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Sensations and brain processes

Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56 (1959)

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  1. The fish in the creek is sentient, even if I can’t speak with it.Michael L. Woodruff - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):119-152.
    : In this paper I argue that Velmens’ reflexive model of perceptual consciousness is useful for understanding the first-person perspective and sentience in animals. I then offer a defense of the proposal that ray-finned bony fish have a first-person perspective and sentience. This defense has two prongs. The first prong is presence of a substantial body of evidence that the neuroanatomy of the fish brain exhibits basic organizational principles associated with consciousness in mammals. These principles include a relationship between a (...)
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  • Operant conditioning and behavioral neuroscience.Michael L. Woodruff - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):652.
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  • Materialism and ‘the soft substance of the brain’: Diderot and plasticity.Charles T. Wolfe - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (5):963-982.
    ABSTRACTMaterialism is the view that everything that is real is material or is the product of material processes. It tends to take either a ‘cosmological’ form, as a claim about the ultimate nature of the world, or a more specific ‘psychological’ form, detailing how mental processes are brain processes. I focus on the second, psychological or cerebral form of materialism. In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, the French materialist philosopher Denis Diderot was one of the first to notice that any self-respecting (...)
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  • What is this thing called 'pain'? The philosophy of science behind the contemporary debate.Mark Wilson - 1985 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (3-4):227-67.
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  • No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
    It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation— ‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, be ‘metaphysically dependent on’, or be ‘nothing over and above’ some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether (...)
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  • Grounding-based formulations of physicalism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - Topoi 37 (3):495-512.
    I problematize Grounding-based formulations of physicalism. More specifically, I argue, first, that motivations for adopting a Grounding-based formulation of physicalism are unsound; second, that a Grounding-based formulation lacks illuminating content, and that attempts to imbue Grounding with content by taking it to be a strict partial order are unuseful and problematic ; third, that conceptions of Grounding as constitutively connected to metaphysical explanation conflate metaphysics and epistemology, are ultimately either circular or self-undermining, and controversially assume that physical dependence is incompatible (...)
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  • Mind-brain analogies.Alan R. White - 1972 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):457-472.
    In the history of thought the relation between the mind and the body has been discussed in terms of various analogies. Plato, for example, examined the analogy of a man and his clothes and of the music of an instrument and the instrument itself; Aristotle advocated the analogy of an instrument's capacity and the instrument itself; Descartes alluded to that of a pilot and his ship; and Ryle derided that of a ghost and a machine.What I wish to discuss, however, (...)
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  • Curse of the qualia.Stephen L. White - 1986 - Synthese 68 (August):333-68.
    In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist holds (1) and (3) (...)
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  • The development of concepts of the mental world.Henry M. Wellman - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):651.
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  • The spatiality of the mental and the mind-body problem.Ruth Weintraub - 1998 - Synthese 117 (3):409-17.
    I consider a seemingly attractive strategy for grappling with the mind-body problem. It is often thought that materialists are committed to spatially locating mental events, whereas dualists are barred from so doing. The thought naturally arises, then, that reasons for or against the spatiality of the mental may be wielded to adjudicate between the different positions in the mind-body dispute. Showing that mental events are spatially located, it may be thought, is ipso facto showing the truth of materialism. Conversely, it (...)
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  • The zombie's cogito: Meditations on type-Q materialism.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585-605.
    Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a “type-A” or “type-B” approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a “type-Q” materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual truths needed for the traditional responses. In this paper, I develop a type-Q response to the zombie argument, one stressing the theory-laden nature of our conceivability and (...)
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  • A case of mind/brain identity: One small bridge for the explanatory gap.W. R. Webster - 2002 - Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the (...)
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  • Dispositionalism, ostension, and austerity.Michael Watkins - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (1):55 - 86.
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  • A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists).Jonathan Waskan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103-125.
    I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential (...)
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  • Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates.Richard M. Warren - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):51-51.
    The authors favor a “color realism” theory that considers colors to be physical properties residing in objects that reflect, emit, or transmit light. It is opposed to the theory that colors are sensations or visual experiences. This commentary suggests that both theories are correct, and that context usually indicates which of these dual aspects is being considered.
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  • Why the social sciences are irreducible.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4961-4987.
    It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory (...)
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  • Herbert Feigl (1902–1988).C. Wade Savage - 1990 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 21 (2):ii-230.
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  • Emergence in Mind (Mind Association Occasional Series) . Edited by Cynthia and Macdonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288 pages ISBN 13: 978-0-19-958362-1. [REVIEW]Elly Vintiadis - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (4):603-610.
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  • Conciencia, intencionalidad y lenguaje: el reconocimiento agencial como base de la ontología social.Juan Sebastián Sánchez Ávila - 2017 - Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana 38 (117):175-210.
    El presente artículo dialoga con la perspectiva del profesor de la Universidad de Stanford, John Searle en su perspectiva acerca de la conciencia, los actos de habla en lo que tiene que ver con la creación de hechos institucionales y su tesis emergentista. Esto con la idea de proponer la lectura del filósofo estadounidense en base a una pragmática de la expresión, que identifica al agente como centro de la creación y transformación social, y por tanto de movilización política, al (...)
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  • The limits of neuropsychological models of consciousness.Max Velmans - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703.
    This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
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  • Preface.Raphael van Riel & Albert Newen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):5-8.
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  • Inconceivable physicalism.Jonathon VandenHombergh - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):116-125.
    Using his two-dimensional semantics, I demonstrate that David Chalmers’s 2010 ‘two-dimensional argument against materialism’ is sound only if a wide swath of reductive physicalist theses – crucially, those involving identity and other intrinsic reductive relations – are inconceivable. 2DA therefore begs the question against its opponents and undermines its argumentative relevance. Comparisons are drawn to similar arguments in Marton and Sturgeon; the present account differs in its formal and philosophical simplicity, as well as its specific application to reductivist doctrines beyond (...)
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  • Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of Reduction.Raphael van Riel - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):747-761.
    Assume that water reduces to H2O. If so water is identical to H2O. At the same time, if water reduces to H2O then H2O does not reduce to water–the reduction relation is asymmetric. This generates a puzzle–if water just is H2O it is hard to see how we can account for the asymmetry of the reduction relation. The paper proposes a solution to this puzzle. It is argued that the reduction predicate generates intensional contexts and that in order to account (...)
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  • Has the case been made against the ecumenical view of connectionism?Robert Van Gulick - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):57-58.
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  • Consciousness, Conceivability, and Intrinsic Reduction.Jonathon VandenHombergh - 2018 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1129-1151.
    Conceivability arguments constitute a serious threat against reductive physicalism. Recently, a number of authors have proven and characterized a devastating logical truth centered on these arguments: namely, that their soundness entails the inconceivability of reductive physicalism. In this paper, I demonstrate that this is only a logical truth when reductive physicalism is interpreted in its stronger, intrinsic sense, as opposed to its weaker—yet considerably more popular—extrinsic sense. The basic idea generalizes: perhaps surprisingly, stronger forms of reduction are uniquely resistant to (...)
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  • Beautiful red squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.
    The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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  • Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain.Jussi Valtonen, Woo-Kyoung Ahn & Andrei Cimpian - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (9):e13034.
    People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to (...)
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  • Consciousness does not seem to be linked to a single neural mechanism.Carlo Umiltà & Marco Zorzi - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):701-702.
    On the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.
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  • On the proper treatment of thermostats.David S. Touretzky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):55-56.
    A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models (...)
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  • Rorty deflazionista.Andrea Tortoreto - 2022 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to propose a reconstruction of Richard Rorty’s philosophy of mind aimed at showing both its systematic structure and the originality of some outcomes, not adequately underlined by critics. My starting point is an early paper, titled Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental, in which Rorty takes sides on the venerable question of the mark of the mental. I will show that Rorty defends a weak view on the above question and that his idea, (...)
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  • Erratum to: Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy.Kevin Toh - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (3):333-368.
    This paper seeks to uncover and rationally reconstruct four theoretical prescriptions that H. L. A. Hart urged philosophers to observe and follow when investigating and theorizing about the nature of law. The four prescriptions may appear meager and insignificant when each is seen in isolation, but together as an inter-connected set they have substantial implications. In effect, they constitute a central part of Hart’s campaign to put philosophical investigations about the nature of law onto a path to a genuine research (...)
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  • Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy.Kevin Toh - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (6):689-724.
    This paper seeks to uncover and rationally reconstruct four theoretical prescriptions that H. L. A. Hart urged philosophers to observe and follow when investigating and theorizing about the nature of law. The four prescriptions may appear meager and insignificant when each is seen in isolation, but together as an inter-connected set they have substantial implications. In effect, they constitute a central part of Hart's campaign to put philosophical investigations about the nature of law onto a path to a genuine research (...)
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  • Color realism and color illusions.Dejan Todorovic - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):49-50.
    As demonstrated by several example displays, color illusions challenge color realism, because they involve a one-to-many reflectance-to-color mapping. Solving this problem by differentiating between veridical and illusory colors corresponding to the same reflectance is hampered because of the lack of an appropriate criterion. However, the difference between veridical and illusory color perception can still be maintained.
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  • Models, yes; homunculus, no.Frederick M. Toates - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):650.
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  • On giving a more active and selective role to consciousness.Frederick Toates - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):700-701.
    An active role for conscious processes in the production of behaviour is proposed, involving top level controls in a hierarchy of behavioural control. It is suggested that by inhibiting or sensitizing lower levels in the hierarchy conscious processes can play a role in the organization of ongoing behaviour. Conscious control can be more or less evident, according to prevailing circumstances.
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  • Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):501-522.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  • Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):501-522.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  • Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.
    The physical realm is causally closed, according to physicalists like me. But why is it causally closed, what metaphysically explains causal closure? I argue that reductive physicalists are committed to one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of any independent explanation, and that as a result, they must give up on using a causal argument to attack mind–body dualism. Reductive physicalists should view dualism in much the way that we view the hypothesis that unicorns exist, or that the Kansas (...)
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  • Causation in Physics and in Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):471-488.
    It is widely thought that there is an important argument to be made that starts with premises taken from the science of physics and ends with the conclusion of physicalism. The standard view is that this argument takes the form of a causal argument for physicalism. Roughly, physics tells us that the physical realm is causally complete, and so minds (among other entities) must be physical if they are to interact with the world as we think they do. In what (...)
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  • What Makes Us Conscious?Anthony P. Atkinson & Michael S. C. Thomas - 1999 - Journal of Intelligent Systems 9 (5-6):307-354.
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  • Are radical and cognitive behaviorism incompatible?Roger K. Thomas - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):650.
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  • Energy Requirements Undermine Substrate Independence and Mind-Body Functionalism.Paul Thagard - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):70-88.
    Substrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning. Attention to energy requirements undermines the use of substrate independence to support claims about the feasibility of artificial intelligence, the moral standing of robots, the possibility that we may be (...)
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  • “Mental way stations” in contemporary theories of animal learning.William S. Terry - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):649.
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  • Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.
    Vision scientists are interested in three diverse entities: physical stimuli, neural states, and consciously perceived colors, and in the mapping rules among the three. In this worldview, the three kinds of entities have coequal status, and views that attribute color exclusively to one or another of them, such as color realism, have no appeal.
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  • Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.
    Though physicalism remains the most popular position in the metaphysics of mind today, there is still considerable debate over how to retain a plausible account of mental concepts consistently with a physicalistic world view. Philip Goff (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2), 191–209, 2011) has recently argued that physicalism cannot give a plausible account of our phenomenal concepts, and that as such, physicalism should be rejected. In this paper I hope to do three things, firstly I shall use some considerations from (...)
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  • Philosophy between Religion and Science.James Tartaglia - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (2):224-241.
    Philosophical concerns are evidenced from the beginning of human literature, which have no obvious connection to philosophy’s mainstream epistemological and metaphysical problematic. I reject the views that the nature of philosophy is a philosophical question, and that the discipline is united by methodology, arguing that it must be united by subject matter. The origins of the discipline provide reasons to doubt the existence of a unifying subject matter, however, and scepticism about philosophy also arises from its a priori methodology and (...)
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  • Conceptualizing physical consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.
    Theories that combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it (...)
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  • Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”.Neal R. Swerdlow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):699-700.
    Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.
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  • Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
    It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...)
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  • Memory consolidation, multiple realizations, and modest reductions.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):501-513.
    This article investigates several consequences of a recent trend in philosophy of mind to shift the relata of realization from mental state–physical state to function‐mechanism. It is shown, by applying both frameworks to the neuroscientific case study of memory consolidation, that, although this shift can be used to avoid the immediate antireductionist consequences of the traditional argument from multiple realizability, what is gained is a far more modest form of reductionism than recent philosophical accounts have intimated and neuroscientists themselves have (...)
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