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  1. Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...)
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  • Nonstandard definability.Stuart T. Smith - 1989 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 42 (1):21-43.
    We investigate the notion of definability with respect to a full satisfaction class σ for a model M of Peano arithmetic. It is shown that the σ-definable subsets of M always include a class which provides a satisfaction definition for standard formulas. Such a class is necessarily proper, therefore there exist recursively saturated models with no full satisfaction classes. Nonstandard extensions of overspill and recursive saturation are utilized in developing a criterion for nonstandard definability. Finally, these techniques yield some information (...)
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  • Interpreting the compositional truth predicate in models of arithmetic.Cezary Cieśliński - 2021 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 60 (6):749-770.
    We present a construction of a truth class (an interpretation of a compositional truth predicate) in an arbitrary countable recursively saturated model of first-order arithmetic. The construction is fully classical in that it employs nothing more than the classical techniques of formal proof theory.
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