My research into Virtual Reality technology and its central property of immersion has indicated that immersion in Virtual Reality (VR) electronic systems is a significant key to the understanding of contemporary culture as well as considerable aspects of previous culture as detected in the histories of philosophy and the visual arts. The fundamental change in aesthetic perception engendered by immersion, a perception which is connected to the ideal of total-immersion in virtual space, identifies certain shifts in ontology which are relevant (...) to a better understanding of the human being. This understanding was achieved through a broad inquiry into the histories of Virtual Reality, philosophy, and the visual arts and has lead to the formulation of an aesthetic theory of immersive consciousness indicative of immersive culture. The primary subject of this discourse is immersion then: an experience which will be identified within the dissertation as the indispensable characteristic of Virtual Reality. The understanding of immersion arrived at here will be used to fashion a synchronous theory of art particularly informed by encounters and concepts of immersion into virtuality. To sufficiently address this subject in a scholarly fashion, I have researched, found and accumulated aesthetic and philosophic examples of immersive tendencies, as found within the histories of art and philosophy, which subsequently contributed towards the articulation of what I have come to call immersive consciousness. As a result of formulating such an immersive consciousness, a good deal of the basis for the questioning of the Western ontological tradition has been found in the Western tradition itself when we look with new eyes and ask new uncertain questions. Moreover, this immersive consciousness will be used to propose some abstract questions encircling today's electronic-based culture. Through the structuring of the argument within the thesis - and overtly within the conclusion - I have articulated a non-teleological creative strategy which provides the basis for an unconstraining integration of noologies (ways of semblancing the thinking process). This strategy provides a means of exemplifying - and for honoring - various methods of thinking. This structuring strategy is consistent with the 'hacker ethic' as defined by Steven Levy, as a demand that access to computers - and anything which might teach us something about the way the world works - should be unlimited and total. To follow this strategy, this dissertation has set out to understand how topical conceptions of virtual immersion connect to pre-existing systems of thought as revealed in art as they have extended out of antecedent ontological self-understandings, historical human self-understandings which have evidenced themselves in the elaboration of technological objectives. To do this I have forged a certain rhizomatic paternity/maternity for Virtual Reality within this dissertation by joining choice immersive examples of simulacra technology into mental connections with the relevant examples culled from the histories of art, architecture, information-technology, sex, myth, space, consciousness and philosophy. (shrink)

The holism-reductionism debate, one of the classic subjects of study in the philosopy of science, is currently at the heart of epistemological concerns in ecology. Yet the division between holism and reductionism does not always stand out clearly in this field. In particular, almost all work in ecosystem ecology and landscape ecology presents itself as holistic and emergentist. Nonetheless, the operational approaches used rely on conventional reductionist methodology.From an emergentist epistemological perspective, a set of general 'transactional' principles inspired by the (...) work of J. Dewey and J.K. Feibleman are proposed in an effort to develop a coherent ontological and methodological semantics. (shrink)

We examine three business-related initiatives designed to achieve peace positive impacts in the Cape Town township of Langa. Each was seemingly straightforward in its purpose, logic, and implementation. However, their positive intent was frustrated and their impacts ultimately harmful to their articulated goals. Understanding why this is so can be difficult in violent, turbulent, and information-poor environments such as Langa, confounding progress even by actors with ethical intentions. To aid in sense making and to provide insight for more positive future (...) action, we develop from 125 interviews conducted for this study causal loop models for these initiatives within their conflict subsystems. These explain the perverse impacts of these initiatives by illuminating their (lack of) salience to key conflict factors, their (in)sufficiency to effect positive change in light of competing systems dynamics, and their (in)attentiveness to interdependencies with the intentions and actions of others. We thus contribute to understanding of the factors required to achieve positive social outcomes in more extreme contexts. More generally, we demonstrate the value of systems analysis both for scholarship related to business and peace and for reducing blind spots that can inhibit sound planning for ethical business action amidst complexity. (shrink)

Agriculture occupies 38% of the planet’s terrestrial surface, using 70% of freshwater resources. Its modern practice is dominated by an industrial–productivist discourse, which has contributed to the simplification and degradation of human and ecological systems. As such, agricultural transformation is essential for creating more sustainable food systems. This paper focuses on discursive change. A prominent discursive alternative to industrial–productivist agriculture is regenerative agriculture. Regenerative discourses are emergent, radically evolving and diverse. It is unclear whether they have the potential to generate (...) the changes required to shift industrial–productivist agriculture. This paper presents a literature-based discourse analysis to illustrate key thematic characteristics of regenerative agricultural discourses. The analysis finds that such discourses: situate agricultural work within nested, complex living systems; position farms as relational, characterised by co-evolution between humans and other landscape biota; perceive the innate potential of living systems as place-sourced; maintain a transformative openness to alternative thinking and practice; believe that multiple regenerative cultures are necessary for deeply regenerative agriculture; and depart from industrialism to varying degrees. The paper concludes by reviewing three transformative opportunities for regenerative discourses—discourse coalitions, translocal organising and collective learning. (shrink)

Currently there is such a cornucopia of conflicting theories in the field of addiction studies that it has become exceedingly difficult for treatment providers, therapists, and policymakers to integrate this vast field of knowledge into effective treatment. Since such a chaotic overabundance of treatment theories, styles, and definitions cloud the field of addictionology, many therapists claim their field is in need of a paradigm shift. In the last 20 years an integrative and compound model has emerged known as the biopsychosocial (...) model, but without a solid and comprehensive meta-framework, syncretistic confusion can result when therapists pick and choose techniques without direction or an overall rationale. To address this problem, Guy du Plessis applies integral theory as a conceptual framework for understanding addiction, as well as a meta-therapeutic framework for therapists. The integral foundation of addiction outlined in this book provides researchers, academics, treatment providers, policy makers, and therapists with a conceptual architectonic of addiction and its treatment that is integrative, inclusive, and practical. An Integral Foundation for Addiction Treatment belongs on the shelf of every addiction treatment therapist, and anyone else who is impacted or influenced by the topic. (shrink)

This article outlines an integrally informed model for addictionon treatment and recover that is being pioneered and developed at Tabankulu Secondary Addiction Recovery Center in Cape Town, South Africa. Tabankulu is the world’s first inpatient Addictionon treatment center to implement an integrally informed treatment model. The Integrated Recovery model is a comprehensive, balanced, multi-phased, and multi-disciplinary approach to the treatment of and recovery from addiction. Its philosophy is derived from integrang a 12 Step abstinence-based methodology, mindfulness-based interventions, positive psychology, and (...) Integral Theory. The case is made that addictionon treatment facilities, therapists working with this population, and recovering addicts will become more proficient, effective, and consequently have higher success rates by becoming integrally informed. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that a comprehensive understanding of addiction and its treatment should include an existential perspective. I provide a brief overview of an existential perspective of addiction and recovery, which will contextualize the remainder of the essay. I then present a case study of how the six-step philosophical practice method of Logic-Based Therapy can assist with issues that often arise in addiction treatment framed through an existential perspective.

This paper addresses theoretical challenges, still relevant today, that arose in the first decades of the twentieth century related to the concept of the organism. During this period, new insights into the plasticity and robustness of organisms as well as their complex interactions fueled calls, especially in the UK and in the German-speaking world, for grounding biological theory on the concept of the organism. This new organism-centered biology understood organisms as the most important explanatory and methodological unit in biological investigations. (...) At least three theoretical strands can be distinguished in this movement: Organicism, dialectical materialism, and holistic biology. This paper shows that a major challenge of OCB was to describe the individual organism as a causally autonomous and discrete unit with consistent boundaries and, at the same time, as inextricably interwoven with its environment. In other words, OCB had to conciliate individualistic with anti-individualistic perspectives. This challenge was addressed by developing a concept of life that included functionalist and metabolic elements, as well as biochemical and physical ones. It allowed for specifying organisms as life forms that actively delimit themselves from the environment. Finally, this paper shows that the recent return to the concept of the organism, especially in the so-called “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,” is challenged by similar anti-individualistic tendencies. However, in contrast to its early-twentieth-century forerunner, today’s organism-centered approaches have not yet offered a solution to this problem. (shrink)

Despite its current popularity, “emergence” is a concept with a venerable history and an elusive, ambiguous standing in contemporary evolutionary theory. This paper briefly recounts the history of the term and details some of its current usages. Not only are there radically varying interpretations about how to define emergence but “reductionist” and “holistic” theorists hold very different views about the issue of causation. However, these two seemingly polar positions are not irreconcilable. Reductionism, or detailed analysis of the parts and their (...) interactions, is essential for answering the “how” question in evolution—how does a complex living system work? But holism is equally necessary for answering the “why” question—why did a particular arrangement of parts evolve? In order to answer the “why” question, a broader, multi-leveled paradigm is required. The reductionist approach to explaining emergent complexity has entailed a search for underlying “laws of emergence.” In contrast, the “Synergism Hypothesis” focuses on the “economics”—the functional effects produced by emergent wholes and their selective consequences in evolutionary change. This paper also argues that emergent phenomena represent, in effect, a subset of a larger universe of cooperative, synergistic effects in the natural world. (shrink)

Philosophy of biology is often said to have emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, it has been alleged that the only authors who engaged philosophically with the life sciences were either logical empiricists who sought to impose the explanatory ideals of the physical sciences onto biology, or vitalists who invoked mystical agencies in an attempt to ward off the threat of physicochemical reduction. These schools paid little attention to actual biological science, and as (...) a result philosophy of biology languished in a state of futility for much of the twentieth century. The situation, we are told, only began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a new generation of researchers began to focus on problems internal to biology, leading to the consolidation of the discipline. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted narrative of the history of philosophy of biology. We do so by arguing that the most important tradition within early twentieth-century philosophy of biology was neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but the organicist movement that flourished between the First and Second World Wars. We show that the organicist corpus is thematically and methodologically continuous with the contemporary literature in order to discredit the view that early work in the philosophy of biology was unproductive, and we emphasize the desirability of integrating the historical and contemporary conversations into a single, unified discourse. (shrink)

Edward O. Wilson’s recent decision to abandon kin selection theory has sent shockwaves throughout the biological sciences. Over the past two years, more than a hundred biologists have signed letters protesting his reversal. Making sense of Wilson’s decision and the controversy it has spawned requires familiarity with the historical record. This entails not only examining the conditions under which kin selection theory first emerged, but also the organicist tradition against which it rebelled. In similar fashion, one must not only examine (...) Wilson’s long career, but also those thinkers who influenced him most, especially his intellectual grandfather, William Morton Wheeler (1865–1937). Wilson belongs to a long line of organicists, biologists whose research highlighted integration and coordination, many of whom struggled over the exact same biological riddles that have long defined Wilson’s career. Drawing inspiration (and sometimes ideas) from these intellectual forebears, Wilson is confident that he has finally identified the origin of the social impulse. (shrink)

This study presents and develops in detail (a new version of) the argumental conception of meaning. The two basic principles of the argumental conception of meaning are: i) To know (implicitly) the sense of a word is to know (implicitly) all the argumentation rules concerning that word; ii) To know the sense of a sentence is to know the syntactic structure of that sentence and to know the senses of the words occurring in it. The sense of a sentence is (...) called immediate argumental role of that sentence. According to the argumental conception of meaning a theory of meaning for a particular language yields a systematic specification of the understanding of every sentence of the language which consists in a specification of the immediate argumental role of the sentence. The immediate argumental role is a particular aspect of the use of a sentence in arguments. But it is not the whole use in arguments, nor is the whole use in arguments reducible to the immediate argumental role. That is why, by accepting the argumental conception of meaning, we can have epistemological holism without linguistic holism. The argumental conception distinguishes between the understanding and the correctness of a language. Such a distinction makes it possible to account for our understanding of paradoxical languages. Redundancy theory of truth, realistic conceptions of truth or epistemic conceptions of truth are all compatible with an argumental conception of sense. But here it is argued that an epistemic conception of truth is preferrable. Acceptance of the argumental conception of meaning and of an epistemic conception of truth leads to a rejection of the idea of analytic truth. The argumental conception is pluralistic with respect to the understandability of different logics, and neutral with respect to their correctness. (shrink)

Holism and reductionism are usually seen as opposite and mutually exclusive approaches to nature. Recently, some have come to see them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In this book I have argued that, even stronger, they should be seen as mutually dependent and co-operating research programmes. I have discussed holism and reductionism in biology in general and in ecology in particular. After an introductory chapter I have provided an overview of holistic and reductionistic positions in biology, and of the (...) reduction problems to which they relate. I have argued that it is extremely important to distinguish between ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects of these problems. The overview has shown that there are actually several approaches to reduction problems in biology, which can be characterized as more or less radically or moderately holistic or reductionistic. It has shown also that there are three major ’contradistinctions’ between holism and reductionism in biology, to wit the doctrine of emergence versus the reduction thesis; functional explanations versus causal explanations; and phenomenology versus mechanicism. In later chapters I have shown that these ’contradistinctions’ are not really contradistinctions at all. In the next chapters I have discussed the terms ’reduce’ and ’reduction’ in science. In chapter 3 I have discussed the reduction of laws and theories. I have shown that there are many different types of reduction depending on the auxiliary hypotheses that are being used in addition to the reducing theory: approximation-, aggregation, correlation and/or identification-hypotheses. The distinctions between these types has later, in chapter 5, proved to be of great importance in defining the concept of ’emergence’. The major conclusion of chapter 3 was that reduction is an epistemological issue, pertaining to logical relations between statements or systems of statements. It should not be confused, therefore, with ’ontological reduction’, certainly not in one of its ordinary senses, such as diminishing, devaluating or the like. Scientific reductions are, with the exception of instrumentalistic reductions, kinds of explanation, and, moreover, non-eliminative kinds of explanation. This means that a reduced law or theory is not eliminated by the reducing theory but rather consolidated or even reinforced. The ontology of the reduced law or theory is thereby also being consolidated. In chapter 4 I have argued that the same holds for reductions of concepts. Concept reductions are supposed to be accomplished by means of so-called ontological identity relations, which are in turn supposed to connect terms in the law or theory to be reduced, which do not occur in the reducing theory, with theoretical terms of the reducing theory. Because they are called ontological identity relations, several philosophers have thought that concept reductions imply some form of ontological reduction. And because they often occur in the context of micro-reductions, some have even thought that concept reductions are themselves micro-reductions. As a result, the idea has arisen that ontological identity relations are connections between macro-concepts and micro-concepts. However, concept reductions by means of ontological identity relations cannot be micro-reductions, because micro-reduction is, by definition, reduction with an aggregation step. Moreover, ontological identity relations are relations between different representations of and the same type of thing or attribute. That is, they express different epistemological sides of the same ontological coin. Therefore, concept reductions cannot be considered ontological reductions either, certainly not in the ordinary sense of diminishing, devaluating or the like. Thus, concept reduction is, like law or theory reduction, an epistemological issue: it pertains to relations between, in this case, different concepts or representations of one and the same type of thing or attribute. ’Ontological reduction’, then, may, in the context of scientific reductions, actually be considered a contradiction of terms. In chapter 5 I have linked this conclusion to the emergence thesis and to the alleged contradistinction between this thesis and the reduction thesis. I have shown that the doctrine of emergence actually consists of two separate claims, namely an ontological thesis stating that a whole has emergent properties which the component parts do not possess, neither separately nor in other partial combinations; and an epistemological thesis stating that emergent properties of wholes are ’in principle’ irreducible. I have argued that the first claim may be regarded as a valid, universal thesis about relations between properties of wholes and properties of parts, but that the second claim is untenable. I have discussed many emergent properties of wholes, biological as well as physico-chemical, that have proved to be explainable in terms of micro-theories about the component parts and auxiliary hypotheses. Once again, however, it is important to realize that reduction is an epistemological issue, whereas emergence, in the sense of thesis, is an ontological one. It is not ’wholes’ or ’emergent properties of wholes’ that are being reduced but statements about them. Reduction is a kind of explanation, not of explaining-away. Thus, it leaves the ontology of whatever is reduced fully intact. I have developed a new definition of the term ’emergence’ which expresses emergence in terms of the auxiliary hypotheses that may be used in reductions, in particular aggregation-, correlation- and identification-hypotheses. This has even lead to two very remarkable conclusions. First, emergence may be considered the opposite of ontological identity. And second, if there were no emergence, there wouldn’t be any reductions either. to reduce.) In this respect, therefore, there is absolutely no contradistinction between holism and reductionism. On these grounds I have introduced my thesis that holism and reductionism should rather be seen as mutually dependent, and hence co-operating, research programmes than as conflicting views of nature or of relations between sciences. Holistic programmes play an important role in science as guide programmes for reductionistic programmes by discovering or developing macro-laws or -theories about phenomena at the level of wholes, which they themselves, however, cannot explain. For these explanations they depend on the fruits of reductionistic programmes. If the latter succeed in providing the explanations they act as supply programmes for the holistic guide programmes. Reductionistic programmes depend in turn on holistic programmes for providing the macro-laws or -theories that call for these explanations. In chapter 6 I have discussed an example of this mutual dependency in the form of the reduction of the Bohr-effect in animal physiology. I have shown that this law has been reduced to the theory of allostery, applied to hemoglobin molecules in red blood cells, and that this application of the theory of allostery has been reduced to the theory of chemical bonding. I have also shown that at least six research programmes were involved in these reductions, and that the relations between these programmes can be characterized very well in terms of the model of holistic guide programmes and reductionistic supply programmes. The only, but highly significant, qualification appearing from example was that the terms ’holistic’ and ’reductionistic’ are extremely relative and should always be related to a certain given level of organization. In chapter 7 I have resolved the remaining contradistinction between holism and reductionism in biology, viz. the need for functional explanations and the demand that explanations be causal. I have shown that functional explanations are perfectly legitimate explanations which in a sense can be reconstrued as causal explanations. I have argued that functional explanations are indispensable components of more comprehensive, causal-evolutionary explanations, because the latter appeal to the adaptive value, and hence the function, of the property to be explained. In that sense functions can be regarded as adaptations, and functional explanations can be regarded as a sort of ’short-hand’ for evolutionary explanations. Finally, I have shown that in the context of functional explanations, too, co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes occurs. In part 2 I have applied my thesis to ecology. I have shown that in ecology too, holismreductionism disputes notwithstanding, co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes occurs, or, in so far as this appears to be not the case, that it should be strived after. In chapter 8 I have given an overview of reduction problems in ecology and of the various approaches to these problems. I have noticed that in ecology, too, there are several, radical, moderate and anti-reductionistic research strategies, with respect to the levels of both ecosystems, communities and populations. I have also noticed, however, that concrete solutions to reduction problems in ecology are frustrated by what is called the intellectual immaturity or the anomalous status of ecology. This refers to the almost complete lack of general laws and theories in ecology, at least at the higher levels of communities and ecosystems. Of a number of possible causes I have lifted out two, which lend themselves to philosophical analysis and clarification. The first one is the ambiguity of a major part of the ecological vocabulary. This was the subject of chapters 9 and 10. The second is the inhibitory effect which holism-reductionism disputes have on the growth of knowledge. This was the subject of chapter 13. In chapter 9 I have discussed the concept of an community. It appeared that the term ’community’ is used for several different entities at various levels of organization. This ambiguity alone seems to be sufficient for the lack of ’general’ laws and theories about ’communities’. My purpose in chapter 9 was to try and contribute to a solution of this problem. In doing so I have argued, first, that it seems wise to use the term ’community’ only for groups of species belonging to a single taxonomic or phylogenetic group, and to use the term ’biocoenosis’ for the higher level of organization, defined as the biotic component of an ecosystem. Next I have argued that, although species within communities may of course interact with each other, interaction is itself not a necessary or sufficient condition for community membership. Finally, I have hit upon what is known as the most notorious problem in community ecology, to wit the boundary problem, as well as the problem of heterogeneity. I have found that the cause of these problems lies in the fact that communities are almost invariably being seen as groups of populations occurring together in space and time, whereas the empirical fact is rather that populations of different species mostly do not occur together in the same space, and, moreover, that the species composition of communities changes continuously. This has lead to the suggestion that a community had better be defined as the group of individuals of two or more species occurring in the area of intersection of populations of these species. It is only in such intersection areas that one can really talk of the co-occurrence of species. I have shown the empirical adequacy of this definition by discussing various salt marsh plant communities on the Dutch island of Schiermonnikoog. In chapter 10 I have clarified two other important, yet highly controversial, concepts in ecology, to wit habitat and niche. It appeared that there are at least four different habitat concepts in ecology, and as many niche concepts, the additional complication being that two of these habitat concepts correspond to two of these niche concepts, whence the distinction between habitat and niche is blurred. In addition, different habitat concepts appeared to correspond to different environment concepts and also to different biotope concepts. My purpose in chapter 10 was to disentangle all these concepts from one another and to supply each of them with a suitable term. I have done so by keeping a close eye on commonly accepted notions about habitat differentiation and niche differentiation, two ’principles’ allowing one to explain the coexistence or non-coexistence of species in communities. The results can be found in boxes 5 and 7 in chapter 10. In chapter 11 I was finally able to substantiate my claim that in ecology, too, co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes occurs. I have discussed the reduction of the classical competition model of Lotka and Volterra to modern niche theory. The Lotka/Volterra model is a phenomenological model: it describes the possible effects of competition between two species. Modern niche theory, on the other hand, is a mechanistic theory, in which both the objects of competition and a mechanism are being specified. I have shown that the reduction was established with the help of a relatively simple identification hypothesis and two relatively simple aggregation hypotheses, making it yet another example of heterogeneous microreduction in biology. In the reduction, the Lotka/Volterra model acted as a holistic guide programme and modern niche theory acted as a reductionistic supply programme. In chapter 12 I have discussed another example of co-operation in the form of the approximative reduction of MacArthur and Wilson’s equilibrium theory of island biogeography. I have argued that this can be seen as a holistic model, which has been of great unifying and especially heuristic value, but which in time has been found to be a bit too simple and in some respects had to be corrected. Therefore, it can also be seen as an idealization in the sense of the model of idealization and concretization, which subsequent research programmes have concretized. Because these concretizations have a reductive character, we can see in this structure of idealization and concretization yet another example of the co-operation of holistic and reductionistic research programmes in ecology. A philosophically interesting side-conclusion was that the model of idealization and concretization thus appears to apply also to relations between research programmes, and not only to programme-internal developments. In chapter 13 I have discussed an example of the inhibitory effect that holism-reductionism disputes may have on the growth of knowledge. The example concerns a controversy in island biogeography over the role of interspecific competition in structuring communities. This controversy has lasted for about ten years, appeares to have died out rather than to have been resolved, and has produced nothing new in the field of explanations of community structure. I have shown that the major factors underlying the controversy were differing, in casu holistic and reductionistic, views of communities. Though this presented a problem for my thesis, I have argued that, ultimately, the controversy can be resolved, and in a sense has been resolved, in a way that corroborates my thesis. In the epilogue, finally, I have mentioned some remaining problems concerning the adequacy of the present reduction model in dealing with reduction in ecology. These problems pertain to the question of specificty of ecological laws and theories, the likelihood that reductions in ecology generally occur on the basis of several reducing micro-theories, and the possible relationship between the former two points. (shrink)

У статті розглядається концепція холізму в антропологічному вимірі, що дозволяє виявити еквівокацію різноспрямованих параметрів холізму: духовність як причинність - низхідний вектор розвитку з надсистеми та цілєорієнтованість - висхідний вектор розвитку. Синтезуюча єдність вертикальних і горизонтальних компонентів холізму спирається на принципи саморозвитку та самоорганізації цілісної системи. Основними характеристиками холізму визначаються принципи: цілеорієнтованості, ієрархічності, циклічності, самоорганізації. Духовність як необ’єктивована, нерозкладна трансцендентність в межах холізму визначається вищою надсистемою – причиною універсальної цілісності. Відповідно холістичної онтології людина, як причинно-холістична система, прагне цілісної реалізації, зорентованої на (...) духовність. Порушення цілісності в обмежених формах реалізації людини містить небезпеку відхилень у сфері психічного та фізичного здоров’я. Відповідно причинно-системний підхід до цілісності людини та її розвитку містить перспективи оновленого погляду на місце та роль людини у світі, перегляд концептуальних питань виховання, освіти та відновлення здоров’я людини. (shrink)

Systems biology is today such a widespread discipline that it becomes difficult to propose a clear definition of what it really is. For some, it remains restricted to the genomic field. For many, it designates the integrated approach or the corpus of computational methods employed to handle the vast amount of biological or medical data and investigate the complexity of the living. Although defining systems biology might be difficult, on the other hand its purpose is clear: systems biology, with its (...) emerging subfields systems medicine and systems pharmacology, clearly aims at making sense of complex observations/experimental and clinical datasets to improve our understanding of diseases and their treatments without putting aside the context in which they appear and develop. In this short review, we aim to specifically focus on these new subfields with the new theoretical tools and approaches that were developed in the context of cancer. Systems pharmacology and medicine now give hope for major improvements in cancer therapy, making personalized medicine closer to reality. As we will see, the current challenge is to be able to improve the clinical practice according to the paradigm shift of systems sciences. (shrink)

The practicability of the comprehensive FSR concept is problematic. Contemporary FSR must be positioned at the point of overlap between the positivist and constructivist paradigms, which are both grounded in a continual identification with the rational-empirical consciousness, in thinking -being.Spirituality, defined as the process in which one systematically trains the receptivity to gain regular access to transcendental consciousness, emphasizes the experience of just being, of consciousness-as-such. It is an experiential spirituality, which is not based on dogmas, but on do-it-yourself techniques (...) to break the continuous spell of the rational-empirical consciousness. Such a spirituality facilitates the cultivation of societally and environmentally friendly behavior. Sustainability can be defined as the integrative 'emergent property' of experiential spirituality and rational morality based on negotiated agreements.In addition to the outward-oriented approaches of the positivist and constructivist paradigms, an inward-oriented approach, focusing on consciousness development, is recommended. Language-mediated interaction must be supported by consciousness-mediated interaction. (shrink)

Integral Theory as developed by Ken Wilber and other contemporary Integral scholars acknowledge many antecedent foundational influences, and proto-Integral thinkers. Curiously, the philosopher-statesman Jan Smuts’ theory of Holism is seldom acknowledged, although it has significantly contributed, albeit often implicitly, to the development of Integral Theory. This paper and presentation has two central aims: To point out that Smuts can be counted amongst one of the great Integral thinkers of the 20th Century; that Smuts’ notion of Holism had a significant influence (...) on the development of Integral Theory. This paper and presentation will provide a brief outline of Smuts’ theory of Holism as developed in his book Holism and Evolution and other philosophical essays. (shrink)

During the last thirty years, both the mechanism and the vitalism has undergone remarkable changes. While the former, persisting in the strictly mechanistic thesis, has grown independent of its ancient antiteleological attitude, the latter, overcome as the doctrine of “entelechy”, has turned out fruitful owing to its other component, i.e. to the idea of autonomy of life. To-day, then, the contention takes place between two totally different points of view, between “machinism” and “autonomism”. Both interpretations of life are equally theories, (...) and not descriptions of pure facts; both are, also, metaphysical thesis.Le mécanisme ainsi que le vitalisme a subi des changements remarquables pendant les trente années dernières. Alors que le premier, tout en restant fidèle à la thèse strictement „mécaniste”, est devenu indépendant de son attitude antifinaliste d'autrefois, le vitalisme, surmonté en tant que la doctrine sur l'entélechie, s'est montré fructueux par son autre composante, c'est-à-dire, par l'idée de l'autonomie de la vie. Ainsi, c'est le „machinisme” et l'„autonomisme”, revÊtu du holisme, qui sont en dispute aujourd'hui. Toutes les deux interprétations de la vie sont également des théories, et non pas des pures descriptions de faits; elles sont aussi, toutes deux des thèses métaphysiques. (shrink)

Is organicism inherently Christian-friendly, and for that matter, is mechanism inherently religion nonfriendly? They have tended to be, but the story is much more complicated. The long history of the intertwined metaphors of nature taken as an organism, versus that of nature as a machine, reveals that both metaphors have flourished in the endeavors of philosophers, scientists, and persons of faith alike. Different kinds of Christians have been receptive to both organicist and mechanistic models, just as various kinds of nonreligious (...) scientists have been receptive to both holistic and machine metaphors. Although, it is true, organicism has been generally more attractive to persons of faith than mechanism, an overview of the rich and varied history of allegiances to these metaphors—religious and nonreligious alike—shows that debate is much more interesting and complex. A brief inspection of conversation surrounding recent scientific discoveries shows that this debate between metaphors is still very much alive today. (shrink)

Nineteenth century hygiene might be a confusing concept. On the one hand, the concept of hygiene was gradually becoming an important concept that was focused on cleanliness and used interchangeably with sanitation. On the other hand, the classical notions of hygiene rooted in the Hippocratic teachings remained influential. This study is about two attempts to newly theorise such a confusing concept of hygiene in the second half of the century by Edward. W. Lane and Thomas R. Allinson. Their works, standing (...) on the borders of self-help medical advice and theoretical treatises on medical philosophies, were not exactly scholarly ones, but their medical thoughts - conceptualised as _hygienic medicine_ - show a characteristically holistic medical view of hygiene, a nineteenth-century version of the reinterpretation of the nature cure philosophy and vitalism. However, the aim of this study is to properly locate their conceptualisations of hygienic medicine within the historical context of the second half of the nineteenth century rather than to simply introduce the medical ideas in their books. Their views of hygiene were distinguished not only from the contemporary sanitary approach but also from similar attempts by contemporary orthodox and unorthodox medical doctors. Through a chronological analysis of changes in the concept of hygiene and a comparative analysis of these two authors’ and other medical professionals’ views of hygiene, this paper aims to help understand the complicated picture of nineteenth-century hygiene, particularly during the second half of the century, from the perspective of medical holism and reductionism. (shrink)

Es wird der Nachweis versucht, dass es — ebenso wie in der Physik — auch in der Biologie komplementäre Erkenntnissysteme gibt. Wie Welle und Korpuskel in der Physik, so sind innerhalb der Biologie u.a. Form und Funktion, Innenwelt und Umwelt sowie auch vor allem Vererbung und Anpassung komplementäre Begriffsgefüge. Das wird im einzelnen diskutiert und nachgewiesen.Für die Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit im Ganzen folgt daraus, dass systematisch aufgebaute Erkenntnisgefüge nur in Teilbereichen des Wirklichen möglich sind — nur in der klassischen Mechanik, (...) der Elektrodynamik, der vergleichenden Anatomie, der Genetik usw. — Das Wirkliche in seiner Gesamthet hingegen besitzt keine systematische sondern nur eine historisch-dialektische Struktur. Metaphysisch bedeutet das, dass das Wesen der Wirklichkeit in schöpferischer Freiheit im Sinne etwaGoethes, aber nicht in sturer Notwendigkeit besteht.Se demuestra que — como en laFisica — tambien en la Biologia existen complementarios sistemas de conocimiento. Como onda y corpúsculo dentro de la Fisica, asi son dentro de la Biologia entre otros forma y función, mundo internoy ambientey en primer lugar también herencia y adaptación principios complementarios. Esto será discutido y demonstrado en sus particularidades.Para el conocimiento de la realidad como totalidad sigue de tales consideraciones la conclusión que conocimientos sistematicamente construidos son posibles solo en esferas particulares de la realidad — como p.e. en la mecánica racional, en la electrodinámica, en la anatomia comparada, en la genética etc. —. Lo real en su totalidad posee al contrario ninguna estructura sistemática sino solo un históricadialectica. Metafisicamente hablado significa esto que la esencia de la realidad consiste en una libertad creativa en el sentido deGoethe, pero de ninguna manera en una necesidad absoluta en el sentido deSpinoza. (shrink)

In 1927, Fritz Jahr coined the term “bioethics” to indicate an “environmental ethics based on biopsychics”. In 1970, Van Rensselaer Potter also coined the term “bioethics” to indicate a “new global ethics based on biology”. As the same Potter wrote, after 1971 “in the USA there was an immediate explosion of the use of the word bioethics” but with a completely different meaning which became dominant and spread worldwide. He went on to say, “their [the public's] image of bioethics delayed (...) the [global] emergence of what now exists”. Elsewhere I have analyzed how this happened, here I analyze why. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe problem addressed in this paper is the need for fresh resources for enhanced ethical leadership in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa. To respond to that problem the paper uses two valuable but insufficiently known sources from the culture of the Sesotho-speaking people of southern Africa, now found in Lesotho and much of South Africa's Free State province. The first one is a set of concepts that pertain to sound human relationships. The second one is Basotho history in the (...) persons of the founding monarch of the Basotho nation, King Moshoeshoe I and to a lesser extent his remarkable mentor, Chief Mohlomi. A final section of this paper draws these sources together into a set of contentions about successful leadership in which ethical quality is seen as paramount. (shrink)

On the basis of a comparative analysis of the biosemiotic work of Jakob von Uexküll and of various theories on biological holism, this article takes a look at the question: what is the status of a semiotic approach in respect to a holistic one? The period from 1920 to 1940 was the peak-time of holistic theories, despite the fact that agreement on a unified and accepted set of holistic ideas was never reached. A variety of holisms, dependent on the cultural (...) and disciplinary contexts, is sketched here from the works of Jan Smuts, Adolf Meyer-Abich, John Scott Haldane, Kurt Goldstein, Alfred North Whitehead and Wolfgang Köhler. In contrast with his contemporary holists, who used the model of an organism as a unifying explanatory tool for all levels of reality, Jakob von Uexküll confined himself to disciplinary organicism by extending the borders of the definition of “organism” without any intention to surpass the borders of biology itself. The comparison reveals also a significant difference in the perspectives of Uexküll and his contemporary holists, a difference between a view from a subjective centre in contrast with an all-encompassing structural view. Uexküll’s theories are fairly near to J. S. Haldane’s interpretation of an organism as a coordinative centre, but even here their models do not coincide. Although biosemiotics and holistic biology have different theoretical starting points and research-goals, it is possible nonetheless to place them under one and the same doctrinal roof. (shrink)

Recent developments toward a more holistic biology do not eliminate reductionism and determinism, but they do suggest more complex forms of them, in which there are multiple, interacting influences, as there are in complex or chaotic systems. Though there is a place in biology for both systemic and atomistic modes of explanation, for those with a theological perspective the shift to complex explanations in biology is often welcome. It suggests a more subtle view of divine action in which God's purposes (...) are affected through engagement with the complex systems of creation rather than by discrete interventions. It also invites us to connect the biological interdependence with the interdependence in the nature and purposes of God, and it is consonant with a mystical vision of the unity of all things. (shrink)

Spirituality is a highly contested concept. Within the nursing literature, there are a huge range and diversity of definitions, some of which appear coherent whereas others seem quite disparate and unconnected. This vagueness within the nursing literature has led some to suggest that spirituality is so diverse as to be meaningless. Are the critics correct in asserting that the vagueness that surrounds spirituality invalidates it as a significant aspect of care? We think not. It is in fact the vagueness of (...) the concept that is its strength and value. In this paper, we offer a critique of the general apologetic that surrounds the use of the language of spirituality in nursing. With the critics, we agree that the term ‘spirituality’ is used in endlessly different and loose ways. Similarly, we agree that these varied definitions may not refer to constant essences or objects within people or in the world. However, we fundamentally disagree that this makes spirituality irrelevant or of little practical utility. Quite the opposite; properly understood, the vagueness and lack of clarity around the term spirituality is actually a strength that has powerful political, social, and clinical implications. We develop an understanding of spirituality as a way of naming absences and recognizing gaps in healthcare provision as well as a prophetic challenge to some of the ways in which we practise health care within a secular and sometimes secularizing context such as the National Health Service. (shrink)

As the debate about holism and reductionism in ecology has ebbed in the last twenty years, this article aims to reassess the traditional opposition between holistic and reductionist epistemologies during the development of population biology. The history of the notion of carrying capacity, the upper demographic limit of a viable population, will be analyzed as a paradigmatic case of the progressive imposition of reductionist strategies, from both an epistemological and a semantic point of view, since the middle of the twentieth (...) century. Then, Richard Looijen’s reduction of the carrying capacity concept to the niche partitioning theory will be assessed and rebuked for both empirical and logical reasons. Eventually, some recent “weak” and “hard” emergent conceptualizations of the notion of carrying capacity, in logistic map models or in coupled niche-population systems, will be presented in order to show how they call into question the nature and the use of the notion of carrying capacity as a predefined ecological limit. (shrink)

El presente artículo está dentro de la línea de una serie de trabajos cuyo motivo principal gira en torno a la no-dualidad; en él se reúnen algunas de las reflexiones que han prosperado en diversos espacios intelectuales de oriente. Doctrinas, textos, escuelas y pensadores han ido dando cuerpo y sentido a este escrito, constituyendo un espectro muy valioso de perspectivas y variantes interpretativas.

Time series of macroscopic quantities that are aggregates of microscopic quantities, with unknown one‐many relations between macroscopic and microscopic states, are common in applied sciences, from economics to climate studies. When such time series of macroscopic quantities are claimed to be causal, the causal relations postulated are representable by a directed acyclic graph and associated probability distribution—sometimes called a dynamical Bayes net. Causal interpretations of such series imply claims that hypothetical manipulations of macroscopic variables have unambiguous effects on variables “downstream” (...) in the graph, and such macroscopic variables may be predictably produced or altered even while particular microstates are not. This paper argues that such causal time series of macroscopic aggregates of microscopic processes are the appropriate model for mental causation. (shrink)

Popular visions of holistic health and holistic medicine are not so much reactions to perceived excesses of technological medicine as they are visions of the good life itself and how to attain it. This paper attempts to clarify some of the concepts associated with holistic health and medicine. The particular vision of holistic health presented here is well exemplified in the writings of Plato. First, I examine the scientific concept of holism and argue that, while medicine is inadequately characterized by (...) scientific reductionism, any plausible holistic medicine must make room for a limited scientific reductionism. Next, I analyze the complexity of Plato's usage of health and demonstrate some of the parallels between Plato's thought and popular and scientific visions of holistic health. Finally, I look at what Plato has to say about medical practice and the relation of medicine and philosophy as therapies for the whole person. (shrink)

Van der Klaauw was a professor of Descriptive Zoology in the period 1934–1958. This paper presents a concise annotated overview of his publications. In his work three main topics can be recognized: comparative anatomy of the mammalian auditory region, theoretical studies about ecology and ecological morphology, and vertebrate functional morphology. In particular van der Klaauw developed new concepts on functional morphology, based upon a holistic approach. A series of studies in functional morphology of Vertebrates by his students is added. An (...) overview of recent morphological and theoretical studies show that this new approach had a long lasting impact in studies of functional morphology. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that nurses should be holists whilst at the same time accepting that ‘holism’ is a contentious concept. One of the problems for a supporter of holism is that of which holism -- an attempt to outline the version of holism advocated is made by identifying only two versions of holism: The Strong theory and the Pragmatic theory of holism. By introducing this device it is hoped to avoid, if only by stipulation, some of the (...) more sophisticated nuances of holism drawn by other commentators. However despite a most judicious use of Ockham's Razor some detailed groundwork remains. In the first part of this paper a simple example is used which aims to articulate what are arguably some of the central issues within the holism debate. These issues are then placed within a wider philosophical context. The second part of the paper will offer definitions of Strong and Pragmatic holism. Drawing on specific examples from the nursing context it will be argued that the Pragmatic theory of holism is the theory of holism most compatible with nursing theory and practice. The methods employed in this paper are philosophical. Since the questions considered are conceptual rather than empirical requiring a discursive approach, utilising thought experiments and case implication to explore the issues. (shrink)

The political engagement of scientists is not necessarily left-wing, and even when it is, it can take widely varying forms. This is illustrated by the specific character of Dutch scientific activism in the 1930s and 40s, which took shape in a society where ‘pillarized’ social divisions were more important than horizontal class structure. This paper examines how, within this context, the Delft physicist Jan Burgers developed a version of scientific politics, built on a philosophy of value-laden science.

Scientific description of Nature is here based on geometry, number and energy. Geometry and number are the two only forms of our mind by which we describe Nature. Energy is here considered as the ultimate entity, which in physics is defined by the help of six propreties. The author holds that for an adequate description of physical Nature seven propreties of energy are required and eight are necessary in biology adding the holistic tendencies. On this basis an attempt is made (...) to show that holism is a scientific theory. As we can only perceive geometry and number, holistic propreties as such cannot be dealt with, we can only study the underlying physico-chemical manifestation. There are three holistic principles: 1) Interaction of parts leads to neocreation of propreties; this interaction can only be energetic. 2) The propreties of the whole are not potentially contained in the propreties of the parts. 3) The whole is more than the sum of its parts. Close interaction means fields of force and organisation, which implies that holism is organismic. The second principle is a safeguard against all unwarranted extrapolation. The whole and its parts only have additive propreties in common. Thus it is impossible to derive a macroscopic deterministic world from a microscopic undeterministic world because determinism is additive. The third principle is opposed to all attempts to describe holisation on a logical or mathematical basis. There is holisation in time and holisation in space and the latter can be subdivided into three groups according to their type of wholeness. Energy acts on energy and not on wholeness. All energetic interference with the basis has a holistic repercussion. The question of the egg and epigenetic organogenesis are also discussed from a holistic point of view.Naturbeschreibung ist hier auf Geometrie, Zahl und Energie begründet. Geometrie und Zahlenmässigkeit sind die einzigen Formen unseres Geistes durch die wir die Natur beschreiben. Energie, hier als Grundstein der Welt betrachtet, wird in der Physik durch sechs Eigenschaften definiert; zur vollständigen Beschreibung der physischen Welt seien aber sieben notwendig, während in der Biologie acht Eigenschaften nötig sind, indem Ganzheitsschöpfung als achte zählt. Auf dieser Basis wird gezeigt, dass der Holismus eine wissenschaftliche Theorie ist. Da wir nur Geometrie und Zahlenmässigkeit in der Natur erfassen, so können die holistischen Eigenschaften nicht direkt als solche betrachtet werden, sondern immer nur die ihnen zu Grunde liegenden physiko-chemischen Erscheinungen. Es gibt drei holistische Prinzipien: 1) Gegenseitige Beeinflussung führt zu Ganzheitseigenschaften. Beeinflussung kann nur energetisch sein. 2) Die Eigenschaften der Ganzheit sind nicht potential in den Eigenschaften der Teile enthalten. 3) Das Ganze ist mehr als die Summe seiner Teile. Gegenseitige Beeinflussung bedingt Kraftfelder und diese wieder Organisation. und so ist denn der Holismus seinem Wesen nach organismisch. Das zweite Prinzip legt Verwahrung gegen unstatthafte Extrapolation ein. Das Ganze und seine Teile haben nur additive Eigenschaften im gemein. Es ist also unmöglich eine deterministische makroskopische Welt von einer undeterministischen mikrophysischen abzuleiten weil Determinismus additiv ist. Das dritte Prinzip verwehrt sich gegen alle Anwendung von Logik und Mathematik zur Erklärung oder Beschreibung von Holisation . Es gibt Holisation 1) in der Zeit, 2) im Raum. Im Raum unterscheiden sich die Holisationen nach dem Wirkungskreis der Kraftfelder oder durch Abwesenheit solcher. Dies ist eine neue Aufteilung der Welt nach dem Wesen der Ganzheit. Die Einwirkung der Energie auf die Ganzheit ist mikrophysisch. Energie wirkt auf Energie und nicht auf die Ganzheit als solche. Jede energetische Einwirkung besitzt jedoch eine holistische Auswirkung. Das Problem der Eizelle und der epigenetischer Entwicklung wird auch besprochen. (shrink)

In the literature the term “natural balance” occurs frequently and is used for highly divergent collections of facts and for results arrived at by different methods. In this paper it is attempted to give a review of the many possible meanings of “balance in nature”, and to evaluate the application of the term in the scientific literature.To achieve this twofold objective it seemed useful to start by giving as objective as possible a description of the “balance situation” in natural communities, (...) in analogy with the original physical concept and according to strict scientific criteria. On the basis of this working standard, part of the ecological literature is discussed with respect to statements and presumptions concerning “balance”. The extensive literature is classified according to several groups, on the one hand on the basis of the nature of the views , on the other hand according to the importance that certain authors attach to the theory of a given author. For each of these groups, an evaluation of the content of the term “balance” is given. It was found that the reasoning is not always sound and that the nature of the data on which the concept is based varies widely, which also holds for the method of reasoning applied in the conclusions drawn. In none of the publications arguments were found supporting the existence of a natural “balance situation” as formulated in the standard description. Consequently, it seemed justified to conclude that it is not correct to apply a concept “natural balance”, defined purely scientifically, to natural situations, either because “balance” in the indicated sense is simply not present or because the situation under consideration is not a natural one . The concept “natural balance” has had only heuristic value for scientific research. In other contexts it has a different value, because there criteria other than scientific or methodological ones hold for the content of a concept. It is therefore not objectionable to use the term “natural balance” in common parlance, especially since this usage makes it possible to convey to the layman a great deal in few words. (shrink)

The historical development of a field of human knowledge progresses like the solution of a jig-saw puzzle, the full extent of which is completely unknown. What begins as an ocean may become only a lake; what starts as a grove of trees may develop into a forest. As study advances through the decades, the situation is repeatedly surveyed and the interpretation of the whole is modified to accord with the added information. For these reasons, conceptions and generalizations periodically undergo alteration, (...) as effectively stated and discussed by Cooper. Universal conformity in such conceptions is of course hardly to be expected in matters that deal largely with speculation rather than with simple experimental data. (shrink)