Tercera Cultura: #TheLibro es una introducción a las ciencias cognitivas -Psicología, Lingüística, Filosofía, Neurociencia, Antropología, Inteligencia Artificial- escrita en un lenguaje simple y claro, ilustrado con ejemplos de la cultura popular, dirigido a estudiantes y geeks de todas las edades.

Studies of animal culture have not normally included a consideration of cetaceans. However, with several long-term field studies now maturing, this situation should change. Animal culture is generally studied by either investigating transmission mechanisms experimentally, or observing patterns of behavioural variation in wild populations that cannot be explained by either genetic or environmental factors. Taking this second, ethnographic, approach, there is good evidence for cultural transmission in several cetacean species. However, only the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops) has been shown experimentally to (...) possess sophisticated social learning abilities, including vocal and motor imitation; other species have not been studied. There is observational evidence for imitation and teaching in killer whales. For cetaceans and other large, wide-ranging animals, excessive reliance on experimental data for evidence of culture is not productive; we favour the ethnographic approach. The complex and stable vocal and behavioural cultures of sympatric groups of killer whales (Orcinus orca) appear to have no parallel outside humans, and represent an independent evolution of cultural faculties. The wide movements of cetaceans, the greater variability of the marine environment over large temporal scales relative to that on land, and the stable matrilineal social groups of some species are potentially important factors in the evolution of cetacean culture. There have been suggestions of gene-culture coevolution in cetaceans, and culture may be implicated in some unusual behavioural and life-history traits of whales and dolphins. We hope to stimulate discussion and research on culture in these animals. (shrink)

Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit (...) justification, it is not clear why or whether this should be the case. Ethics regulations guiding human subject research include principles such as respect for persons—and related duties—that are required as a matter of justice while regulations guiding animal subject research attend only to highly circumscribed considerations of welfare. Further, the regulations guiding research on animals discount any consideration of animal welfare relative to comparable human welfare. This paper explores two of the most promising justifications for these differences␣between the two sets of regulations. The first potential justification points to lesser moral status for animals on the basis of their lesser capacities. The second potential justification relies on a claim about the permissibility of moral partiality as␣found in common morality. While neither potential justification is sufficient to justify the regulatory difference as it stands, there is possible common ground between supporters of some regulatory difference and those rejecting the current difference. (shrink)

I selectively and critically review the state of knowledge about human evolution and the place of humans vis-à-vis living apes, with emphasis on bipedal posture and locomotion, expansion of the brain and associated cognitive capacities, speech, tool behavior, culture, and society. I end with a personal perspective on God and Heaven.

There is now increasing evidence for significant ?moral universals??that is, patterns of ethical principles that are recognized by virtually every human society. James Q. Wilson has assembled an engaging collection of this evidence for the existence of a ?moral sense.? At least in regard to the universality of the key features of sympathy and a sense of fairness or reciprocity, Wilson is right. Indeed, these features are even more universal than Wilson realizes: they extend to our closest nonhuman relatives as (...) well. Yet the claim that these facts are best accounted for by positing the existence of a ?moral sense? remains vague. Particularly when we consider what Wilson calls ?the universal aspiration,? the basis of this tendency in our moral thinking is as likely to lie in our capacity to reason as in our moral sentiments. (shrink)

De modo semelhante aos rompantes etnocêntricos de uma cultura humana frente a outras, as relações entre humanos e primatas não humanos incluem um estranhamento pontuado por atração e repulsa, identificação e diferença. Ciência, arte e mitologia são a expressão viva e atualizada disso. Desde 1960, a primatologia destaca-se nesse cenário por contribuir significativamente na revisão das definições sobre o comportamento dos primatas e, consequentemente, na redefinição do humano ao apresentar a polêmica proposição de existência de "culturas" entre animais não humanos. (...) Assim, a aproximação entre humanos e primatas não humanos parece inexorável e irreversível. Isso implica, por exemplo, em cogitar se esse processo engendra, ou não, a constituição de novas alteridades a partir de um novo outro (não humano), carregado de significados. Isso incluiria, por exemplo, a reformulação de representações e de categorias de classificação, bem como o aprofundamento do debate sobre os direitos dos animais não humanos. Ao dirigir tal tipo de desafio a situações de pesquisa antropológica deve-se ter aguda consciência de que o registro etnográfico das relações entre humanos e os outros primatas será uma construção empírica, perceptual e teórica. Dado o tipo particular de relação estabelecida entre humanos e outros primatas, pautada em um universo fronteiriço de incômodas semelhanças e diferenças, constituem-se aí coletivos híbridos em que o alcance e a profundidade das interações possíveis ainda são desconhecidos. The relations between humans and non-human primates resemble the ethnocentric reaction of one human culture in relation to others, and include an estrangement marked by attraction and rejection, identification and differentiation. Art, science and myths are the vivid and updated expression of these phenomena. Since the 1960's primatology stands out in that scenario for contributing significantly to the revision of the definitions about the behavior of primates and, consequently, for the redefinition of human beings, and for making the controversial proposal of the existence of non-human animal "cultures". Then, the close connection between humans and non-human primates seems relentless and irreversible - and raises the question on whether or not these processes engender a new kind of otherness deriving from a non-human other that is full of meaning. This would include, for example, the reformulation of the representations and categories of classification, as well as deepening the debate about the rights of non-human animals. When the challenge is taken up in situations of anthropological research that address the relationships between human beings and the other primates, the ethnographic register that describes the relations between human beings and other primates will be an equally sharp empirical, perceptual and theoretical construction. Given the peculiar type of relationship established between human beings and other primates, implemented in a frontier universe of uncomfortable similarities and differences, they constituted a hybrid collective where interactions are possible but we do not know exactly how complex or how depth they are. (shrink)

During the past decades, our image ofHomo neanderthalensishas changed dramatically. Initially, Neanderthals were seen as primitive brutes. Increasingly, however, Neanderthals are regarded as basically human. New discoveries and technologies have led to an avalanche of data, and as a result of that it becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint what the difference between modern humans and Neanderthals really is. And yet, the persistent quest for a minimal difference which separates them from us is still noticeable in Neanderthal research. Neanderthal discourse is (...) a vantage point from which the logic of ‘us’ versus ‘other’ is critically reconsidered. Studying contemporary academic literature and science autobiographies from an oblique perspective, focusing not on Neanderthals as objects, but on the dynamics of interaction between Neanderthal researchers and their finds, basic convictions at work in this type of research are retrieved. What is at issue is not the actual distinction between modern humans and Neanderthals, but rather the dualistic construction of human and nonhuman. Neanderthal understanding is affected by the desire to safeguard human uniqueness. The overall trend is to identify the human mark or spark, which defines us as favoured ‘winners’. The paradoxes emerging in contemporary Neanderthal discourse are symptomatic of the fact that a dualistic style of thinking is no longer tenable. (shrink)

Historically, crises have spawned deliberate, widespread efforts to change a culture's worldviews. Anthropologists have characterized such efforts as “revitalization movements” and speculated that many of the world's religions, including Christianity, arose through revitalization. Some responses to the planet's environmental crisis share the characteristics of both a revitalization movement and an incipient religion. They call for a science‐based cosmology and an encompassing reverence for nature, and thus differ from responses to environmental decline offered by traditional religions. As environmental problems deepen, historical (...) precedent suggests that religious shifts in affected cultures may follow. (shrink)

In the last 25 years writing in bioethics, particularly in medical ethics, has generally claimed that action is ethically acceptable only if it receives informed consent from those affected. However, informed consent provides only limited justification, and may provide even less as new information technologies are used to store and handle personal data, including personal genetic data. The central philosophical weakness of relying on informed consent procedures for ethical justification is that consent is a propositional attitude, so referentially opaque: consent (...) is given to specific propositions describing limited aspects of a situation, and does not transfer even to closely related propositions. Assembling genetic data in databases creates additional difficulties for ethical justification. This is not because genetic information is intrinsically exceptional, but because the merger of genetic and information technologies make it possible to assemble massive quantities of complex information that defeat individuals' best efforts to grasp what is at stake, or to give or withhold informed consent. The future agenda for bioethics will need to take account of both these limitations of appeals to informed consent. (shrink)

A dissociated area of medical research warrants bioethical consideration: a proposed transplantation of a donor’s entire body, except head, to a patient with a fatal degenerative disease. The seeming improbability of such an operation can only underscore the need for thorough bioethical assessment: Not assessing a case of such potential ethical import, by showing neglect instead of facing the issue, can only compound the ethical predicament, perhaps eroding public trust in ethical medicine. This article discusses the historical background of full-body (...) transplantation, documents the seriousness of its current pursuit, and builds an argument for why prima facie this type of transplant is bioethically distinct. Certainly, this examination can only be preliminary, indicating what should be a wide and vigorous discussion among practitioners and ethicists. It concludes with practical suggestions for how the medical and bioethics community may proceed with ethical assessment. (shrink)

Currently, some philosophers and technicians propose to change the fundamental constitution of Homo sapiens, as by significantly altering the genome, implanting microchips in the brain, and pursuing related techniques. Among these proposals are aspirations to guide humanity’s evolution into new species. Some philosophers have countered that such species alteration is unethical and have proposed international policies to protect species integrity; yet, it remains unclear on what basis such right to species integrity would rest. An answer may come from an unexpected (...) angle of rights issues: Some cultures have indicated that they want no part of our technological culture, preferring to retain their practices. Yet, rights documents do not explicitly establish that any individual has a right to species integrity. Careful interpretation of rights documents nonetheless reveals that such a right to species integrity is implicit. Interpreting these so as to reveal this needed right is also necessary to retain the foundations of rights documents and institutions. Further, acknowledging a right of species integrity could mean, because of practicalities, a limit to the freedom of proponents to implement proposals to manipulate the species. (shrink)

As engineers propose constructing humanlike automata, the question arises as to whether such machines merit human rights. The issue warrants serious and rigorous examination, although it has not yet cohered into a conversation. To put it into a sure direction, this paper proposes phrasing it in terms of whether humans are morally obligated to extend to maximally humanlike automata full human rights, or those set forth in common international rights documents. This paper’s approach is to consider the ontology of humans (...) and of automata and whether ontological difference between them, that pertains to the very bases of human rights, affects the latter’s claims to full human rights. Considering common bases of human rights, can these bases tell us whether a certain ontological distinction of humans from automata—or a de facto distinction about humans tacitly acknowledged by full-rights-recognizing societies—makes a difference in whether humans are morally obligated to assign these entities full rights? Human rights to security also arise. The conclusion is that humans need not be under any moral obligation to confer full human rights on automata. The paper’s ultimate point is not to close the discussion with this ontological cap but to set a solid moral and legal groundwork for opening it up tout court. (shrink)

In this paper I defend a theory of welfare rights for nonhuman animals. I do this by demonstrating that a well-established framework for protecting the interests of farm animals, the ‘Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare’, is already functioning just as a set of rights. To support this claim I adopt a common approach to detecting evidence for deontological reasoning and look at the structural features of rights. I first consider Hohfeld’s system of legal rights and consider whether the Five Freedoms (...) may be understood as liberties or claim rights, before making a more successful comparison with side constraints and an interest theory of rights as understood by Nozick and Raz. I also respond to a likely objection that it is not possible to have some welfare rights without a right to freedom from exploitation. The argument therefore contributes to breaking down the stubborn division between ‘animal welfare’ and ‘animal rights’. (shrink)

To the three classic wounds to human narcissism – that of Copernicus , Darwin , and Freud – there must be appended a fourth wound: man is not the only subject in the universe. While most philoso- phers are unwilling to accept it, ethological research shows that animals are also subjects; indeed, in human/animal hybrid communities, certain animals can become individuals or even persons. Through animal biography, anec- dotes, and other often disqualified but nonethe- less empirical forms of knowledge, we (...) can come to know these singular animals. (shrink)

Speaking: from Intention to Articulation Willem J. M. Levelt, 1989 (1993 paperback) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press ISBN: 0–262–12137–9(hb), 0–262–62089–8(pb)Rules for Reasoning Richard E. Nisbett (Ed.), 1993 Hillsdale, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates ISBN: 0–8058–1256–3(hb), 0–8085–1257–1 (pb)Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science Alvin I. Goldman, 1993 Cambridge, MA, MIT Press ISBN: 0–262–07153–3(hb), 0–262–57100–5(pb)Language Comprehension in Ape and Child, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Serial No. 233, Vol. 58, Nos 3–4 Sue Savage‐Rumbaugh, Jeannine Murphy, Rose A. Sevcik, Karen E. (...) Brakke, Shelly L. Williams & Duane M. Rumbaugh, with commentary by Elizabeth Bates, and a reply by the authors, 1993 Chicago: University of Chicago Press ISBN: 0–226–73542–7Language, Music and Mind Diana Raffman, 1993 Cambridge, MIT Press/Bradford Books ISBN: 0–262–18150–9Psychology of Proof Lance J. Rips, 1994 Cambridge, MA, MIT Press ISBN: 0–262–18153–3Human and Machine Thinking P. Johnson‐Laird, 1993 Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum ISBN: 0–8058–0921‐XIntelligent Behavior in Animals and Robots David McFarland & Thomas Bosser, 1993 Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press/ Bradford Books ISBN: 0–262–13293–1The Eye and the Mind: Reflections on Perception and the Problem of Knowledge Charles Landesman, 1993 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers ISBN: 0–7923–2586–9The Moral Self GilG. Noam & Thomas E. Wren (Eds), in cooperation with Gertud Nunner‐Winkler & Wolfgang Edelstein, 1993 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press ISBN: 0–262–14052–1The Logic of Discovery: A Theory of the Rationality of Scientific Research Scott A. Kleiner, 1993 Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers ISBN: 0–7923–2371–8Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind S.M. Christenson & D.R. Turner (Eds), 1993 Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum ISBN: 0–805–80931–7. (shrink)

The advanced sensory, psychological and social abilities of chimpanzees confer upon them a profound ability to suffer when born into unnatural captive environments, or captured from the wild – as many older research chimpanzees once were – and when subsequently subjected to confinement, social disruption, and involuntary participation in potentially harmful biomedical research. Justifications for such research depend primarily on the important contributions advocates claim it has made toward medical advancements. However, a recent large-scale systematic review indicates that invasive chimpanzee (...) experiments rarely provide benefits in excess of their profound animal welfare, bioethical and financial costs. The approval of large numbers of these experiments – particularly within the US – therefore indicates a failure of the ethics committee system. By 2008, legislative or policy bans or restrictions on invasive great ape experimentation existed in seven European countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In continuing to conduct such experiments on chimpanzees and other great apes, the US was almost completely isolated internationally. In 2007, however, the US National Institutes of Health National Center for Research Resources implemented a permanent funding moratorium on chimpanzee breeding, which is expected to result in a major decline in laboratory chimpanzee numbers over the next 30 years, as most are retired or die. Additionally, in 2008, The Great Ape Protection Act was introduced to Congress. The bill proposed to end invasive research and testing on an estimated 1,200 chimpanzees confined within US laboratories, and, for approximately 600 federally-owned, to ensure their permanent retirement to sanctuaries. These events have created an unprecedented opportunity for US legislators, researchers, and others, to consider a global ban on invasive chimpanzee research. Such a ban would not only uphold the best interests of chimpanzees, and other research fields presently deprived of funding, but would also increase the compliance of US animal researchers with internationally-accepted animal welfare and bioethical standards. It could even result in the first global moratorium on invasive research, for any non-human species, unless conducted in the best interests of the individual or species. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 147-153 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals Steven M. Wise. Foreward by Jane Goodall. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books, 2000. pp. 384. US $17.50. ISBN 0-7382-0437-4 (Paperback) "Ancient philosophers claimed that all nonhuman animals had been designed and placed on this earth just for human beings. Ancient jurists (...) declared that law had been created just for human beings. Although philosophy and science have long since recanted, the law has not." Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage, p. 4. Readers of this journal are well-versed in the myriad ways in which nonhuman animals are harmfully exploited at the hands of human beings—from battery hens and veal calves to mass-produced pigs; from Pennsylvania pigeon shoots to canned hunts on Texas ranches; from rodeos to roadside zoos; from LD-50 toxicity tests on rats and Draize eye tests on rabbits to head trauma and infectious disease experimentation on primates. Despite other sticking points, it is by now uncontroversial among [End Page 147] nonanthropocentric theorists that, in utilitarian terms, the benefits to humans of the above practices fall far short of justifying the harms they cause to their nonhuman victims or, in deontological terms, that they violate the rights of creatures with inherent value. Indeed, these arguments are so well-rehearsed and so widely regarded as compelling that it no longer seems particularly bold to predict that if reason ever prevails over tradition and prejudice, the future will look back on this generation's treatment of our fellow creatures with the same kind of shame and condemnation with which European Americans regard our slaveholding past.More sobering but equally familiar is the observation that decisive arguments for the gross immorality of existing practices will bring about neither their elimination nor significant reform as long as the presumed legitimacy of human exploitation of nonhuman beings remains entrenched in both popular consciousness and economic, political, and legal institutions. In the interests of chipping away at popular apathy, academics should no doubt go on repeating the well-worn arguments against speciesism in classrooms, popular venues, and professional research. But in a world structured far more directly by the interests of a powerful few than by the values of the many, this consciousness-raising strategy properly plays at most a supporting role to the even more vital project of challenging and ultimately restructuring the institutions that sanction and carry out these injustices. In short, what nonhuman animals need from ethically sensitive intellectuals is not just rational argument, but effective legal and political action.One of the main institutional obstacles to progress in this area is undoubtedly the legal relegation of animals to property status—which is why Steve M. Wise's Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals is such an important book. Wise teaches animal rights law at Harvard, Vermont, and John Marshall Law Schools and has spent more than twenty years fighting for animals in the legal system; his book displays the bittersweet fruit of that experience. The tenor throughout is a mixture of conviction in the justice of his cause—which cannot but sustain a vision of its eventual success—together with the frustration and determined patience borne from decades of butting up against an utterly implacable wall. An eloquent foreword by Jane Goodall, together with Wise's own harrowing first chapter, describe the nightmarish existences imposed on our nearest nonhuman relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos, for the sake of science, entertainment, and profit—nightmares enabled by a legal system that [End Page 148] treats all nonhumans as mere things. An engaging storyteller with a synthetic conception of the history of ideas, Wise unearths the origins of this conception of animals in the Great Chain of Being, demonstrates its defeat by Darwinian science, and builds piece by piece a case—drawing heavily on research into animal consciousness—for extending legal rights at least to chimpanzees and bonobos.The substantive theses of this case are, first, that the denial of... (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 10, Page 42-43, October 2011.

In standard cases of discrimination the interests of the discriminatees are considered comparatively worse than those of others. Accordingly, discrimination is often defined as some form of differential consideration or treatment which, among other features, entails a disadvantage for discriminatees. There are some apparent forms of nonstandard discrimination, however, in which it seems that this need not occur. This paper examines three of them: epistemic discrimination, discrimination against entities unable to be harmed by it and nonhierarchical segregation. If, as it (...) seems, these really are forms of discrimination that means standard definitions may fail or must be reinterpreted. There is a way to account for the mentioned nonstandard forms of discrimination by claiming that all forms of worse consideration or treatment can be considered discriminatory. This, however, entails interpreting the term “worse” in a very broad manner, and some may not find this solution intuitive. Despite this, the paper will argue that alternative accounts entail more serious problems. (shrink)

Burgess-Jackson argues that the duties we have to our companion animals are similar to the duties we have to our children. Specifically, he argues that a person who takes custody of either a nonhuman animal or a child elevates the moral status of the child or animal, endowing each with rights neither had before. These rights obligate that person to provide for the well being of the creature—animal or child—in question. This paper offers two arguments against this position. First, a (...) creature's rights rest solely on the creature's intrinsic properties. Thus, the person taking custody of a creature does not endow the creature with new rights. Rather, the custodian assumes the responsibilities associated with ensuring that the creature's rights are protected and preserved. Second, our children possess intrinsic properties and, hence, rights—most important, the right to life—that our pets lack. This difference undermines the analogy on which Burgess-Jackson's argument depends. Our pets are not like our children, as Burgess-Jackson claims. Instead, they are more akin to our slaves. (shrink)

This paper considers the hotly debated issue of whether one should grant moral and legal personhood to intelligent robots once they have achieved a certain standard of sophistication based on such criteria as rationality, autonomy, and social relations. The starting point for the analysis is the European Parliament’s resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics and its recommendation that robots be granted legal status and electronic personhood. The resolution is discussed against the background of the so-called Robotics Open Letter, which (...) is critical of the Civil Law Rules on Robotics. The paper reviews issues related to the moral and legal status of intelligent robots and the notion of legal personhood, including an analysis of the relation between moral and legal personhood in general and with respect to robots in particular. It examines two analogies, to corporations and animals, that have been proposed to elucidate the moral and legal status of robots. The paper concludes that one should not ascribe moral and legal personhood to currently existing robots, given their technological limitations, but that one should do so once they have achieved a certain level at which they would become comparable to human beings. (shrink)

Recently there has been a somewhat surprising interest among Kantian theorists in the moral standing of animals, coupled with a no less surprising optimism among these theorists about the prospect of incorporating animal moral standing into Kantian theory without contorting its other attractive features. These theorists contend in particular that animal standing can be incorporated into Kantian moral theory without abandoning its logocentrism: the claim that everything that is valuable depends for its value on its relation to rationality. In this (...) essay I raise doubts about the prospects for accommodating animal moral standing within a logocentric Kantianism. I argue instead that the best way to incorporate animal moral standing into Kantian theory is to admit more radical departures from Kant’s position by maintaining that consciousness is a locus of moral standing independent from rationality. I propose that we should attribute moral standing to all conscious animals because the capacity of consciousness is the criterion distinguishing individuals whose well-being generates reasons from individuals whose well-being fails to do so. We need such a criterion because we speak of the well-being of things, such as artifacts and meteorological phenomena, which clearly lack moral standing. Having already argued against the Kantian view that the criterion of moral standing is rationality, I proceed to argue that consciousness is also superior to its other principal rival for the criterion of moral standing: life. On the view that emerges from this discussion, we have obligations to show concern for conscious individuals by treating their well-being as providing us with reasons for action; the view thus endorses the criterion of moral standing typically advanced by utilitarians. On this view we also have a distinct class of obligations to show respect for conscious rational individuals; the view thus endorses the Kantian claim that persons have a distinctive moral status in virtue of their possession of rational capacities. In this essay thus begin to show how a principal insight of each leading approach to modern moral theory may be captured in a unified theory. (shrink)

This paper explores how embryos have been representedin law. It argues that two main models haveunderpinned legal discourse concerning the embryo. Onediscourse, which has become increasingly prevalent,views embryos as legal subjects or persons. Suchrepresentations are facilitated by technologicaldevelopments such as ultrasound imaging. In additionto influencing Parliamentary debate prior to thepassage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act1990, images of embryos as persons featureprominently in popular culture, including advertisingand films, and this discourse came to the fore in the`orphaned embryo' debate in (...) 1996. The main opposingdiscourse dismisses embryos as commodifiable objects,which fits with a trend towards legal recognition thatreproductive materials such as sperm may be classifiedas property which may be donated or sold. In thecase of cryo-preserved embryos these competingperspectives have resulted in litigation over thestatus of frozen embryos. In this paper I argue thatit might be productive to shift the debate from thispolarised dispute over whether embryos matter or not,whether they are pre-persons or commodities. Instead,I suggest that we should attempt to locate them in abiotechnological milieu, where cyborg metaphors may beutilised, and questions of how we should treat embryoswould be contextualised alongside our response toother cyborgs. (shrink)

The time is ripe for a greater interrogation of assumptions and commitments underlying an emerging common ground on the ethics of animal research as well on the 3 R (replacement, refinement, reduction) approach that parallels, and perhaps even further shapes, it. Recurring pressures to re-evaluate the moral status of some animals in research comes as much from within the relevant sciences as without. It seems incredible, in the light of what we now know of such animals as chimpanzees, to deny (...) that these animals are properly accorded high moral status. Barring the requirement that they be human, it is difficult to see what more animals such as chimpanzees would have to possess to acquire it. If the grounds for ascribing high moral status are to be non-arbitrary and responsive to our best knowledge of those individuals who possess the relevant features, we should expect that a sound ethical experimental science will periodically reassess the moral status of their research subjects as the relevant knowledge demands. We already can observe this reassessment as scientists committed to humane experimental science incorporate discoveries of enrichment tools and techniques into their housing and use of captive research animals. No less should this reassessment include a critical reflection on the possible elevation of moral status of certain research animals in light of what is discovered regarding their morally significant properties, characteristics or capacities, or so I will argue. To do anything short of this threatens the social and moral legitimacy of animal research. (shrink)

Peter Singer’s views on the status of nonhuman animals have attracted both attention and intense controversy in many Western countries, including the United States, Canada, and Germany. The reactions to his theories in France are less well known. The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of critical responses to Singer by French academics and thinkers. How have they received Singer’s contention that we must bring nonhuman animals within the sphere of moral concern? Do French scholars agree with (...) his utilitarian argument on marginal cases, his definition of the term “person,” his defense of the Great Ape Project? Finally, is he considered in France a brilliant and groundbreaking ethicist, a dangerous extremist, or somewhere in between? (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the international implications of liberal theories which extend justice to sentient animals. In particular, it asks whether they imply that coercive military intervention in a state by external agents to prevent, halt or minimise violations of basic animal rights can be justified. In so doing, it employs Simon Caney's theory of humanitarian intervention and applies it to non-human animals. It argues that while humane intervention can be justified in principle using Caney's assumptions, justifying any particular intervention on (...) behalf of animals is much more difficult – and in present circumstances impossible. If these claims are correct, a number of important conclusions follow. First, all states lack legitimacy because of the horrors that they inflict upon animals. As a result of this, all states are prima facie liable to intervention by external agents. To remedy this situation, all states have the responsibility to massively transform their relationsh... (shrink)

In recent years there has been growing scholarly interest in the relationship between bioethics and human rights. The majority of this work has proposed that the normative and institutional frameworks of human rights can usefully be employed to address those bioethical controversies that have a global reach: in particular, to the genetic modification of human beings, and to the issue of access to healthcare. In response, a number of critics have urged for a degree of caution about applying human rights (...) to such controversies. In particular, they have claimed that human rights have unresolved distributive and foundational problems. Interestingly, however, some of these critics have gone on to suggest that it might be possible to draw on certain bioethical insights to remedy these problems with human rights. This paper evaluates these recent attempts to apply insights from bioethics to the theory and practice of human rights. It argues that while these insights do not constitute an entirely new and original contribution to human rights thinking, they do force human rights scholars and campaigners to reflect on some key issues. First of all, they force us to question the prevalent idea that human rights are always 'inviolable trumps'. Secondly, they demand that we pay close attention to the 'fairness' of the institutions we charge with determining our concrete rights. And finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the notion that human rights are held exclusively by members of the human species. (shrink)

In recent years there has been growing scholarly interest in the relationship between bioethics and human rights. The majority of this work has proposed that the normative and institutional frameworks of human rights can usefully be employed to address those bioethical controversies that have a global reach: in particular, to the genetic modification of human beings, and to the issue of access to healthcare. In response, a number of critics have urged for a degree of caution about applying human rights (...) to such controversies. In particular, they have claimed that human rights have unresolved distributive and foundational problems. Interestingly, however, some of these critics have gone on to suggest that it might be possible to draw on certain bioethical insights to remedy these problems with human rights. This paper evaluates these recent attempts to apply insights from bioethics to the theory and practice of human rights. It argues that while these insights do not constitute an entirely new and original contribution to human rights thinking, they do force human rights scholars and campaigners to reflect on some key issues. First of all, they force us to question the prevalent idea that human rights are always ‘inviolable trumps’. Secondly, they demand that we pay close attention to the ‘fairness’ of the institutions we charge with determining our concrete rights. And finally, and perhaps most radically, these insights challenge the notion that human rights are held exclusively by members of the human species. (shrink)

Capps and Lederman, in a paper published in this journal in 2015, argued that, at the time, the dismal circumstances of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa was an opportunity to revisit public health responses to emergent infectious diseases. Using a One Health lens, they argued for an ecological perspective—one that looked to respond to zoonoses as an environmental as well as public health concern. Using Ebola virus disease as an example, they suggested shared immunity as a strategy to vaccinate (...) both humans and great apes. Since then, vaccination as a conservation strategy in this case has been debated and at least one great ape vaccination trial has been proposed: some, however, are less convinced of the ethical arguments to pursue vaccinating wild animals. Using this opportunity, we review Capps and Lederman’s arguments and directly respond to the plausible objections to them. (shrink)

In this article I review the anthology Experiencing Animal Minds: An Anthology of Animal-Human Encounters, edited by Julie A. Smith and Robert W. Mitchell. Apart from providing an overview of the arguments proposed in the book, I propose Jakob von Uexküll’s (1909/1985) idea that we should get rid of the anthropocentric prejudice that animal lives belong to the same frame as ours. The animal other has to be studied from his or her own perspective, not from ours, as we try (...) to reconsider from the right perspective the ontological break of the single word "animal" proposed by Jacques Derrida (2008). (shrink)

Like many humans in the wake of genocide and war, most wildlife today has sustained trauma. High rates of mortality, habitat destruction, and social breakdown precipitated by human actions are unprecedented in history. Elephants are one of many species dramatically affected by violence. Although elephant communities have processes, rituals, and social structures for responding to trauma—grieving, mourning, and socialization—the scale, nature, and magnitude of human violence have disrupted their ability to use these practices. Absent the cultural, carrier groups who traditionally (...) lead and teach these healing practices, humans must assume the role. Trauma theory has brought attention to victims' severe, sustained psychological damage. Looking through the lens of trauma theory provides a better understanding of how systematic violence has affected individuals and groups and how the pervasive nature of traumatic events affects human-nonhuman animal relationships. The framing of recent trauma theory compels conservationists to create new relationships—neither anthropocentric nor powerbased—with nonhuman animals. The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust, Kenya, shows how humans, taking on the role of interspecies witness, bring orphan elephants back to health and help re-build elephant communities shattered by genocide. (shrink)

Animals have moral standing; that is, they have properties (including the ability to feel pain) that qualify them for the protections of morality. It follows from this that humans have moral obligations toward animals, and because rights are logically correlative to obligations, animals have rights.

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,'' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and (...) when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. (shrink)

Entry for the Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy.

Humans are animals; humans are machines. The current academic and popular dialogue on extending the personhood boundary to certain non-human animal species and at the same time to machines/robots reflects a dialectic about how “being human” is defined; about how we perceive our species and ourselves in relation to the environment. While both paths have the potential to improve lives; these improvements differ in substance and in consequence. One route has the potential to broaden the anthropocentric focus within the West (...) and honor interdependence with life systems; while the other affords greater currency to a human-purpose-driven worldview–furthering an unchecked Anthropocene. The broadening of legal personhood rights to life systems is underway with a ruling for dolphins in India; for a river in New Zealand and with Laws of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia. Many philosophers; ethicists; and ethologists define personhood within the confines of the dominant anthropocentric paradigm; yet alternate eco-centric paradigms offer an inclusive model that may help dismantle the artificial wall between humans and nature. In this paper; I explore these eco-centric paradigms and the implications of an associated worldview for human perceptions; self-awareness; communication; narrative; and research. (shrink)

After rejecting Carruthers' conflation of levels of consciousness as implausible and conceptually muddled, and Carruthers' claim that nonhumans are automata as undermined by evolutionary and ethological considerations, we develop a general criticism of contemporary philosophical approaches which, though recognizing nonhuman consciousness, still see animals as mere receptacles of experiences. This is, we argue, due to the fact that, while in the case of humans we grant a self - something that has not only a descriptive but also a prescriptive side, (...) requiring at least non-interference - in the case of nonhumans we focus only on the descriptive aspects. Consequently, we treat humans as equals whatever their capacities, but we order nonhumans in a hierarchy based on their cognitive level. We conclude that such double standards are not only inconsistent but also self-serving. (shrink)