Results for 'Graham Hubbs'

307 found
Order:
See also
Graham Hubbs
University of Idaho
  1. Transparency, Corruption, and Democratic Institutions.Graham Hubbs - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (1):65-83.
    This essay examines some of the institutional arrangements that underlie corruption in democracy. It begins with a discussion of institutions as such, elaborating and extending some of John Searle’s remarks on the topic. It then turns to an examination of specifically democratic institutions; it draws here on Joshua Cohen’s recent Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals. One of the central concerns of Cohen’s Rousseau is how to arrange civic institutions so that they are able to perform their public functions without (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Anscombe on Intentions and Commands.Graham Hubbs - 2016 - Klesis 35:90-107.
    The title of this essay describes its topic. I open by discussing the two-knowledges/one-object worry that Anscombe introduces through her famous example of the water-pumper. This sets the context for my main topic, viz., Anscombe’s remarks in _Intention_ on the similarities and differences between intentions and commands. These remarks play a key role in her argument’s shift from practical knowledge to the form of practical reasoning and in its subsequent shift back to practical knowledge. The remarks should be seen as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Awe and Humility in the Face of Things: Somatic Practice in East-Asian Philosophies.Graham Parkes - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (3):69--88.
    Whereas the Platonic-Christian philosophical tradition in the West favours an ”ascent to theory’ and abstract reasoning, east-Asian philosophies tend to be rooted in somatic, or bodily, practice. In the philosophies of Confucius and Zhuangzi in China, and KÅ«kai and Dōgen in Japan, we can distinguish two different forms of somatic practice: developing physical skills, and what one might call ”realising relationships’. These practices improve our relations with others -- whether the ancestors or our contemporaries, the things with which we surround (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4. Aristotle’s Argument From Truth in Metaphysics Γ 4.Graham Clay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):17-24.
    Some of Aristotle’s statements about the indemonstrability of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Γ 4 merit more attention. The consensus seems to be that Aristotle provides two arguments against the demonstrability of the PNC, with one located in Γ 3 and the other found in the first paragraph of Γ 4. In this article, I argue that Aristotle also relies upon a third argument for the same conclusion: the argument from truth. Although Aristotle does not explicitly state this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. What Derivations Cannot Do.Graham Oppy - 2015 - Religious Studies 51 (3):323-333.
    I think that there is much about contemporary philosophy of religion that should change. Most importantly, philosophy of religion should be philosophy of religion, not merely philosophy of theism, or philosophy of Christianity, or philosophy of certain denominations of Christianity, or the like. Here, however, I shall complain about one fairly narrow aspect of contemporary philosophy of religion that really irks me: its obsession with derivations that have as their conclusion either the claim that God exists or the claim that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  54
    Ontological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2019 - The Philosophers' Magazine 86:66-73.
    This article is a brief overview of major ontological arguments. The most noteworthy feature of this article is the statement of a new parody of the Anselmian and Cartesian arguments that is obviously immune to objections adverting to intrinsic minima and maxima.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  7. Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?Peter J. Graham - 2006 - Philosophica 78:105-127.
    Jennifer Lackey ('Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission' The Philosophical Quarterly 1999) and Peter Graham ('Conveying Information, Synthese 2000, 'Transferring Knowledge' Nous 2000) offered counterexamples to show that a hearer can acquire knowledge that P from a speaker who asserts that P, but the speaker does not know that P. These examples suggest testimony can generate knowledge. The showpiece of Lackey's examples is the Schoolteacher case. This paper shows that Lackey's case does not undermine the orthodox view that testimony cannot generate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  8. Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 247-273.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  9. Leftow on God and Necessity.Graham Oppy - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):5-16.
    This paper is a critical examination of some of the major themes of Brian Leftow's book *God and Necessity*.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--174.
    This paper argues for the general proper functionalist view that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Such a process is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally. This paper applies this view to so-called testimony-based beliefs. It argues that when a hearer forms a comprehension-based belief that P (a belief based on taking another to have asserted that P) through the exercise of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  11. Semantics, Hermenutics, Statistics: Some Reflections on the Semantic Web.Graham White - forthcoming - Proceedings of HCI2011.
    We start with the ambition -- dating back to the early days of the semantic web -- of assembling a significant portion human knowledge into a contradiction-free form using semantic web technology. We argue that this would not be desirable, because there are concepts, known as essentially contested concepts, whose definitions are contentious due to deep-seated ethical disagreements. Further, we argue that the ninetenth century hermeneutical tradition has a great deal to say, both about the ambition, and about why it (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Functions, Warrant, History.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press. pp. 15-35.
    I hold that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Evolution by natural selection is the central source of etiological functions. This leads many to think that on my view warrant requires a history of natural selection. What then about learning? What then about Swampman? Though functions require history, natural selection is not the only source. Self-repair and trial-and-error learning are both sources. Warrant requires (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  13. Epistemological Foundations for Koons' Cosmological Argument?Graham Oppy - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):107 - 125.
    Some people -- including the present author -- have proposed and defended alternative restricted causal principles that block Robert Koons’s ’new’ cosmological argument without undermining the intuition that causation is very close to ubiquitous. In "Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argument", Koons argues that any restricted causal principles that are insufficient for the purposes of his cosmological argument cause epistemological collapse into general scepticism. In this paper I argue, against Koons, that there is no reason to suppose that my favourite (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals.Peter J. Graham - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 93--115.
    Many hold that perception is a source of epistemically basic (direct) belief: for justification, perceptual beliefs do not need positive inferential support from other justified beliefs, especially from beliefs about one’s current sensory episodes. Perceptual beliefs can, however, be defeated or undermined by other things one believes, and so to be justified in the end there must be no undefeated undermining grounds. Similarly for memory and introspection.1..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  15. Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.
    We review the "Entitlement" projects of Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright in light of recent work from and surrounding both philosophers. Our review dispels three misunderstandings. First, Burge and Wright are not involved in a common “entitlement” project. Second, though for both Wright and Burge entitlement is the new notion, “entitlement” is not some altogether third topic not clearly connected to the nature of knowledge or the encounter with skepticism. Third, entitlement vs. justification does not align with the externalism vs. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  77
    The Structure of Defeat: Pollock's Evidentialism, Lackey's Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism.Peter J. Graham & Jack C. Lyons - forthcoming - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeaters. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.
    There has been a recent explosion of interest in the epistemology of disagreement. Much of the recent literature is concerned with a particular range of puzzle cases (discussed in the Cases section of my paper). Almost all of the papers that contribute to that recent literature make mention of questions about religious disagreement in ways that suggest that there are interesting connections between those puzzle cases and real life cases of religious disagreement. One important aim of my paper is to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  18. Dialectic and Dialetheic.Graham Priest - 1989 - Science and Society 53 (4):388 - 415.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  19. Does Justification Aim at Truth?Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.
    Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  20.  72
    Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds?Peter Graham - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 179-202.
    In 'Perceptual Entitlement' (PPR 2003), Tyler Burge argues that on his teleological reliabilist account of perceptual warrant, warrant will persist in non-normal conditions, even radical skeptical scenarios like demon worlds. This paper explains why Burge's explanation falls short. But if we distinguish two grades of warrant, we can explain, in proper functionalist, teleological reliabilist terms, why warrant should persist in demon worlds. A normally functioning belief-forming process confers warrant in all worlds, provided it is reliable in normal conditions when functioning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan.Peter J. Graham - 2011 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 67-88.
    Alvin Plantinga argues by counterexample that no naturalistic account of functions is possible--God is then the only source for natural functions. This paper replies to Plantinga's examples and arguments. Plantinga misunderstands naturalistic accounts. Plantinga's mistakes flow from his assimilation of functional notions in general to functions from intentional design in particular.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. The Function of Perception.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Synthese Library. pp. 13-31.
    What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perception contributes to survival and reproduction.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Weak Agnosticism Defended.Graham Oppy - 1994 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (3):147 - 167.
    Agnosticism has had some bad press in recent years. Nonetheless, I hope to show that agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism. This is not a mere philosophical exercise; for, as it happens, the formulated position is--I think--the one to which I subscribe. I include a qualification here since it may be that the position to which I subscribe is better characterised as fallibilist atheism--but more of that anon.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial Entitlement.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Andreas Stokke & Eliot Michaelson (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-112.
    According to the Acceptance Principle, a person is entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true (asserted) and that is intelligible to him or her, unless there are stronger reasons not to. Burge assumes this Principle and then argues that it has an apriori justification, basis or rationale. This paper expounds Burge's teleological reliability framework and the details of his a priori justification for the Principle. It then raises three significant doubts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Epistemic Evaluations: Consequences, Costs and Benefits.Peter J. Graham, Megan Stotts, Zachary Bachman & Meredith McFadden - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (4):7-13.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. I Am Also of the Opinion That Materialism Must Be Destroyed.Graham Harman - 2010 - Environment and Planning D 28 (5):1-17.
    This paper criticizes two forms of philosophical materialism that adopt opposite strategies but end up in the same place. Both hold that individual entities must be banished from philosophy. The first kind is ground floor materialism, which attempts to dissolve all objects into some deeper underlying basis; here, objects are seen as too shallow to be the truth. The second kind is first floor materialism, which treats objects as naive fictions gullibly posited behind the direct accessibility of appearances or relations; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  27. Cosmological Arguments.Graham Oppy - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):31-48.
    This paper provides a taxonomy of cosmological arguments and givesgeneral reasons for thinking that arguments that belong to a given category do not succeed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28. Perfection, Near-Perfection, Maximality, and Anselmian Theism.Graham Oppy - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2):119-138.
    Anselmian theists claim (a) that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived; and (b) that it is knowable on purely—solely, entirely—a priori grounds that there is a being than which none greater can be conceived. In this paper, I argue that Anselmian Theism gains traction by conflating different interpretations of the key description ‘being than which no greater can be conceived’. In particular, I insist that it is very important to distinguish between ideal excellence and maximal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. The Devilish Complexities of Divine Simplicity.Graham Oppy - 2003 - Philo 6 (1):10-22.
    In On the Nature and Existence of God, Richard Gale follows majority opinion in giving very short shrift to the doctrine of divine simplicity: in his view, there is no coherent expressible doctrine of divine simplicity. Rising to the implicit challenge, I argue that---contrary to what is widely believed---there is a coherently expressible doctrine of divine simplicity, though it is rather different from the views that are typically expressed by defenders of this doctrine. At the very least, I think that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  30.  58
    Social Knowledge and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2018 - In The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History. Volume IV: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London: pp. 111-138.
    Social knowledge, for the most part, is knowledge through testimony. This essay separates knowledge from justification, characterizes testimony as a source of belief, explains why testimony is a source of knowledge, canvasses arguments for anti-reductionism and for reductionism in the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate, addresses counterexamples to knowledge transmission, defends a safe basis account of testimonial knowledge, and turns to social norms as a partial explanation for the reliability of testimony.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. Pantheism, Quantification and Mereology.Graham Oppy - 1997 - The Monist 80 (2):320-336.
    I provide a classification of varieties of pantheism. I argue that there are two different kinds of commitments that pantheists have. On the one hand, there is an ontological commitment to the existence of a sum of all things. On the other hand, there is an ideological commitment: either collectively or distributively, the sum of all things is divine.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. Williamson on Counterpossibles.Berto Francesco, David Ripley, Graham Priest & Rohan French - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713.
    A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  33. Merely Confused Supposition.Graham Priest & Stephen Read - 1980 - Franciscan Studies 40 (1):265-97.
    In this article, we discuss the notion of merely confused supposition as it arose in the medieval theory of suppositio personalis. The context of our analysis is our formalization of William of Ockham's theory of supposition sketched in Mind 86 (1977), 109-13. The present paper is, however, self-contained, although we assume a basic acquaintance with supposition theory. The detailed aims of the paper are: to look at the tasks that supposition theory took on itself and to use our formalization to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  34. On ‘a New Cosmological Argument’.Graham Oppy - 2000 - Religious Studies 36 (3):345-353.
    Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss contend that their ‘new cosmological argument’ is an improvement over familiar cosmological arguments because it relies upon a weaker version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason than that used in those more familiar arguments. However, I note that their ‘weaker’ version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason entails the ‘stronger’ version of that principle which is used in more familiar arguments, so that the alleged advantage of their proof turns out to be illusory. Moreover, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  35. Moral Uncertainty and Human Embryo Experimentation.Graham Oddie - 1994 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Grant Gillett & Janet Martin Soskice (eds.), Medicine and Moral Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3--144.
    Moral dilemmas can arise from uncertainty, including uncertainty of the real values involved. One interesting example of this is that of experimentation on human embryos and foetuses, If these have a moral stauts similar to that of human persons then there will be server constraitns on what may be done to them. If embryous have a moral status similar to that of other small clusters of cells, then constraints will be motivated largely by consideration for the persons into whom the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  36. Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement.Graham Oddie - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):607-620.
    It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy. The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. On Rescher on Pascal's Wager.Graham Oppy - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):159 - 168.
    In Pascal's Wager: A Study Of Practical Reasoning In Philosophical Theology ,[1] Nicholas Rescher aims to show that, contrary to received philosophical opinion, Pascal's Wager argument is "the vehicle of a fruitful and valuable insight--one which not only represents a milestone in the development of an historically important tradition of thought but can still be seen as making an instructive contribution to philosophical theology".[2] In particular, Rescher argues that one only needs to adopt a correct perspective in order to see (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  38. Craig, Mackie, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument.Graham Oppy - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (2):189 - 197.
    In ‘Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument’ , 367–75), Professor William Lane Craig undertakes to demonstrate that J. L. Mackie's analysis of the kalam cosmological argument in The Miracle of Theism is ‘superficial’, and that Mackie ‘has failed to provide any compelling or even intuitively appealing objection against the argument’ . I disagree with Craig's judgement; for it seems to me that the considerations which Mackie advances do serve to refute the kalam cosmological argument. Consequently, the purpose of this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  39. Arguments From Moral Evil.Graham Oppy - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3):59 - 87.
    In this paper, I argue that -- contrary to widely received opinion -- logical arguments from evil are well and truly alive and kicking.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40. Uncaused Beginnings.Graham Oppy - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (1):61-71.
    I defend the view that it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the causal relation even though it is impossible for any other (non-overlapping) parts of reality to have no cause. I claim that, while there are good theoretical and commonsense grounds for maintaining that it is simply not possible for non-initial parts of reality to have no cause, these good grounds do not require one to claim that it is impossible that reality has an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Arguing About The Kalam Cosmological Argument.Graham Oppy - 2002 - Philo 5 (1):34-61.
    This paper begins with a fairly careful and detailed discussion of the conditions under which someone who presents an argument ought to be prepared to concede that the argument is unsuccessful. The conclusions reached in this discussion are then applied to William Lane Craig’s defense of what he calls “the kalam cosmological argument.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, the chief contention of the paper is that Craig ought to be prepared to concede that “the kalam cosmological argument” is not a successful argument. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  42. Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Partiality, Preferences and Perspective.Graham Oddie - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):57-81.
    A rather promising value theory for environmental philosophers combines the well-known fitting attitude (FA) account of value with the rather less well-known account of value as richness. If the value of an entity is proportional to its degree of richness (which has been cashed out in terms of unified complexity and organic unity), then since natural entities, such as species or ecosystems, exhibit varying degrees of richness quite independently of what we happen to feel about them, they also possess differing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Omnipotence.Graham Oppy - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):58–84.
    Recently, many philosophers have supposed that the divine attribute of omnipotence is properly understood as some kind of maximal power. I argue that all of the best known attempts to analyse omnipotence in terms of maximal power are multiply flawed. Moreover, I argue that there are compelling reasons for supposing that, on orthodox theistic conceptions, maximal power is not one of the divine attributes.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44. Kalām Cosmological Arguments: Reply to Professor Craig.Graham Oppy - 1995 - Sophia 34 (2):15-29.
    This paper is a reply to Professor William Lane Craig's “Graham Oppy On The kalām Cosmological Argument” Sophia 32.1, 1993, pp. 1–11. Further references to the literature are contained therein.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Hume and the Argument for Biological Design.Graham Oppy - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (4):519-534.
    There seems to be a widespread conviction — evidenced, for example, in the work of Mackie, Dawkins and Sober — that it is Darwinian rather than Humean considerations which deal the fatal logical blow to arguments for intelligent design. I argue that this conviction cannot be well-founded. If there are current logically decisive objections to design arguments, they must be Humean — for Darwinian considerations count not at all against design arguments based upon apparent cosmological fine-tuning. I argue, further, that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  46. Dwelling with the Fourfold.Graham Harman - 2009 - Space and Culture 12 (3):292-302.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47. The Fictionalist’s Attitude Problem.Graham Oddie & Daniel Demetriou - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485-498.
    According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible. This is the basis of Mackie's now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie's approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument.Graham Oppy - 2004 - Philo 7 (2):203-211.
    This paper is a reply to Robert Maydole’s “The Modal Perfection Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being,” published in Philo 6, 2, 2003. I argue that Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument fails, and that there is no evident way in which it can be repaired.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  49. What Do We See in Museums?Graham Oddie - 2016 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 79:217-240.
    I address two related questions. First: what value is there in visiting a museum and becoming acquainted with the objects on display? For art museums the answer seems obvious: we go to experience valuable works of art, and experiencing valuable works of art is itself valuable. In this paper I focus on non-art museums, and while these may house aesthetically valuable objects, that is not their primary purpose, and at least some of the objects they house might not be particularly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument.Graham Oppy - 2007 - Philo 10 (1):72-84.
    In “On Oppy’s Objections to the Modal Perfection Argument,” Philo 8, 2, 2005, 123–30, Robert Maydole argues that his modal perfection argument—set out in his “The Modal Perfection Argument for a Supreme Being,” Philo 6, 2, 2003, 299–313—“remains arguably sound” in the face of the criticisms that I made of this argument in my “Maydole’s 2QS5 Argument,” Philo 7, 2, 2004, 203–11. I reply that Maydole is wrong: his argument is fatally flawed, and his attempts to avoid the criticisms that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 307