Festschrift in Honor of Barry Smith on the occasion of his 65th Birthday. Published as issue 4:4 of the journal Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization. Includes contributions by Wolfgang Grassl, Nicola Guarino, John T. Kearns, Rudolf Lüthe, Luc Schneider, Peter Simons, Wojciech Żełaniec, and Jan Woleński.

The essay surveys recent developments in ontology and defends a strategy for improvement of ontologies based on ontological realism. As a thought experiment, we consider central theses of Aristotelian metaphysics, and show how they fall short of what we believe to be the requirements of ontology today. Above all, Aristotle provides us with no strategy for the reconciliation of common-sense realism and scientific realism where these diverge. We focus specifically on shortfalls in Aristotle’s treatment of individual accidents, especially in regard (...) to the category of place. We then show how Aristotle’s metaphysics needs to be supplemented by a theory of holes, of fiat boundaries, of granularity, and of vagueness. (shrink)

What follows is a contribution to the theory of space and of spatial objects. It takes as its starting point the philosophical subfield of ontology, which can be defined as the science of what is: of the various types and categories of objects and relations in all realms of being. More specifically, it begins with ideas set forth by Aristotle in his Categories and Metaphysics, two works which constitute the first great contributions to ontological science. Because Aristotle’s ontological ideas were (...) developed prior to the scientific discoveries of the modern era, he approached the objects and relations of everyday reality with the same ontological seriousness with which scientists today approach the objects of physics. We shall seek to show that what Aristotle has to say about these commonsensical objects and relations can, when translated into more formal terms, be of use also to contemporary ontologists. More precisely, we shall argue that his ideas can contribute to the development of a rigorous theory of those social and institutional components of everyday reality – the settings of human behavior – which are the subject of this volume. When modern-day philosophers turn their attentions to ontology they begin not with Aristotle but rather, in almost every case, with a set-theoretic ontology of the sort which is employed in standard model-theoretic semantics. Set-theoretic ontology sees the world in atomistic terms: it postulates a lowest level of atoms or urelements, from out of which successively higher levels of set-theoretic objects are then constructed. The approach to ontology to be defended here, in contrast, starts not with atoms but with the mesoscopic objects by which we are surrounded in our normal day-to-day.. (shrink)

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) und Raoul Heinrich Francé (1874-1943) hatten einen ungewöhnlichen (nicht-akademischen) Zugang zu Wissenschaft. Francé bezog sich in seiner biozentrischen Philosophie (lebensbezogene Natur- und Weltanschauung) immer wieder auf Comte und andere Positivisten. In Entwicklungsprozessen sahen beide Harmonie und Ordnung gegenstrebiger Vorgänge. Konkrete Wahrnehmung und Experimente sind an Beobachtungen geknüpft, durchaus frei von metaphysischen Überhöhungen (Positivismus). Obwohl sie den zeitgenössischen Fortschrittsoptimismus nicht teilen, sind sie doch unermüdliche Befürworter des Lebens in Mannigfaltigkeit und Singularität.

On the basis of a critique of the notion of collective intentionality employed by John Searle to explain social reality, the article argues Searle’s constitutive rule that, for social objects “X counts as Y in C” raises more problems than it solves. Searle was perfectly right to say that Derrida’s formula “there is nothing outside the text” is false. But we can vindicate (and emend) Derrida by saying “ there is nothing social outside the text”: social objects are identified with (...) the inscrbed acts that give rise to them. (shrink)

The following paper advances a new argument for the thesis that scientific and historical knowledge are not different in type. This argument makes use of a formal ontology of history which dispenses with generality, laws and causality. It views the past social world as composed of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian objects: of events, ordered in ontological dependencies. Theories in history advance models of past reality which connect—in experiment—faces of past events in complexes. The events themselves are multi-grained so that we can connect (...) together different faces of theirs without counterfeiting history. This means that, on the basis of the same set of facts, historians can produce different models of past events, in which different dependences are brought forth. A conception of this kind substantiates an objectivist account of the recurrent falsifications of the theories in history. (shrink)