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According to the orthodox interpretation of bounce cosmologies, the universe was born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous universe. To defend the thesis that the whole of physical reality was caused to exist a finite time ago, Craig and Sinclair have argued the low-entropy interface between universes should instead be understood as the beginning of two universes. Here, I present Craig and Sinclair with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the direction of time is reducible, as friends of (...) |
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Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) |
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Graham Oppy has emerged as one of the kalam cosmological argument’s most formidable opponents. He rejects all four of the arguments drawn from metaphysics and physics for the second premiss that the universe began to exist. He also thinks that we have no good reason to accept the first premiss that everything that begins to exist has a cause. In this response, I hope to show that the kalam cosmological argument is, in fact, considerably stronger than Oppy claims, surviving even (...) |
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In this note a recently developed quantum oscillating finite space cosmological model is described. The principle novelty of the model is that there is a quantum blurring of the classical singularity between cycles, instead of a singularity free bounce. Recently, Quentin Smith (1988) has argued that present theoretical and observational evidence justifies the belief that the past history of the universe is finite. The relevance of this cosmological model to Smith's arguments is discussed. |
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V nasledujúcom príspevku sa snažíme zdôvodniť vyčlenenie troch typov procesov v pozorovanom vesmíre - procesov slabo, stredne a silne usmernených, a to na základe rôznej miery autonómnosti ich štruktúrnych prvkov a rôznej miery či intenzity zákonov, ktorými sú usmerňované alebo riadené. Individuálne a konkrétne procesy sú tak v podstate totožné s individuálnymi a konkrétnymi systémami, cez ktoré, v ktorých a prostredníctvom ktorých sa úplne realizujú, disponujúc tak vždy a všade vlastným substanciálnym obsahom. Na tomto základe potom vyčleňujeme slabo usmernené procesy (...) |
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V prvej časti príspevku s názvom Čas sa najprv na základe známeho textu Aurélia Augustína Vyznania vymedzujú hlavné problémy spojené s určovaním času, jeho reálnosťou, pretržitosťou, merateľnosťou atď. V druhej časti s názvom Veľký tresk sa uvádzajú rôzne vymedzenia tejto veľmi špecifickej udalosti, ktorá by mala byť počiatkom všetkého, čo skúmame a čím žijeme; najprv tie tradičné, kedy sa veľký tresk chápe ako explodujúca singularita a biela diera, a potom aj tie novšie, kedy prestáva byť absolútnym počiatkom vesmíru a stáva (...) |
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Lane Craig, for example, asserts, that it is "intuitively obvious." 1 This approach is not promising since this principle is not self evident. A principle p is self evident if and only if everybody who understands p believes p, but many philosophers and cosmologists not only believe it possible. |
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Quentin Smith contends that modern science provides enough evidence ‘to justify the belief that the universe began to exist without being caused to do so.’There was a time when such a claim would have been dismissed because it conflicts with a principle absolutely fundamental to all human thought, including science itself. As Thomas Reid expressed the matter:That neither existence, nor any mode of existence, can begin without an efficient cause is a principle that appears very early in the mind of (...) |
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After presenting Apostels views on scientific realism, I present definitions of the concepts of ontology and metaphysics. I then proceed to develop Apostels basic ontology and his metaphysics. Apostel proposed a particular understanding of existence based on his views on causation. He also developed a view of the universe as a causal self-explaining system. I discuss and illustrate three kinds of what he calls metaphysical deductions that aim to deliver such a view of the universe. The most important one is (...) |
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where ds is the space-time interval between two events, a the scale factor representing the radius of the universe at a given time, and do is the line element of a space with constant curvature. The application of this metric to the field equations provides us with the Friedmann’s solutions, which are the heart of big bang cosmology. With the cosmological constant omitted, these solutions read. |
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Recent models in quantum cosmology make use of the concept of imaginary time. These models all conjecture a join between regions of imaginary time and regions of real time. We examine the model of James Hartle and Stephen Hawking to argue that the various no-boundary attempts to interpret the transition from imaginary to real time in a logically consistent and physically significant way all fail. We believe this conclusion also applies to quantum tunneling models, such as that proposed by Alexander (...) |
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In conclusion, then, I think that the refutations proffered by Mackie of thekalām cosmological argument were all too quick and easy. Nor do I think Oppy has succeeded in rehabilitating those refutations. |
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