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  1. Descartes’s Clarity First Epistemology.Elliot Samuel Paul - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    Descartes has a Clarity First epistemology: (i) Clarity is a primitive (indefinable) phenomenal quality: the appearance of truth. (ii) Clarity is prior to other qualities: obscurity, confusion, distinctness – are defined in terms of clarity; epistemic goods – reason to assent, rational inclination to assent, reliability, and knowledge – are explained by clarity. (This is the first of two companion entries; the sequel is called, "Descartes's Method for Achieving Knowledge.").
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  • Did Descartes make a Diagonal Argument?Toby Meadows - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):219-247.
    This paper explores the idea that Descartes’ cogito is a kind of diagonal argument. Using tools from modal logic, it reviews some historical antecedents of this idea from Slezak and Boos and culminates in an orginal result classifying the exact structure of belief frames capable of supporting diagonal arguments and our reconstruction of the cogito.
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  • Diagonal Anti-Mechanist Arguments.David Kashtan - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):203-232.
    Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is sometimes said to refute mechanism about the mind. §1 contains a discussion of mechanism. We look into its origins, motivations and commitments, both in general and with regard to the human mind, and ask about the place of modern computers and modern cognitive science within the general mechanistic paradigm. In §2 we give a sharp formulation of a mechanistic thesis about the mind in terms of the mathematical notion of computability. We present the argument from (...)
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  • Realizing Newcomb’s Problem.Peter Slezak - unknown
    Richard Jeffrey said that Newcomb’s Problem may be seen “as a rock on which... Bayesianism... must founder” and the problem has been almost universally conceived as reconciling the science-fictional features of the decision problem with a plausible causal analysis. Later, Jeffrey renounced his earlier position that accepted Newcomb problems as genuine decision problems, suggesting “Newcomb problems are like Escher’s famous staircase”. We may interpret this to mean that we know there can be no such thing, though we see no local (...)
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  • Was Descartes a liar? Diagonal doubt defended.Peter Slezak - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):379-388.
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