This paper considers what liberal philosopher Michael Sandel coins the ‘moral limits of markets’ in relation to the idea of paying people for data about their biometrics and emotions. With Sandel arguing that certain aspects of human life (such as our bodies and body parts) should be beyond monetisation and exchange, others argue that emerging technologies such as Personal Information Management Systems can enable a fairer, paid, data exchange between the individual and the organisation, even regarding highly personal data about (...) our bodies and emotions. With the field of data ethics rarely addressing questions of payment, this paper explores normative questions about data dividends. It does so by conducting a UK-wide, demographically representative online survey to quantitatively assess adults’ views on being paid for personal data about their biometrics and emotions via a Personal Information Management System, producing a data dividend, a premise which sees personal data through the prism of markets and property. The paper finds diverse attitudes based on socio-demographic characteristics, the type of personal data sold, and the type of organisation sold to. It argues that (a) Sandel’s argument regarding the moral limits of markets has value in protecting fundamental freedoms of those in society who are arguably least able to (such as the poor); but (b) that contexts of use, in particular, blur moral limits regarding fundamental freedoms and markets. (shrink)

A recent interpretation of artificial intelligence (AI) (Floridi 2013, 2022) suggests that the implementation of AI demands the investigation of the binding conditions that make it possible to build and integrate artifacts into our lived world. Such artifacts can successfully interact with the world because our environment has been designed to be compatible with intelligent machines (such as robots). As the use of AI becomes ubiquitous in society, possibly leading to the formation of increasingly intelligent bio-technological unions, there will likely (...) be a coexistence of a plethora of micro-environments wrapped and tailored around humans and basic robots. The key element of this pervasive process will be the capacity to integrate biological realms in an infosphere suitable for the implementation of AI technologies. This process will require extensive datafication. This is because data is the basis of the logical-mathematical codes and models that drive and guide AI. This process will have huge consequences on workplaces, on workers, as well as on the decision-making processes required for the functioning of future societies. In this paper we will offer a comprehensive reflection on the moral and social implications of datafication as well as a set of considerations about its desirability, which will be informed by the following insights: (1) full protection of privacy may become structurally impossible, thus leading to undesirable forms of political and social control; (2) worker’s freedom may be reduced; (3) human creativity, imagination, and even divergence from AI logic might be channeled and possibly discouraged; (4) there will likely be a push towards efficiency and instrumental reason, which will become preeminent in production lines as well as in society. (shrink)

Advances in technology have transformed and expanded the ways in which policing is run. One new manifestation is the mass acquisition and processing of private facial images via automatic facial recognition by the police: what we conceptualise as AFR-based policing. However, there is still a lack of clarity on the manner and extent to which this largely-unregulated technology is used by law enforcement agencies and on its impact on fundamental rights. Social understanding and involvement are still insufficient in the context (...) of AFR technologies, which in turn affects social trust in and legitimacy and effectiveness of intelligent governance. This article delineates the function creep of this new concept, identifying the individual and collective harms it engenders. A technological, contextual perspective of the function creep of AFR in policing will evidence the comprehensive creep of training datasets and learning algorithms, which have by-passed an ignorant public. We thus argue individual harms to dignity, privacy and autonomy, combine to constitute a form of cultural harm, impacting directly on individuals and society as a whole. While recognising the limitations of what the law can achieve, we conclude by considering options for redress and the creation of an enhanced regulatory and oversight framework model, or Code of Conduct, as a means of encouraging cultural change from prevailing police indifference to enforcing respect for the human rights violations potentially engaged. The imperative will be to strengthen the top-level design and technical support of AFR policing, imbuing it with the values implicit in the rule of law, democratisation and scientisation-to enhance public confidence and trust in AFR social governance, and to promote civilised social governance in AFR policing. (shrink)

Debates about terrorism and technology often focus on the potential uses of technology by non-state terrorist actors and by states as forms of counterterrorism. Yet, little has been written about how technology shapes how we think about terrorism. In this chapter I argue that technology, and the language we use to talk about technology, constrains and shapes our understanding of the nature, scope, and impact of terrorism, particularly in relation to state terrorism. After exploring the ways in which technology shapes (...) moral thinking, I use two case studies to demonstrate how technology simultaneously hides and enables terroristic forms of state violence: police control technologies and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones. In both these cases, I argue that features of these technologies, combined with a narrative of precision and efficiency, serves to mask the terroristic nature of the violence that these practices inflict and reinforces the moral exclusion of those against whom these technologies are deployed. In conclusion, I propose that identifying acts of terrorism requires a focus on the impact of technologies of violence (whether they are “high tech” or not) on those most affected, regardless of whether users of these technologies conceive of their actions as terroristic. (shrink)

As more and more companies adopt artificial intelligence to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their products and services, they expose themselves to ethical crises and potentially damaging public controversy associated with its use. Despite the prevalence of AI ethical problems, most companies are strategically unprepared to respond effectively to the public. This paper aims to advance our empirical understanding of company responses to AI ethical crises by focusing on the rise and fall of facial recognition technology. Specifically, through a (...) comparative case study of how four big technology companies responded to public outcry over their facial recognition programs, we not only demonstrated the unfolding and consequences of public controversies over this new technology, but also identified and described four major types of company responses—Deflection, Improvement, Validation, and Pre-emption. These findings pave the way for future research on the management of controversial technology and the ethics of AI. (shrink)

In this article I analyse the hidden genealogical link between portrait photography, used for criminological and psychiatric purposes, and contemporary systems of biometric identification of the human face. The aim is to highlight the shift between the emphasis on the importance of the human ‘expert eye’ in recognizing the face when talking about nineteenth-century photography and the use of computer technology that produces and reads digital facial images. In both cases, however, these are modes and variants of reducing and flattening (...) the human face; the face itself disappears under the onslaught of technologies of vision and mediation, becoming a mere data set. Special attention is devoted to the pose, the frontal view, which is the technological a priori of the empirical possibility of recognition, articulated through the history of visualization of the face from early portrait photography to facial recognition systems. Consequently, what we call the ‘face’ is a simulacra of individual the face presented to the apparatus: the ‘real’ face is transposed upon multiple technological layers (camera – plates – photographic surface), losing its characteristic features to be re-written according to specific techniques of measurement. (shrink)