Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds.Robert A. Wilson, Matthew J. Barker & Ingo Brigandt - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):189-215.
    Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • Species, higher taxa, and the units of evolution.Marc Ereshefsky - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (1):84-101.
    A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • A puzzle about persistence.John W. Carroll & Lee Wentz - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):323-342.
    Our topic is the ontology and persistence conditions of material objects. One widely held doctrine is that identity-over-time has causal commitments. Another is that identity-over-time is just identity as it relates one object that exists at two times. We believe that a tension exists between these two apparently sensible positions: very roughly, if identity is the primary conceptual component of identity-over-time and—as is plausible—identity is noncausal, then the conceptual origins of the causal commitments of identity-over-time become a mystery. We will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Spinning Shadows.Roy Sorensen - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):345 - 365.
    If a spinning sphere casts a shadow, does the shadow also spin? This riddle is the point of departure for an investigation into the nature of shadow movement. A general theory of motion will encompass all moving things, not just physical objects. Ultimately, I argue that round shadows do indeed spin. Shadows are followers of the objects that cast them. Parts of the shadow correspond to parts of the leader, so motion of the caster's parts accounts for motions of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Persisting Problem of the Ship of Theseus.Meredith Wilson Michaels - 1980 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark