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  1. Severity and death.Adam Ehlert - 2024 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 27 (2):217-226.
    This article discusses the relationship between two theories about the badness of death, the Life-Comparative Account and the Gradualist Account, and two methods of operationalizing severity in health care priority setting, Absolute Shortfall and Proportional Shortfall. The aim is that theories about the badness of death can influence and inform the idea of the basis of severity as a priority setting criterion. I argue that there are strong similarities between the Life-Comparative Account and Absolute Shortfall, and since the Life-Comparative Account (...)
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  • (1 other version)Grief and the Inconsolation of Philosophy.Dominic J. C. Wilkinson - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (3):273-296.
    Can metaphysics yield the consolations of philosophy? One possibility, defended by Derek Parfit, is that reflection on the nature of identity and time could diminish both fear of death and grief. In this paper, I assess the prospect of such consolation, focussing especially on attempts to console a grieving third party. A shift to a reductionist view of personal identity might mean that death is less threatening. However, there is some evidence to suggest that such a shift does not necessarily (...)
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  • Epicurean Priority-setting During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond.Bjørn Hol & Carl Tollef Solberg - 2023 - De Ethica 7 (2):63-83.
    The aim of this article is to study the relationship between Epicureanism and pandemic priority-setting and to explore whether Epicurus's philosophy is compliant with the later developed utilitarianism. We find this aim interesting because Epicurus had a different way of valuing death than our modern society does: Epicureanism holds that death—understood as the incident of death—cannot be bad (or good) for those who die (self-regarding effects). However, this account is still consistent with the view that a particular death can be (...)
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  • Age and Illness Severity: A Case of Irrelevant Utilities?Borgar Jølstad & Niklas Juth - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (2):209-224.
    Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. Age seems to matter when considering severity, but perhaps not small age differences. In the following article we consider Small Differences : small differences in age are not relevant when considering differential illness severity. We show that SD cannot be accommodated within utilitarian, prioritarian or egalitarian theories. Attempting to accommodate SD by postulating a threshold model becomes exceedingly complex and self-defeating. The only way to accommodate SD seems to be to (...)
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  • If fetuses are persons, abortion is a public health crisis.Bruce Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (5):465-472.
    Pro-life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral status of persons, and an accompanying right to life, a view most pro-choice advocates deny. A difficulty for this pro-life position has been Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, in which she argues that even if the fetus is a person, abortion is often permissible because a pregnant woman is not obliged to continue to offer her body as life support. Here, we outline the moral theories underlying public health ethics, and examine (...)
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  • Bør vi diskontere fremtidige helsegevinster?Carl Tollef Solberg, Mathias Barra & Bjarne Robberstad - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (2-3):170-184.
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  • The Devils in the DALY: Prevailing Evaluative Assumptions.Carl Tollef Solberg, Preben Sørheim, Karl Erik Müller, Espen Gamlund, Ole Frithjof Norheim & Mathias Barra - 2020 - Public Health Ethics 13 (3):259-274.
    In recent years, it has become commonplace among the Global Burden of Disease study authors to regard the disability-adjusted life year primarily as a descriptive health metric. During the first phase of the GBD, it was widely acknowledged that the DALY had built-in evaluative assumptions. However, from the publication of the 2010 GBD and onwards, two central evaluative practices—time discounting and age-weighting—have been omitted from the DALY model. After this substantial revision, the emerging view now appears to be that the (...)
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  • Bør vi diskontere fremtidige helsegevinster?Cornelius Cappelen & Herman Cappelen - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (2-3):170-184.
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  • Severity as a Priority Setting Criterion: Setting a Challenging Research Agenda.Mathias Barra, Mari Broqvist, Erik Gustavsson, Martin Henriksson, Niklas Juth, Lars Sandman & Carl Tollef Solberg - 2019 - Health Care Analysis 28 (1):25-44.
    Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief history of the path to today’s severity criteria in (...)
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  • Considering Quality of Life while Repudiating Disability Injustice: A Pathways Approach to Setting Priorities.Govind Persad - 2019 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 47 (2):294-303.
    This article proposes a novel strategy, one that draws on insights from antidiscrimination law, for addressing a persistent challenge in medical ethics and the philosophy of disability: whether health systems can consider quality of life without unjustly discriminating against individuals with disabilities. It argues that rather than uniformly considering or ignoring quality of life, health systems should take a more nuanced approach. Under the article's proposal, health systems should treat cases where quality of life suffers because of disability-focused exclusion or (...)
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  • Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to Christensen.Bruce P. Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (7):478-479.
    In ’Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ’future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a subject, then abortion cannot deprive a fetus of a future of value, as no individual exists to be deprived once death has occurred. However, the Epicurean account also implies that the wrongness of murder is also (...)
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  • Let Us Be Fair to 5-Year-Olds: Priority for the Young in the Allocation of Scarce Health Resources.Kelsey Gipe & Samuel J. Kerstein - 2018 - Public Health Ethics 11 (3):325-335.
    Life-saving health resources like organs for transplant and experimental medications are persistently scarce. How ought we, morally speaking, to ration these resources? Many hold that, in any morally acceptable allocation scheme, the young should to some extent be prioritized over the old. Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer and Ezekiel Emanuel propose a multi-principle allocation scheme called the Complete Lives System, according to which persons roughly between 15 and 40 years old get priority over younger children and older adults, other things being (...)
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  • Newborn health benefits or financial risk protection? An ethical analysis of a real-life dilemma in a setting without universal health coverage.Kristine Husøy Onarheim, Ole Frithjof Norheim & Ingrid Miljeteig - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):524-530.
    IntroductionHigh healthcare costs make illness precarious for both patients and their families’ economic situation. Despite the recent focus on the interconnection between health and financial risk at the systemic level, the ethical conflict between concerns for potential health benefits and financial risk protection at the household level in a low-income setting is less understood.MethodsUsing a seven-step ethical analysis, we examine a real-life dilemma faced by families and health workers at the micro level in Ethiopia and analyse the acceptability of limiting (...)
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  • The disvalue of death in the global burden of disease.Carl Tollef Solberg, Ole Frithjof Norheim & Mathias Barra - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (3):192-198.
    In the Global Burden of Disease study, disease burden is measured as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). The paramount assumption of the DALY is that it makes sense to aggregate years lived with disability (YLDs) and years of life lost (YLLs). However, this is not smooth sailing. Whereas morbidity (YLD) is something thathappens toan individual, loss of life itself (YLL) occurs when that individual’s life has ended. YLLs quantify something that involves no experience and does not take place among living individuals. (...)
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  • Valuing life and evaluating suffering in infants with life-limiting illness.Dominic Wilkinson & Amir Zayegh - 2020 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 41 (4):179-196.
    In this paper, we explore three separate questions that are relevant to assessing the prudential value of life in infants with severe life-limiting illness. First, what is the value or disvalue of a short life? Is it in the interests of a child to save her life if she will nevertheless die in infancy or very early childhood? Second, how does profound cognitive impairment affect the balance of positives and negatives in a child’s future life? Third, if the life of (...)
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