This article offers a historical inquiry into behaviorism and its impact on standard of judgement concerning education policies. Drawing from Aldous Huxley’s reservation towards behaviorism as a scientific movement that naturalizes the role of control in human affairs, the paper maps the impact of behaviorism on economics of education. By tracing the influence of behaviorism in both rational (human capital theory) and quasi-rational (behavioral insight) economics, we draw attention to the activity of knowledge-making that describes and prescribes agency. The paper (...) demonstrates how policy instruments and outcomes are intimately linked to assumptions about personhood, and in the case of behavioral insight, they contribute to the scope of decision-making entrusted to government and business. Utilizing a genealogical approach, the paper invites ethical reflections on the long-term implications of behavioral economics in light of automation. (shrink)

A survey was conducted of the perceived correlates of illegal abuses in the electronics industry. Human resource directors of thirty-one firms responded to a questionnaire which assessed their perceptions of the degree to which illegal behavior was caused by (1) deficiencies in the moral character of employees (2) the clarity of expectations and standards describing illegal behavior and (3) the presence of reinforcements and punishments contingent on these behaviors. All three variables were related to the frequency of abuses in three (...) areas of organizational crime (e.g. administrative, labor, environment) and three areas of personal crime (theft, falsifying records kickbacks) as reported by the directors and/or indicated by archival records. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of how organizations may reduce illegal activity. (shrink)

This paper critically reviews and discusses the concept of organizational virtuousness as presented in positive organizational scholarship. It identifies Kim S. Cameron, David S. Bright, and Arran Caza as the most influential researchers within this field and portrays commonalities, differences, and inconsistencies among the various notions of organizational virtuousness offered in positive organizational literature throughout the last 15 years. While the commonalities refer to attributes, levels of analyses, outcomes, and methodology, the variances concern the locus of residence, the priority of (...) outcomes, indicators, supporting features and the virtues included in positive organizational virtuousness. The analysis further discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these differences and stresses the challenges which the POS movement needs to face in order to clarify its definition of organizational virtuousness and, maybe, converge on one unified meaning. Finally, these challenges are summarized and linked to future research proposals which offer potential ideas on how to further develop the concept of positive organizational virtuousness. (shrink)

Different disciplines have analyzed binary choices to model collective behavior in human systems. Several situations in which social dilemma arise can be modeled as N-person prisoner’s dilemma games including homeland security, public goods, international political economy among others. The purpose of this study is to develop an analytical solution to the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game when boundedly rational agents interact in a population. Previous studies in the literature consider the case in which cooperators and defectors have the same learning factors. (...) We obtain an analytical equation to find equilibria in the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game in the general case when agents have different learning factors. We also introduce a more realistic approach where probability values are bounded between zero and one and therefore eliminates the possibility of infeasible probability values. Since no analytic solution can be derived in this case, agent based simulation is used to analyze the asymptotic behavior of the resulted dynamical system. (shrink)

The comparator model is insufficient for three reasons. First, consciousness is involved in the process of comparison as well as in the output. Second, we still do not have enough neurophysiological information to match the events of consciousness, although such knowledge is growing. Third, the anatomical localisation proposed can be damaged bilaterally but consciousness will persist.

RESUMENMe propongo examinar críticamente la analogía entre selección natural y condicionamiento operante que Fodor y Piattelli-Palmarini utilizan para sostener que los mismos argumentos que desacreditan la teoría conductista desacreditan la teoría de la selección natural. Estas teorías no son independientes ni conceptual ni históricamente y, por eso, no es razonable hacer una analogía entre ambas con las intenciones que se proponen Fodor y Piattelli-Palmarini. La selección natural es una condición causal del me­ca­nismo de condicionamiento operante, motivo por el cual la (...) refutación de la teoría del condicio­na­miento no puede ser una razón para la refutación de la teoría de la selección natural. ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue against the analogy between natural selection and operant conditioning that Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini used to argue that the same arguments that discredit the behaviorist theory discredit the theory of natural selection. These theories are not independent either conceptually or historically and, therefore, it is unreasonable to make an analogy between selection and operant conditioning that can serve Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini's intentions. Natural selection is a causal condition of the mechanism of operant conditioning, so the refutation of the theory of operant conditioning cannot be a reason for the refutation of the theory of natural selection. (shrink)

A pair of arguments suggests that self-control is not properly conceptualized on the pattern/act/preference model Rachlin proposes. The first concerns the irrational following of personal rules. The second concerns scenarios in which behavioral patterns an agent deems good come into conflict.

Presented here is an overview from the standpoints of sociology, history of science, philosophy of science and “pure science” of the lingering question of whether sociology is a form of scientific pursuit. The conclusion is drawn that sociology barely meets any of the rigid criteria traditionally associated with the natural sciences. Sociology is viewed as having a position of theory and argument which is labeled “inconoclastic scepticism.”.

In grappling with the micro-macro problem in sociology, philosophers of the field are finding it increasingly useful to associate micro-sociology with theory reduction. In this article I argue that the association is ungrounded and undesirable. Although of a reductive "disposition," micro-sociological theories instantiate something more like "reductive explanation," whereby the causal roles of social wholes are explained in terms of their psychological parts. In this form, micro-sociological theories may actually have a better shot at closing the sociology–psychology explanatory gap, and (...) resist many antireductionist arguments, including the well-known argument from "multiple realization.". (shrink)

Leading expressivist proposals characterize the mental state expressed in the making of a normative judgment solely in terms of intrinsic, psychological dispositions. As a result, they fail to capture a subset of the normative judgments that agents can and do make; they miss the way that external factors can influence what the making of a normative judgment looks like. This problem can be seen most plainly in the context of systemic oppression. Intuitively, one can make a normative judgment that conflicts (...) with the oppressive ideas one has previously been conditioned to endorse, but expressivism seems to deny that this is possible. The expressivist's inability to count these avowals made under oppression as genuine normative judgments makes expressivism deficient as a metaethical theory. (shrink)

A motivational system approach to avoidance behavior is presented. According to this approach, a motivational state increases the probability of relevant response patterns and establishes the appropriate or “ideal” consummatory stimuli as positive reinforcers. In the case of feeding motivation, for example, hungry rats are likely to explore and gnaw, and to learn to persist in activities correlated with the reception of consummatory stimuli produced by ingestion of palatable substances. In the case of defense motivation, fearful rats are likely to (...) flee or freeze, and to learn to persist in activities correlated with consummatory stimuli produced by flight from a dangerous place. Defense system activation is distinct from alarm reactions. The latter prepare the animal for probable noxious events, involve relatively intense negative affect and extinguish rapidly in situations where the noxious event no longer occurs. In contrast, defense system activation potentiates innate and modified defense reactions, thus preparing the animal for possible, but not necessarily probable, noxious events; it involves little or no negative affect and extinguishes very slowly when the noxious event no longer occurs. With these assumptions and the resulting model we attempt to resolve several long-standing problems in avoidance learning, including the low correlation between negative affect and avoidance performance, differential rates of extinction for avoidance performance and conditioned emotional responses, and evidence that some avoidance responses are much more easily learned than others. In addition, the model has implications for the study of parallels between appetitive and aversive motivation, sign tracking in aversive conditioning, and orientation of flight responses. Historical antecedents and alternative approaches are discussed. (shrink)

Although it has become increasingly evident that an adequate theory of obligation must rest on evolutionary biology and human ethology, attempts toward this end need to explore the full range of personal, cultural, and political obligations observed in our species. The new naturalism reveals the complexity of social behavior and the defects of reductionist models that oversimplify the foundations of human duties and rights. Ultimately, this approach suggest a return to the Aristotelian concept of natural justice.

The so-called post-Wittgensteinian Oxford philosophers are often criticized not only for failing to provide for the causal explanation of human behavior and psychological states, but also for failing to recognize that psychological explanations require appeal to sub-personal or molecular processes. Three strategies accommodating this criticism appear in so-called homunculus theories and include: (1) that the sub-systems be assigned intentional or informational content purely heuristically; (2) that the intentional or informational content of molar states be analyzed without remainder in terms of (...) molecular processing; (3) that the entire or salient range of mental or informational molar states be accessible at the molecular level, or vice versa. Option (2) proves to be the most radical and is favored by Dennett. (1) relevantly requires a reduction of the intentional. (3) is illustrated in various ways by the views of Freud, Chomsky, Fodor. (2) is shown to depend on (1) or to be idle; and (3) embraces at least in part an appeal to molar-level explanation. The argument developed attempts to show the sense in which discourse about molar and molecular-level phenomena in the psychological context is fundamentally different from macroscopic and microtheoretical-level discourse about physical phenomena. The conclusion drawn is that neither a molar nor a sub-personal level theory is suitably explanatory in the psychological sense: a psychological theory is committed rather to a set of sub-personal components of such systems, that serve to explain molar phenomena. (shrink)

Artykuł referuje poglądy amerykańskiego filozofa Daniela C. Dennetta, dotyczące językowego charakteru świadomości. W pierwszym kroku autor rekonstruuje Dennettowską strategię naturalizacji świadomości, pokazując, jak język umożliwia powstanie świadomości w toku ewolucji ludzi. Naturalizacja ta jest możliwa, wedle Dennetta, jedynie przy behawiorystycznym założeniu, zgodnie z którym świadomość jest ukrytym zachowaniem językowym. Autor pokazuje, jak Dennett przyswaja i przekształca pierwotne pomysły behawiorystów Meada, Skinnera i Jaynesa, wpisując je w ewolucyjny scenariusz. Inskrypcja ta prowadzi do konkretnych problemów, rozważanych w ostatniej części pracy: a) w (...) filozofii Dennetta występują właściwie dwie definicje świadomości: pierwsza głosi, że świadomość jest pewnego rodzaju zachowaniem językowym, druga natomiast, że jest wirtualną maszyną memetyczną; b) Dennett nie wyjaśnia zasady rozstrzygalności, która pokazywałaby, jak dana treść umysłu może zostać uświadomiona, zamiast tego podaje tylko metaforę rywalizacji, w której pewne zdarzenia w mózgu wygrywają z innymi; c) wpisanie możliwego scenariusza rozwoju świadomości w pejzaż ewolucji nie oznacza jeszcze, że teoria może zostać empirycznie sprawdzona. (shrink)

What distinguishes a whole from an arbitrary sum of elements? I suggest a temporal and causal oriented approach. I defend two connected claims. The former is that existence is, by every means, coextensive with being the cause of a causal process. The latter is that a whole is the cause of a causal process with a joint effect. Thus, a whole is something that takes place in time. The approach endorses an unambiguous version of Restricted Composition that suits most commonsensical (...) intuitions about wholes. (shrink)

First, a number of previous theories of intrinsic motivation are reviewed. Then, several studies of highly motivating computer games are described. These studies focus on what makes the games fun, not on what makes them educational. Finally, with this background, a rudimentary theory of intrinsically motivating instruction is developed, based on three categories: challenge, fantasy, and curiosity.Challenge is hypothesized to depend on goals with uncertain outcomes. Several ways of making outcomes uncertain are discussed, including variable difficulty level, multiple level goals, (...) hidden information, and randomness. Fantasy is claimed to have both cognitive and emotional advantages in designing instructional environments. A distinction is made between extrinsic fantasies that depend only weakly on the skill used in a game, and intrinsic fantasies that are intimately related to the use of the skill. Curiosity is separated into sensory and cognitive components, and it is suggested that cognitive curiosity can be aroused by making learners believe their knowledge structures are incomplete, inconsistent, or unparsimonious. (shrink)

The past 25 years have seen a rapid growth of knowledge about brain mechanisms involved in visual mental imagery. These advances have largely been made independently of the long history of philosophical – and even psychological – reckoning with imagery and its parent concept ‘imagination’. We suggest that the view from these empirical findings can be widened by an appreciation of imagination’s intellectual history, and we seek to show how that history both created the conditions for – and presents challenges (...) to – the scientific endeavor. We focus on the neuroscientific literature’s most commonly used task – imagining a concrete object – and, after sketching what is known of the neurobiological mechanisms involved, we examine the same basic act of imagining from the perspective of several key positions in the history of philosophy and psychology. We present positions that, firstly, contextualize and inform the neuroscientific account, and secondly, pose conceptual and methodological challenges to the scientific analysis of imagery. We conclude by reflecting on the intellectual history of visualization in the light of contemporary science, and the extent to which such science may resolve long-standing theoretical debates. (shrink)

In recent years there has been considerable discussion and controversy concerning the concepts of mental health and mental illness. The controversy has centered around the problem of providing criteria for an adequate conception of mental health and illness, as well as difficulties in specifying a clear and workable system for the classification, understanding, and treatment of psychological and emotional disorders. In this paper I shall examine a cluster of these complex and important issues, focusing on attempts to define ‘mental health’ (...) and ‘mental illness’; diverse factors influencing the ascription of the predicates ‘is mentally ill’ and ‘is mentally healthy’; and some specific problems concerning these concepts as they appear in various theories of psychopathology. The approach here will be in the nature of a survey, directed at the specification of a number of problems—conceptual, methodological, and pragmatic—as they arise in various attempts to define and to provide criteria for applying the concepts of mental health and mental illness. (shrink)

The way people come to report private stimulation arising within their own bodies is not well understood. Although the Darwinian assumption of biological continuity has been the basis of extensive animal modeling for many human biological and behavioral phenomena, few have attempted to model human communication based on private stimulation. This target article discusses such an animal model using concepts and methods derived from the study of discriminative stimulus effects of drugs and recent research on interanimal communication. We discuss how (...) humans acquire the capacity to identify and report private stimulation and we analyze intra- and interspecies differences in neurochemical mechanisms for transducing interoceptive stimuli, enzymatic and other metabolic factors, learning ability, and discrimination learning histories and their relation to psychiatric and developmental disabilities. (shrink)

To avoid teleological interpretations, it is important to make a distinction between functions and uses of consciousness, and to address questions concerning the consequences of consciousness. Assumptions about the phylogenetic distribution of consciousness are examined. It is concluded that there is some value in identifying consciousness an exclusively human attribute.

Gray's integration of the different levels of description and explanation in his theory is problematic: The introduction of consciousness into his theorising consists of the mind-brain identity assumption, which tells us nothing new. There need not be correlations between levels of description. Gray's account does not extend beyond “brute” correlation. Integration must be achieved in a principled, mutually constraining way.