Binding and its consequences

Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a number of other debates in decision theory. I then assess the plausibility of this claim, and suggest that it should be rejected.

Author's Profile

Christopher J. G. Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-03-22

Downloads
1,675 (#4,875)

6 months
171 (#12,840)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?