Switch to: References

Citations of:

Humeanism about Motivation

In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 153–158 (2010)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

On Humean Explanation and Practical Normativity.Graham Hubbs - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):78-95.details If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are “entirely different” matters, then it would seem to follow that endorsing a given account of action-explanation does not restrict the account of practical normativity one may simultaneously endorse. In this essay, I challenge the antecedent of this conditional by targeting its consequent. Specifically, I argue that if one endorses a Humean account of action-explanation, which many find attractive, one is thereby committed to a Humean account of practical normativity, which (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.details The article begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are always beliefs, never desires. The article next argues that Dancy’s argument for his position is flawed. On the one hand, it is not true that desire always comes with motivation in the agent; on the other, even if this was the case, it would still (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 130–145.details This chapter examines an evidentialist ethics of belief, and W. K. Clifford’s proposal in particular. It argues that regardless of how one understands the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever we lack sufficient evidence. Alternatively, this chapter argues that there are wide-scope conditional requirements on beliefs but that these requirements can be met without having sufficient evidence for the belief in question. It then argues that we are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Directive Content.Patrick Butlin - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (1):2-26.details Representations may have descriptive content, directive content, or both, but little explicit attention has been given to the problem of distinguishing representations of these three kinds. We do not know, for instance, what determines whether a given representation is a directive instructing its consumer to perform some action or has descriptive content to the effect that the action in question has a certain value. This paper considers what it takes for a representation to have directive content. The first part of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

1