Hylomorphists claim that substances—human beings, oak trees, chemical compounds—are compounds of matter and form. If a house is a substance, then its matter would be some bricks and timbers and its form the structure those bricks and timbers take on. While hylomorphism is traditionally presented as a theory of change, it only treats the coming-to-be and passing-away of matter-form compounds. But many hylomorphists understand forms to be entities in their own right, as parts or constituents of substances. So, a neglected (...) question arises: how, when, and from where do forms come to be? I take up the view of one prominent and representative hylomorphist, Kathrin Koslicki, and argue that she cannot answer these questions satisfactorily. I close with a proposal for an account of the generation of forms based on machinery many hylomorphists already accept, namely, causal powers, that points to a deflationary metaphysics of form. (shrink)

Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which substances are composites of matter and form. If my house is a substance, then its matter would be a collection of bricks and timbers and its form something like a structure that unites those bricks and timbers into a single substance. Contemporary hylomorphists are divided on how to understand forms best, but a prominent group of theorists argue that forms are emergent powers. According to such views, when material components are arranged appropriately, (...) a novel substance emerges with the power to impose unity on its components through time. I argue that these accounts of form fall prey to a bootstrapping problem, and so, suffer from issues of redundancy, given plausible assumptions about inherence. In their place, I suggest an ontologically minimalist conception of forms as collective manifestations of the powers of matter. (shrink)

What should we do when two conflicting ontologies are both fruitful, though their fruitfulness varies by context or location? To achieve reconciliation, it is not enough to advocate pluralism. There are many varieties of pluralism and not all pluralisms will serve equally well; some may be inconsistent, others unhelpful. This essay considers another option: local ontology. For a pair of ontologies, a local ontology consists of two claims: (1) each location enjoys a unique ontology, and (2) neither ontology is most (...) fundamental nor most global. To argue for this view and provide an example, I develop a local ontology for two scientific ontologies: processualism and new mechanism. To further support this ontology, I argue against two varieties of pluralism: first, a pluralism based on directly unifying the assumptions of both ontologies and, second, one of allowing both ontologies to coexist within a discipline. I argue that the first option is inconsistent and the second is unhelpful. I conclude that this local ontology provides us with a consistent and fruitful account that includes elements from both mechanism and processualism. (shrink)