but that this right can be overridden by competing moral principles that follow, explicitly or implicitly, from the contract of employment. A set of ethical criteria is developed and summarized in the form of a guideline for determining the moral status of infringements into workplace privacy. In Paper II these criteria are applied to three broad classes of privacy-intrusive workplace practices: monitoring and surveillance, genetic testing, and drug testing. In relation to some scenarios on these themes, it is shown that it is possible to handle such practical ethical problems systematically by way of the proposed guideline. Paper III deals with the fact that employees are protected by health and safety standards that are less protective than those that apply to the general public. Emphasis is put on the distinction between exposure and risk, and this distinction is claimed to be a key determinant for the relevance of arguments put forward in support of such double standards. In Paper IV the nature of the contract of employment is explored from an ethical point of view. An argument is developed against the claim that the individual’s freedom of decision and the practice of institutional arrangements are sufficient to justify a contract of employment. Paper V questions the standpoint that the voluntariness of the contracting parties in an employment relationship has substantial value. One overarching issue concerns the meaning of voluntariness in the employment context, another, its normative importance. It is argued that it is indeterminate exactly where the line should be drawn between voluntary and non–voluntary agreements in this context. Concerning the latter issue, it is claimed that even if we were able to draw such a line, this fact does not tell us anything about the normative importance of the voluntariness condition, nor how much normative weight we should assign to the fulfilment of its conditions in the workplace context. (shrink)