ABSTRACT In this article, we first document the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. We then argue that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field, informed consent and distributive justice, and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy (...) and the harm principle, to infectious examples. We argue that this is insufficient, however. Taking infectious disease into account requires understanding the patient as victim and as vector. Infectiousness reminds us that as autonomous agents we are both embodied and vulnerable in our relationships with others. We conclude by applying this reunderstanding of agency to the examples of informed consent and distributive justice in health care. (shrink)

This paper starts by establishing a prima facie case that disadvantaged groups or individuals are more likely to get a chronic disease and are in a disadvantaged position to adhere to chronic treatment despite access through Universal Health Coverage. However, the main aim of this paper is to explore the normative implications of this claim by examining two different but intertwined argumentative lines that might contribute to a better understanding of the ethical challenges faced by chronic disease health policy. The (...) paper develops the argument that certain disadvantages which may predispose to illness might overlap with disadvantages that may hinder self-management, potentially becoming disadvantageous in handling chronic disease. If so, chronic diseases may be seen as disadvantages in themselves, describing a reproduction of disadvantage among the chronically ill and a vicious circle of disadvantage that could both predict and shed light on the catastrophic health outcomes among disadvantaged groups—or individuals—dealing with chronic disease. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper reviews the dynamics behind, and ethical issues associated with, the phenomenon of drug resistance. Drug resistance is an important ethical issue partly because of the severe consequences likely to result from the increase in drug resistant pathogens if more is not done to control them. Drug resistance is also an ethical issue because, rather than being a mere quirk of nature, the problem is largely a product of drug distribution. Drug resistance results from the over‐consumption of antibiotics (...) by the wealthy; and it, ironically, results from the under‐consumption of antibiotics, usually by the poor or otherwise marginalized. In both kinds of cases the phenomenon of drug resistance illustrates why health (care) – at least in the context of infectious disease – should be treated as a (global) public good. The point is that drug resistance involves ‘externalities’ affecting third parties. When one patient develops a resistant strain of disease because of her over‐ or under‐consumption of medication, this more dangerous malady poses increased risk to others. The propriety of free‐market distribution of goods subject to externalities is famously dubious – given that the ‘efficiency’ rationale behind markets assumes an absence of externalities. Market failure in the context of drug resistance is partly revealed by the fact that no new classes of antibiotics have been developed since 1970. I conclude by arguing that the case of drug resistance reveals additional reasons – to those traditionally appealed to by bioethicists – for treating health care as something special when making policy decisions about its distribution. (shrink)