Otávio Bueno* * and Steven French.** ** Applying Mathematics: Immersion, Inference, Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-19-881504-4 978-0-19-185286-2. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815044. 001.0001. Pp. xvii + 257.

We investigate a theory of Frege structures extended by the Myhill-Flagg hierarchy of implications. We study its relation to a property theory with an approximation operator and we give a proof theoretical analysis of the basic system involved. MSC: 03F35, 03D60.

Pour le philosophe intéressé aux structures et aux fondements du savoir théorétique, à la constitution d'une « méta-théorétique «, θεωρíα., qui, mieux que les « Wissenschaftslehre » fichtéenne ou husserlienne et par-delà les débris de la métaphysique, veut dans une intention nouvelle faire la synthèse du « théorétique », la logique mathématique se révèle un objet privilégié.

Kleene [5] mentions two ways of extending the constructive ordinals. The first is by relativizing the setOof notations for the constructive ordinals, using fundamental sequences which are partial recursive inO. In this way we obtain the setOOwhich provides notations for the ordinals less than ω1O. Continuing the process, the sequenceO,OO,, … and the corresponding ordinalsare obtained. A second possibility is to define higher number classes in which partial recursive functions are used at limit ordinals to provide an “accessibility” mapping from (...) a previously defined number class. The relationship between the ordinals obtained by the two methods of extension has been an open problem. Methods developed in this article are used to show that the two ways of extending the constructive ordinals are equivalent, provided the sets of notations for the higher number classes satisfy certain natural conditions. Equivalence is obtained, not only with respect to ordinals, but also with respect to the forms of the sets of notations for the higher number classes. Specifically, the fundamental fact that the sets of notations for the constructive ordinals are complete Π11sets generalizes to suitably defined higher number classes. As an application we prove that the ordinals of the Addison and Kleene [1] constructive third number class are exactly the ordinals less than ω1Oand the setof notations for their third number class is recursively isomorphic toOO. (shrink)

The prospects and limitations of defining truth in a finite model in the same language whose truth one is considering are thoroughly examined. It is shown that in contradistinction to Tarski's undefinability theorem for arithmetic, it is in a definite sense possible in this case to define truth in the very language whose truth is in question.

We emphasize the role of the choice of vocabulary in formalization of a mathematical area and remark that this is a particular preoccupation of logicians. We use this framework to discuss Kennedy’s notion of ‘formalism freeness’ in the context of various schools in model theory. Then we clarify some of the mathematical issues in recent discussions of purity in the proof of the Desargues proposition. We note that the conclusion of ‘spatial content’ from the Desargues proposition involves arguments which are (...) algebraic and even metamathematical. Hilbert showed that the Desargues proposition implies the coordinatizing ring is associative, which in turn implies the existence of a three-dimensional geometry in which the given plane can be embedded. With W. Howard we give a new proof, removing Hilbert’s ‘detour’ through algebra, of the ‘geometric’ embedding theorem. Finally, our investigation of purity leads to the conclusion that even the introduction of explicit definitions in a proof can violate purity. We argue that although both involve explicit definition, our proof of the embedding theorem is pure while Hilbert’s is not. Thus the determination of whether an argument is pure turns on the content of the particular proof. Moreover, formalizing the situation does not provide a tool for characterizing purity. (shrink)

By theword problemfor some class of algebraic structures we mean the problem of determining, given a finite setEof equations between words and an additional equationx=y, whetherx=ymust hold in all structures satisfying each member ofE. In 1947 Post [P] showed the word problem for semigroups to be undecidable. This result was strengthened in 1950 by Turing, who showed the word problem to be undecidable forcancellation semigroups,i.e. semigroups satisfying thecancellation propertyNovikov [N] eventually showed the word problem for groups to be undecidable.In 1966 (...) Gurevich [G] showed the word problem to be undecidable forfinitesemigroups. However, this result on finite structures has not been extended to cancellation semigroups or groups; indeed it is easy to see that a finite cancellation semigroup is a group, so both questions are the same. We do not here settle the word problem for finite groups, but we do show that the word problem is undecidable for finite semigroups with zero satisfying an approximation to the cancellation property. (shrink)

Freivalds defined an acceptable programming system independent criterion for learning programs for functions in which the final programs were required to be both correct and "nearly" minimal size, i.e., within a computable function of being purely minimal size. Kinber showed that this parsimony requirement on final programs limits learning power. However, in scientific inference, parsimony is considered highly desirable. A lim-computablefunction is (by definition) one calculable by a total procedure allowed to change its mind finitely many times about its output. (...) Investigated is the possibility of assuaging somewhat the limitation on learning power resulting from requiring parsimonious final programs by use of criteria which require the final, correct programs to be "not-so-nearly" minimal size, e.g., to be within a lim-computable function of actual minimal size. It is shown that some parsimony in the final program is thereby retained, yet learning power strictly increases. Considered, then, are lim-computable functions as above but for which notations for constructive ordinals are used to bound the number of mind changes allowed regarding the output. This is a variant of an idea introduced by Freivalds and Smith. For this ordinal notation complexity bounded version of lim-computability, the power of the resultant learning criteria form finely graded, infinitely ramifying, infinite hierarchies intermediate between the computable and the lim-computable cases. Some of these hierarchies, for the natural notations determining them, are shown to be optimally tight. (shrink)

We first discuss some technical questions which arise in connection with the construction of undecidable propositions in analysis, in particular in connection with the notion of the normal form of a function representing a predicate. Then it is stressed that while a function f(x) may be computable in the sense of recursive function theory, it may nevertheless have undecidable properties in the realm of Fourier analysis. This has an implication for a conjecture of Penrose's which states that classical physics is (...) computable. (shrink)

A class of problems is called decidable if there is an algorithm which will give the answer to any problem of the class after a finite length of time. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the classes of problems that can be solved by infinitely long decision procedures in the following sense: An algorithm is given which, for any problem of the class, generates an infinitely long sequence of guesses. The problem will be said to be solved in (...) the limit if, after some finite point in the sequence, all the guesses are correct and the same. Functions, sets, and functionals which are decidable by such infinite algorithms will be calledlimiting recursive. These, together with classes of objects which can beidentified in the limit, are the subjects of this report.Without qualification,setwill mean set of numbers;functionwill mean number-theoretic function of 1 variable, possibly partial;functionalswill take numerical values and have any number of numerical and/or function variables, the latter ranging solely over total functions of 1 variable. Thus a function is a special case of a functional,xwill invariably stand for a numerical variable;φfor a function variable;gfor a guess ;nfor the numerical variable which indexes the guesses, referred to as thetime. (shrink)

Gelfond and Lifschitz proposed the notion of a stable model of a logic program. We establish that the set of all stable models in a Herbrand universe of a recursive logic program is, up to recursive renaming, the set of all infinite paths of a recursive, countably branching tree, and conversely. As a consequence, the problem, given a recursive logic program, of determining whether it has at least one stable model, is Σ11-complete. Due to the equivalences established in the authors' (...) previous nonmonotone rule systems papers ), this applies equally to truth maintenance systems and default logics. (shrink)

A notion of feasible function of finite type based on the typed lambda calculus is introduced which generalizes the familiar type 1 polynomial-time functions. An intuitionistic theory IPVω is presented for reasoning about these functions. Interpretations for IPVω are developed both in the style of Kreisel's modified realizability and Gödel's Dialectica interpretation. Applications include alternative proofs for Buss's results concerning the classical first-order system S12 and its intuitionistic counterpart IS12 as well as proofs of some of Buss's conjectures concerning IS12, (...) and a proof that IS12 cannot prove that extended Frege systems are not polynomially bounded. (shrink)

A notion of finitary inductively presented (f.i.p.) logic is proposed here, which includes all syntactically described logics (formal systems)met in practice. A f.i.p. theory FS0 is set up which is universal for all f.i.p. logics; though formulated as a theory of functions and classes of expressions, FS0 is a conservative extension of PRA. The aims of this work are (i)conceptual, (ii)pedagogical and (iii)practical. The system FS0 serves under (i)and (ii)as a theoretical framework for the formalization of metamathematics. The general approach (...) may be used under (iii)for the computer implementation of logics. In all cases, the work aims to make the details manageable in a natural and direct way. (shrink)

TheTractatusfirst appeared in 1921, the same year that Post's “Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions” appeared in theAmerican Journal of Mathematics. As the latter is the first piece clearly to present and exploit the distinction between a deductive system and a truth-functional interpretation of such a system, we may conclude that Wittgenstein's views had been arrived at somewhat before a variety of logical concepts had received the clarification and refinement incipient on the now taken-for-granted distinction between proof and (...) model theory. One such concept, of considerable interest to Wittgenstein, was that of inference. The following constitutes an attempt to explicate his notion. In particular, I shall attempt to show that his repudiation of “laws of inference” is closely tied to his rejection of logical constants; and that both can be seen as the product of what might be termed a “metaphysics of completeness”—before, of course, any notion of completeness had achieved a measure of precision or currency. (shrink)

In [S, pp. 77–88], Smullyan introduced the class of rudimentary relations, and showed that they form a basis for the recursively enumerable sets. He also asked [S, p. 81] if the addition and multiplication relations were rudimentary. In this note we answer one of these questions by showing that the addition relation is rudimentary. This result was communicated to Smullyan orally in 1960 and is announced in [S, p. 81, footnote 1]. However, the proof has not yet appeared in print. (...) Let us begin by reviewing Smullyan's definition [S, p. 10] of dyadic notation for the positive integers. Each positive integerais identified with the unique stringanan−1…a1a0of 1's and 2's such thata= Σin=0ai2iBecause of this identification, we are able to speak of typographical properties of numbers. (shrink)

Dominical categories are categories in which the notions of partial morphisms and their domains become explicit, with the latter being endomorphisms rather than subobjects of their sources. These categories form the basis for a novel abstract formulation of recursion theory, to which the present paper is devoted. The abstractness has of course its usual concomitant advantage of generality: it is interesting to see that many of the fundamental results of recursion theory remain valid in contexts far removed from their classic (...) manifestations. A principal reason for introducing this new formulation is to achieve an algebraization of the generalized incompleteness theorem, by providing a category-theoretic development of the concepts and tools of elementary recursion theory that are inherent in demonstrating the theorem.Dominical recursion theory avoids the commitment to sets and partial functions which is characteristic of other formulations, and thus allows for an intrinsic recursion theory within such structures as polyadic algebras. It is worthy of notice that much of elementary recursion theory can be developedwithout referencetoelements.By Gödel's generalized incompleteness theorem for consistent arithmetical systemTwe mean any statement of the following sort: if every recursive set is definable inT, thenTis essentially undecidable [41]; or if all recursive functions are definable inT, thenTis essentially undecidable [41]; or if every recursive set is definable inT, thenT0andR0 are recursively inseparable [39]; or if all re sets are representable inT, thenT0is creative [28], [39]; or ifTis a Rosser theory, thenT0andR0are effectively inseparable [39]. (shrink)

In this note is proved the following:Theorem.Iƒ A × B is universal and one oƒ A, B is r.e. then one of A, B is universal.Letα, τbe 1-argument recursive functions such thatxgoes to, τ) is a map of the natural numbers onto all ordered pairs of natural numbers. A set A of natural numbers is calleduniversalif every r.e. set is reducible to A; A × B is calleduniversalif the set.

We investigate the possibility to characterize (multi) functions that are Σ b i -definable with small i (i = 1, 2, 3) in fragments of bounded arithmetic T 2 in terms of natural search problems defined over polynomial-time structures. We obtain the following results: (1) A reformulation of known characterizations of (multi)functions that are Σ b 1 - and Σ b 2 -definable in the theories S 1 2 and T 1 2 . (2) New characterizations of (multi)functions that are (...) Σ b 2 - and Σ b 3 -definable in the theory T 2 2 . (3) A new non-conservation result: the theory T 2 2 (α) is not ∀Σ b 1 (α)-conservative over the theory S 2 2 (α). To prove that the theory T 2 2 (α) is not ∀Σ b 1 (α)-conservative over the theory S 2 2 (α), we present two examples of a Σ b 1 (α)-principle separating the two theories: (a) the weak pigeonhole principle WPHP (a 2 , f, g) formalizing that no function f is a bijection between a 2 and a with the inverse g, (b) the iteration principle Iter (a, R, f) formalizing that no function f defined on a strict partial order ( $\{0,\dots,a\}$ , R) can have increasing iterates. (shrink)

The relative strengths of first-order theories axiomatized by transfinite induction, for ordinals less-than 0, and formulas restricted in quantifier complexity, is determined. This is done, in part, by describing the provably recursive functions of such theories. Upper bounds for the provably recursive functions are obtained using model-theoretic techniques. A variety of additional results that come as an application of such techniques are mentioned.

The aim of this paper is to point out the equivalence between three notions respectively issued from recursion theory, computational complexity and finite model theory. One the one hand, the rudimentary languages are known to be characterized by the linear hierarchy. On the other hand, this complexity class can be proved to correspond to monadic second‐order logic with addition. Our viewpoint sheds some new light on the close connection between these domains: We bring together the two extremal notions by providing (...) a direct logical characterization of rudimentary languages and a representation result of second‐order logic into these languages. We use natural arithmetical tools, and our proofs contain no ingredient from computational complexity. (shrink)

We began by distinguishing Tarskian and Fitchean notions of universality in such a way that the claim that no language is universal in the sense of Tarski is compatible with accepting Fitchean universality. Then we examined a proposal involving two truth concepts — one that fit the Fitchean notion and another that followed Tarski's views on truth — finding little advantage in such generosity. We attempted a reformulation of Herzberger's argument for the negative view — the view that no language (...) is universal in Tarski's sense — but found it unsuccessful when the language of the argument's formulation was brought under consideration. A more persuasive argument for EI was found, free of the defect of the previous one. EI was then shown to have unsettling consequences, prompting us to inquire about avoiding it. We found this possible, noting that EI is itself a solution to the semantic paradoxes, to which there are alternatives that avoid the unwelcome aspects of EI. However, whether any such alternative is ultimately preferable to EI remains to be seen. (shrink)

The hypothetical notion of consequence is normally understood as the transmission of a categorical notion from premisses to conclusion. In model-theoretic semantics this categorical notion is 'truth', in standard proof-theoretic semantics it is 'canonical provability'. Three underlying dogmas, (I) the priority of the categorical over the hypothetical, (II) the transmission view of consequence, and (III) the identification of consequence and correctness of inference are criticized from an alternative view of proof-theoretic semantics. It is argued that consequence is a basic semantical (...) concept which is directly governed by elementary reasoning principles such as definitional closure and definitional reflection, and not reduced to a categorical concept. This understanding of consequence allows in particular to deal with non-wellfounded phenomena as they arise from circular definitions. (shrink)

There is a well-known gap between metamathematical theorems and their philosophical interpretations. Take Tarski’s Theorem. According to its prevalent interpretation, the collection of all arithmetical truths is not arithmetically definable. However, the underlying metamathematical theorem merely establishes the arithmetical undefinability of a set of specific Gödel codes of certain artefactual entities, such as infix strings, which are true in the standard model. That is, as opposed to its philosophical reading, the metamathematical theorem is formulated (and proved) relative to a specific (...) choice of the Gödel numbering and the notation system. A similar observation applies to Gödel’s and Church’s theorems, which are commonly taken to impose severe limitations on what can be proved and computed using the resources of certain formalisms. The philosophical force of these limitative results heavily relies on the belief that these theorems do not depend on contingencies regarding the underlying formalisation choices. The main aim of this paper is to provide metamathematical facts which support this belief. While employing a fixed notation system, I showed in previous work (_Review of Symbolic Logic_, 2021, 14(1):51–84) how to abstract away from the choice of the Gödel numbering. In the present paper, I extend this work by establishing versions of Tarski’s, Gödel’s and Church’s theorems which are invariant regarding _both_ the notation system and the numbering. This paper thus provides a further step towards absolute versions of metamathematical results which do not rely on contingent formalisation choices. (shrink)

Our ultimate purpose is to give an axiomatic treatment of recursion theory sufficient to develop the priority method. The direct or abstract approach is to keep in mind as clearly as possible the methods actually used in recursion theory, and then to formulate them explicitly. The indirect or experimental approach is to look first for other mathematical theories which seem similar to recursion theory, to formulate the analogies precisely, and then to search for an axiomatic treatment which covers not only (...) recursion theory but also the analogous theories as particular cases.The first approach is more general because it does not depend on the existence of analogues. A concrete mathematical theory, it seems, need have no such analogues and still be important, as e.g. classical number theory. In such a case, an axiomatic treatment may still be useful for exhibiting the mathematical structure of the theory considered and the assumptions on which it rests. However, it will lack one of the most heavily advertised advantages of the axiomatic method, namely, the “economy of thought” which results from an uniform theory for several different and interesting cases: we cannot hope for this if, by hypothesis, we know of only one particular case. In contrast, the second approach, if successful at all, is bound to achieve such “economy” because we start out with several interesting particular cases. Another possible virtue of the second approach is that of field work over insight: the abstract pattern that we are looking for and hoping to formalize in axioms, may not be evident in any one mathematical theory, but may spring to the eye if one happens to look simultaneously at several theories which happen to realize the pattern. (shrink)