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  1. Il test della falsa credenza.Marco Fenici - 2013 - Analytical and Philosophical Explanation 8:1-56.
    La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi utilizzano il test della falsa credenza per valutare la capacità dei bambini di attribuire stati mentali a se stessi e a agli altri. Tuttavia non è stato ancora pienamente compreso né quali requisiti cognitivi siano necessari per passare il test né quale sia il loro sviluppo. In questo articolo (...)
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  • Applying the causal theory of reference to intentional concepts.John Michael & Miles MacLeod - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):212-230.
    We argue that many recent philosophical discussions about the reference of everyday concepts of intentional states have implicitly been predicated on descriptive theories of reference. To rectify this, we attempt to demonstrate how a causal theory can be applied to intentional concepts. Specifically, we argue that some phenomena in early social de- velopment ðe.g., mimicry, gaze following, and emotional contagionÞ can serve as refer- ence fixers that enable children to track others’ intentional states and, thus, to refer to those states. (...)
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  • Mindreading in Infancy.Peter Carruthers - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):141-172.
    Various dichotomies have been proposed to characterize the nature and development of human mindreading capacities, especially in light of recent evidence of mindreading in infants aged 7 to 18 months. This article will examine these suggestions, arguing that none is currently supported by the evidence. Rather, the data support a modular account of the domain-specific component of basic mindreading capacities. This core component is present in infants from a very young age and does not alter fundamentally thereafter. What alters with (...)
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  • True Belief Belies False Belief: Recent Findings of Competence in Infants and Limitations in 5-Year-Olds, and Implications for Theory of Mind Development.Joseph A. Hedger & William V. Fabricius - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):429-447.
    False belief tasks have enjoyed a monopoly in the research on children’s development of a theory of mind. They have been granted this status because they promise to deliver an unambiguous assessment of children’s understanding of the representational nature of mental states. Their poor cousins, true belief tasks, have been relegated to occasional service as control tasks. That this is their only role has been due to the universal assumption that correct answers on true belief tasks are inherently ambiguous regarding (...)
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  • Flexible social monitoring as revealed by eye movements: Spontaneous mental state updating triggered by others’ unexpected actions.Dóra Fogd, Natalie Sebanz & Ágnes Melinda Kovács - 2024 - Cognition 249 (C):105812.
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  • Can infants adopt underspecified contents into attributed beliefs? Representational prerequisites of theory of mind.Ágnes Melinda Kovács, Ernő Téglás & Gergely Csibra - 2021 - Cognition 213 (C):104640.
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  • (1 other version)Pragmatics and epistemic vigilance: A developmental perspective.Diana Mazzarella & Nausicaa Pouscoulous - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):355-376.
    Any form of overt communication, be it gestural or linguistic, involves pragmatic skills. This article investigates the social–cognitive foundations of pragmatic development from infancy to late childhood and argues that it is driven by, among other things, the emergence of the capacities to assess the communicator's competence (e.g. perceptual access, epistemic states) and honesty. We discuss the implications of this proposal and show how it sheds new light on the developmental trajectory of a series of pragmatic phenomena, with a specific (...)
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  • (1 other version)How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
    What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...)
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  • Is Implicit Theory of Mind the ‘Real Deal’? The Own‐Belief/True‐Belief Default in Adults and Young Preschoolers.Lu Wang & Alan M. Leslie - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (2):147-176.
    Recent studies reveal spontaneous implicit false-belief understanding in infancy. But is this early ability genuine theory-of-mind? Spontaneous tasks may allow early success by eliminating the selection-response bias thought to underlie later failure on standard tasks. However, using anticipatory eye gaze, we find the same bias in non-verbal tasks in both preschoolers and adults. We argue that the bias arises from theory-of-mind competence itself and takes the form of a rational prior to attribute one's own belief to others. Our discussion then (...)
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  • (1 other version)How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Ian A. Apperly Stephen A. Butterfill - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
    What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...)
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  • Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  • Infants Understand How Testimony Works.Paul L. Harris & Jonathan D. Lane - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):443-458.
    Children learn about the world from the testimony of other people, often coming to accept what they are told about a variety of unobservable and indeed counter-intuitive phenomena. However, research on children’s learning from testimony has paid limited attention to the foundations of that capacity. We ask whether those foundations can be observed in infancy. We review evidence from two areas of research: infants’ sensitivity to the emotional expressions of other people; and their capacity to understand the exchange of information (...)
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  • Constructing a New Theory From Old Ideas and New Evidence.Marjorie Rhodes & Henry Wellman - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (3):592-604.
    A central tenet of constructivist models of conceptual development is that children's initial conceptual level constrains how they make sense of new evidence and thus whether exposure to evidence will prompt conceptual change. Yet little experimental evidence directly examines this claim for the case of sustained, fundamental conceptual achievements. The present study combined scaling and experimental microgenetic methods to examine the processes underlying conceptual change in the context of an important conceptual achievement of early childhood—the development of a representational theory (...)
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  • On the Spatial Foundations of the Conceptual System and Its Enrichment.Jean M. Mandler - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (3):421-451.
    A theory of how concept formation begins is presented that accounts for conceptual activity in the first year of life, shows how increasing conceptual complexity comes about, and predicts the order in which new types of information accrue to the conceptual system. In a compromise between nativist and empiricist views, it offers a single domain-general mechanism that redescribes attended spatiotemporal information into an iconic form. The outputs of this mechanism consist of types of spatial information that we know infants attend (...)
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  • In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the Critics.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):187-212.
    I clarify recently developed phenomenological approaches to social cognition. These are approaches that, drawing on developmental science, social neuroscience, and dynamic systems theory, emphasize the involvement of embodied and enactive processes together with communicative and narrative practices in contexts of intersubjective understanding. I review some of the evidence that supports these approaches. I consider a variety of criticisms leveled against them, and defend the role of phenomenology in the explanation of social cognition. Finally, I show how these phenomenological approaches can (...)
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  • An association account of false belief understanding.L. C. De Bruin & Albert Newen - 2012 - Cognition 123 (2):240-259.
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  • Do infants detect indirect reciprocity?Marek Meristo & Luca Surian - 2013 - Cognition 129 (1):102-113.
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  • Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults.Shaun Gallagher & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):145-169.
    We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
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  • Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  • Executive function depletion in children and its impact on theory of mind.Lindsey J. Powell & Susan Carey - 2017 - Cognition 164 (C):150-162.
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  • Moral learning as intuitive theory revision.Marjorie Rhodes & Henry Wellman - 2017 - Cognition 167:191-200.
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  • ‘I Don't Know’: Children's Early Talk About Knowledge.Paul L. Harris, Bei Yang & Yixin Cui - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):283-307.
    Children's utterances from late infancy to 3 years of age were examined to infer their conception of knowledge. In Study 1, the utterances of two English-speaking children were analysed and in Study 2, the utterances of a Mandarin-speaking child were analysed – in both studies, for their use of the verb know. Both studies confirmed that know and not know were used to affirm, query or deny knowledge, especially concerning an ongoing topic of conversation. References to a third party were (...)
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  • Rappresentazione tacita della conoscenza e interpretazione delle capacità di cognizione sociale nella prima infanzia.Marco Fenici - 2012 - Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 18:197-216.
    Recent studies demonstrated that 15-month-olds selectively respond to others’ beliefs. According to an epistemic mentalist interpretation, this attests that 15-month-olds possess a rudimentary capacity to attribute beliefs. Weaker interpretations suggest instead that infants are only sensitive to others’ beliefs because they can detect their proximal correlates. These two opposed interpretations often appeal to principled objections. In contrast, I argue that the dispute can be brought back to its empirical basis if we clearly explain what it means having ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ (...)
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  • (1 other version)Neo-pragmatism and enactive intentionality.Shaun Gallagher & Katsunori Miyahara - 2012 - In Jay Schulkin (ed.), Action, perception and the brain: adaptation and cephalic expression. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  • (1 other version)The ordinary concept of weakness of will.Ali Yousefi Heris - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (1):123-139.
    Recently, a number of experimental philosophers have converged on the position that the ordinary concept of weakness of will does not solely consist in “judgment” or “intention” violation but is more like a cluster concept in which each factor plays contributory roles in the application of the concept. This, however, raises the question as to which factor is more central or plays a more significant role in folk’s understanding of the concept. I contend that the ordinary concept of weakness of (...)
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  • The Invisible Hand: Toddlers Connect Probabilistic Events With Agentive Causes.Yang Wu, Paul Muentener & Laura E. Schulz - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):1854-1876.
    Children posit unobserved causes when events appear to occur spontaneously. What about when events appear to occur probabilistically? Here toddlers saw arbitrary causal relationships in a fixed, alternating order. The relationships were then changed in one of two ways. In the Deterministic condition, the event order changed ; in the Probabilistic condition, the causal relationships changed. As intended, toddlers looked equally long at both changes. We then introduced a previously unseen candidate cause. Toddlers looked longer at the appearance of a (...)
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  • Mindreading underlies metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):164-182.
    This response defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
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  • Mindreading, Language and Simulation.Ryan C. DeChant - unknown
    Mindreading is the capacity to attribute psychological states to others and to use those attributions to explain, predict, and understand others’ behaviors. In the past thirty years, mindreading has become the topic of substantial interdisciplinary research and theorizing, with philosophers, psychologists and, more recently, neuroscientists, all contributing to the debate about the nature of the neuropsychological mechanisms that constitute the capacity for mindreading. In this thesis I push this debate forward by using recent results from developmental psychology as the basis (...)
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  • (1 other version)The ordinary concept of weakness of will.Ali Yousefi Heris - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):123-139.
    Recently, a number of experimental philosophers have converged on the position that the ordinary concept of weakness of will does not solely consist in “judgment” or “intention” violation but is more like a cluster concept in which each factor plays contributory roles in the application of the concept. This, however, raises the question as to which factor is more central or plays a more significant role in folk’s understanding of the concept. I contend that the ordinary concept of weakness of (...)
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  • Infants’ understanding of the definite/indefinite article in a third-party communicative situation.You-Jung Choi, Hyun-joo Song & Yuyan Luo - 2018 - Cognition 175 (C):69-76.
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  • Mindreading in adults: evaluating two-systems views.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):673-688.
    A number of convergent recent findings with adults have been interpreted as evidence of the existence of two distinct systems for mindreading that draw on separate conceptual resources: one that is fast, automatic, and inflexible; and one that is slower, controlled, and flexible. The present article argues that these findings admit of a more parsimonious explanation. This is that there is a single set of concepts made available by a mindreading system that operates automatically where it can, but which frequently (...)
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  • Two Systems for Mindreading?Peter Carruthers - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):141-162.
    A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues. This has issued in a number of new findings. The present paper shows that the (...)
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  • (1 other version)False-belief understanding in infants.Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott & Zijing He - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110-118.
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  • How to Interpret Infant Socio-Cognitive Competence.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):483-497.
    I review recent evidence that very young, pre-verbal infants attribute belief-like states when anticipating the behavior of others. This evidence is drawn from infant performance on non-verbal false belief tasks. I argue that, contrary to typical interpretations, such evidence does not show that infants attribute belief-like states. Rather, it shows that infants apply an enhanced version of what Gergely ( 2011 ) calls the “teleological stance” to brief bouts of behavior. This requires them to parse behavioral sequences into goals and (...)
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  • (1 other version)False-belief understanding in infants.Zijing He Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110.
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  • The developmental paradox of false belief understanding: a dual-system solution.L. C. De Bruin & A. Newen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belief understanding in terms of a single system, (ii) fail to provide psychological concepts that are sufficiently fine-grained to capture the (...)
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  • A simple explanation of apparent early mindreading: infants’ sensitivity to goals and gaze direction.Marco Fenici - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):497-515.
    According to a widely shared interpretation, research employing spontaneous-response false belief tasks demonstrates that infants as young as 15 months attribute (false) beliefs. In contrast with this conclusion, I advance an alternative reading of the empirical data. I argue that infants constantly form and update their expectations about others’ behaviour and that this ability extends in the course of development to reflect an appreciation of what others can and cannot see. These basic capacities account for infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false (...)
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  • Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm.David Buttelmann, Malinda Carpenter & Michael Tomasello - 2009 - Cognition 112 (2):337-342.
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  • (2 other versions)Getting interaction theory (IT) together: Integrating developmental, phenomenological, enactive, and dynamical approaches to social interaction.Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
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  • Pragmatics, Cognitive Flexibility and Autism Spectrum Disorders.Mikhail Kissine - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):1-28.
    Pragmatic deficits of persons with autism spectrum disorders [ASDs] are often traced back to a dysfunction in Theory of Mind. However, the exact nature of the link between pragmatics and mindreading in autism is unclear. Pragmatic deficits in ASDs are not homogenous: in particular, while inter-subjective dimensions are affected, some other pragmatic capacities seem to be relatively preserved. Moreover, failure on classical false-belief tasks stems from executive problems that go beyond belief attribution; false-belief tasks require taking an alternative perspective on (...)
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  • Understanding the abstract role of speech in communication at 12months.Alia Martin, Kristine H. Onishi & Athena Vouloumanos - 2012 - Cognition 123 (1):50-60.
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  • A constructivist connectionist model of transitions on false-belief tasks.Vincent G. Berthiaume, Thomas R. Shultz & Kristine H. Onishi - 2013 - Cognition 126 (3):441-458.
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  • Mindreading with ease? Fluency and belief reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds.Anika Fiebich - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-16.
    For decades, philosophers and psychologists have assumed that children understand other people’s behavior on the basis of Belief Reasoning (BR) at latest by age 5 when they pass the false belief task. Furthermore, children’s use of BR in the true belief task has been regarded as being ontogenetically prior. Recent findings from developmental studies challenge this view and indicate that 4- to 5-year-old children make use of a reasoning strategy, which is cognitively less demanding than BR and called perceptual access (...)
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  • Fourteen- to Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Use Explicit Linguistic Information to Update an Agent’s False Belief.Kyong-Sun Jin, Yoon Kim, Miri Song, Yu-Jin Kim, Hyuna Lee, Yoonha Lee, Minjung Cha & Hyun-Joo Song - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs?Yuyan Luo - 2011 - Cognition 121 (3):289-298.
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  • On the Long Road to Mentalism in Children’s Spontaneous False-Belief Understanding: Are We There Yet?Jason Low & Bo Wang - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):411-428.
    We review recent anticipatory looking and violation-of-expectancy studies suggesting that infants and young preschoolers have spontaneous (implicit) understanding of mind despite their known problems until later in life on elicited (explicit) tests of false-belief reasoning. Straightforwardly differentiating spontaneous and elicited expressions of complex mental state understanding in relation to an implicit-explicit knowledge framework may be challenging; early action predictions may be based on behavior rules that are complementary to the mentalistic attributions under consideration. We discuss that the way forward for (...)
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  • Putting unicepts to work: a teleosemantic perspective on the infant mindreading puzzle.John Michael - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4365-4388.
    In this paper, I show how theoretical discussion of recent research on the abilities of infants and young children to represent other agents’ beliefs has been shaped by a descriptivist conception of mental content, i.e., to the notion that the distal content of a mental representation is fixed by the core body of knowledge that is associated with that mental representation. I also show how alternative conceptions of mental content—and in particular Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic approach—make it possible to endorse the (...)
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  • The origins of belief representation: Monkeys fail to automatically represent others’ beliefs.Alia Martin & Laurie R. Santos - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):300-308.
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  • Children's attitude problems: Bootstrapping verb meaning from syntax and pragmatics.Valentine Hacquard & Jeffrey Lidz - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):73-96.
    How do children learn the meanings of propositional attitude verbs? We argue that children use information contained in both syntactic distribution and pragmatic function to zero in on the appropriate meanings. Specifically, we identify a potentially universal link between semantic subclasses of attitude verbs, their syntactic distribution and the kinds of indirect speech acts they can be used to perform. As a result, children can use the syntax as evidence about the meaning, which in turn constrains the kinds of pragmatic (...)
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