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  1. Against Moral Responsibilisation of Health: Prudential Responsibility and Health Promotion.Rebecca C. H. Brown, Hannah Maslen & Julian Savulescu - 2019 - Public Health Ethics 12 (2):114-129.
    In this article, we outline a novel approach to understanding the role of responsibility in health promotion. Efforts to tackle chronic disease have led to an emphasis on personal responsibility and the identification of ways in which people can ‘take responsibility’ for their health by avoiding risk factors such as smoking and over-eating. We argue that the extent to which agents can be considered responsible for their health-related behaviour is limited, and as such, state health promotion which assumes certain forms (...)
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  • Internalism and Externalism about Reason.Kosuke Bishago - 2016 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 49 (2):27-47.
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  • Internismo de razões E a concepção procedimental de deliberação correta.Tiaraju Andreazza - 2015 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 20 (2):197-225.
    The aim of this article is to discuss Bernard Williams’s theory of reasons for action. Following the introduction and analysis of its main concepts and the identification of the argument that it is offered in its favor and against alternative positions, I analyze the objection that the soundness of this argument depends on the acceptance of a procedural conception of correct deliberation that Williams would have assumed, without offering any argument, as true. I argue that this objection is false because (...)
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  • Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, (...)
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  • Two kinds of consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):257-272.
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  • Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value.Jacob M. Nebel - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):449-476.
    Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain (...)
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  • Kinds of consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 257-272.
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  • Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism.Fritz J. McDonald - 2016 - In Piotr Makowski, Mateusz Bonecki & Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy (eds.), Praxiology and the Reasons for Action. Transaction Publishers.
    Subjectivism about reasons is the view that a person has a reason to perform act A if she has some motivation to do A, or would have motivation to do A in certain circumstances. In On What Matters, Derek Parfit presents a series of arguments against subjectivism about reasons. In Parfit’s view, if subjectivism were true, nothing would actually matter. Parfit contends that there are only two positions regarding reasons: objectivism and subjectivism. I will argue for an inclusive position on (...)
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