“[T]he Precautionary Principle still has neither a commonly accepted definition nor a set of criteria to guide its implementation. “There is”, Freestone … cogently observes, “a certain paradox in the widespread and rapid adoption of the Precautionary Principle”: While it is applauded as a “good thing”, no one is quite sure about what it really means or how it might be..

The precautionary principle is often invoked in relation to pregnant women and may be one of the underlying reasons for their continuous underrepresentation in clinical research. The principle is appealing, because potential fetal harm as a result of research participation is considered to be serious and irreversible. In our paper, we explore through conceptual analysis whether and if so how the precautionary principle should apply to pregnant women. We argue that the principle is a decision-making strategy underlying risk-benefit decisions in (...) clinical research, which can be applied to pregnant women. However, the current application is a strong one, leading to the promotion of absolute exclusion or, less often, absolute inclusion of pregnant women. In order to change this paralyzing situation, a shift toward weak precautionary thinking is necessary. Instead of automatic extreme precaution, a balance will be found between harms and potential benefits of including pregnant women in clinical research. (shrink)

The precautionary principle has often been described as an extreme principle that neglects science and stifles innovation. However, such an interpretation has no support in the official definitions of the principle that have been adopted by the European Union and by the signatories of international treaties on environmental protection. In these documents, the precautionary principle is a guideline specifying how to deal with certain types of scientific uncertainty. In this contribution, this approach to the precautionary principle is explicated with the (...) help of concepts from the philosophy of science and comparisons with general notions of practical rationality. Three major problems in its application are discussed, and it is concluded that to serve its purpose, the precautionary principle has to (1) be combined with other decision principles in cases with competing top priorities, (2) be based on the current state of science, which requires procedures for scientific updates, and (3) exclude potential dangers whose plausibility is too low to trigger meaningful precautionary action. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The purpose of this paper is to formulate and defend a set of moral principles applicable to management. Our motivation is twofold: 1) to increase the coherence and utility of Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT); and 2) to initiate an alternative stream of business ethics research. To those ends, we specify what counts as adequate guidance in navigating the ethical terrain of business. In doing so, a key element of ISCT, Substantive Hypernorms, is found to be flawed beyond repair. So (...) we propose and defend a remedy:prima faciemoral principles. After delineating the appropriate criteria and format for such principles, we formulate, explain, and defend five of them. We conclude with a brief comment on future research possibilities. (shrink)

One of the major problems in the implementation of the precautionary principle in environmental cases is the estimation of the weight of evidence. In this paper we propose a formal method that determines the weight of evidence based on the specific parameters of a given case. The proposed method is based on an artificial intelligence approach called fuzzy logic, which is commonly used as an interface between logic and human perception, and often applied to computer-based complex decision making. We use (...) one fuzzy expert system that provides a quantification of the estimated environmental damage, and a second fuzzy expert system that computes the weight of evidence in a given case. The proposed expert system can be easily defined and adjusted by regulators and environmental science and policy experts. (shrink)

The debate on “safer by design” has primarily been focused on strategies to render products safer during the design process. This article focuses on correlated basic legal rights of citizens. The reference to “trump rights” is helpful in highlighting two normative claims: Firstly, products that are “safer by design” are suitable instruments to protect the bodily integrity and health of potential users. Both figure as trump rights in Ronald Dworkin’s sense. In this perspective, “safer by design” strategies can guarantee some (...) most basic rights of citizens. Secondly, the debate on trump rights also suggests that safety needs to be regarded as part of a more comprehensive normative framework. Even trump rights are competitive in that a plurality of rights needs to be respected. A final section gives evidence that both claims resonate with recent insights in debate on the precautionary principle. This section also highlights the recent emphasis on environmental concerns. (shrink)

The precautionary principle is frequently invoked in environmental law and policy, and the debate around the principle indicates that there is little agreement on what 'taking precautions' means. The purpose of the present paper is to provide an improved conceptual foundation for this debate in the form of an explication of the concept of precaution. Distinctions between precaution and two related concepts, prevention and pessimism, are briefly discussed. The concept of precaution is analysed in terms of precautionary actions. It is (...) argued that precautionary actions are implicitly assumed to be precautionary with respect to something, and that this assumption should be made explicit. A definition of a precautionary action involving three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (intentionality, uncertainty and reasonableness) is proposed, and the implications of this analysis for the debate on the precautionary principle are discussed. (shrink)