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  1. Kant on Moral Illusion and Appraisal of Others.David Hakim - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):421-440.
    Kant’s accounts of moral education, appraisal respect and gratitude each depend on the assumption that human beings see and judge each other’s actions to be morally good. This assumption appears to stand in tension with the Opacity Thesis, Kant’s claim that we can never know if an action is morally good. This paper examines Kant’s discussion of moral illusion to relieve this tension. It is argued that we are required to uphold moral illusion, i.e. to represent others’ actions to be (...)
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  • Moral regret and moral feeling(s).Katherine Gasdaglis - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):424-452.
    1. Kantian moral theories have been criticized for their inability to make sense of the phenomenology and propriety of regret in the face of difficult moral choices. As Bernard Williams puts it, re...
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  • Offensive Beneficence.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):74--90.
    Simple acts of kindness that are performed sincerely and with evident good will can also, paradoxically, be perceived as deeply insulting by the people we succeed in benefiting. When we are moved to help someone out of genuine concern for her, when we have no intention to humiliate or embarrass her and when we succeed at benefiting her, how can our generosity be disparaging or demeaning to her? Yet, when the tables are turned, we sometimes find ourselves brusquely refusing assistance (...)
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  • Negative Feelings of Gratitude.Tony Manela - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):129-140.
    Philosophers generally agree that gratitude, the called-for response to benevolence, includes positive feelings. In this paper, I argue against this view. The grateful beneficiary will have certain feelings, but in some contexts, those feelings will be profoundly negative. Philosophers overlook this fact because they tend to consider only cases of gratitude in which the benefactor’s sacrifice is minimal, and in which the benefactor fares well after performing an act of benevolence. When we consider cases in which a benefactor suffers severely, (...)
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  • Proaktives, reaktives und reziprokes Wohlwollen. Kants System der Liebespflichten.Elke Elisabeth Schmidt - 2024 - Kant Studien 115 (3):339-364.
    Kant’s duties of love include the duties of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic participation. But what is it that allows Kant to bring such seemingly quite heterogeneous duties under one concept, especially under the concept of love? I will argue that it is benevolence as an essential element of love that takes on this unifying role. In order to understand this role of benevolence as the unifying element of the three duties of love, the concept of benevolence will first be analyzed (...)
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  • On Virtues of Love and Wide Ethical Duties.Melissa Seymour Fahmy - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (3):415-437.
    In this article I argue that understanding the role that the virtues of love play in Kant’s ethical theory requires understanding not only the nature of the virtues themselves, but also the unique nature of wide Kantian duties. I begin by making the case that while the Doctrine of Virtue supports attributing an affective component to the virtues of love, we are right to resist attributing anaffective success conditionto these virtues. I then distinguish wide duties from negative and narrow (positive) (...)
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  • Gratitude, Self-Interest, and Love.Y. Sandy Berkovski - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):645-664.
    Gratitude is usually conceived as a uniquely appropriate response to goodwill. A grateful person is bound to reward an act of goodwill in some appropriately proportionate way. I argue that goodwill, when interpreted as love, should require no reward. Consequently, the idea of gratitude as a proportionate response to love is not intelligible. However, goodwill can also be understood merely as a disinterested concern. Such forms of goodwill are involved in reciprocal relationships. But gratitude has no place in these relationships (...)
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