States’ right to exclude prospective members is the subject of a fierce debate in political theory, but the right to include has received relatively little scholarly attention. To address this lacuna, we examine the puzzle of permissible inclusion: when may states confer citizenship on individuals they have no prior obligation to include? We first clarify why permissible inclusion is a puzzle, then proceed to a normative evaluation of this practice and its limits. We investigate self-determination – a dominant principle in (...) theories of the right to exclude – as a normative ground for limits on the right to include. We argue that states’ duties to respect one another’s self-determination yield limits on permissible inclusion. When inclusive policies for citizenship undermine the permissible scope of self-determination of other states, they are impermissible; they should either be prohibited, or require compensation. (shrink)

While many argue investment-based criteria for immigration are wrong or at least problematic, skill-based criteria remain relatively uncontroversial. This is normatively inconsistent. This article assesses three prominent normative objections to investment-based selection criteria for immigrants: that they wrongfully discriminate between prospective immigrants that they are unfair, and that they undermine political equality among citizens. It argues that either skill-based criteria are equally susceptible to these objections, or that investment-based criteria are equally shielded from them. Indeed, in some ways investment-based criteria (...) are less normatively problematic than skill-based criteria. Given this analysis, the resistance to investment-based migration criteria, but not to skill-based criteria, is inconsistent. (shrink)

This article provides a new interpretation of Richard Rorty’s notion of the private-public distinction. The first section of the article provides a short theoretical overview of the origins of the public-private distinction in Rorty’s political thought and clarifies the Rortian terminology. The main portion of the article is dedicated to the critique of Rorty’s private-public distinction, divided into two thematic sections: (i) the private-public distinction as undesirable and (ii) the private-public distinction as unattainable. I argue that Rorty’s formulation provides plausible (...) answers to the first kind of criticism, but not to the second. Finally, a reformulation of the private-public distinction will be suggested, which both mitigates the second line of criticism and better coheres with Rorty’s general theory. (shrink)

Critics of investment citizenship often appeal to the idea that citizenship should not be commodified. This chapter clarifies how the different arguments in support of this Commodification Objection are best understood as versions of wider claims in the literature on the moral limits of markets (MLM). Through an analysis of the three main objections – The Wrong Distribution Argument, The Value Degradation Argument, and the Motivational Corruption Argument – it claims that these objections rely on flawed and partial interpretations of (...) the broader debates. As such, they do not in fact support the conclusions critics of investment citizenship wish to draw from them. The paper concludes that the commodification objection to investment citizenship should therefore be abandoned, and that normative resistance to the practice should be made on other grounds. (shrink)

Ortega y Gasset is known for his philosophy of life and his effort to propose an alternative to both realism and idealism. The goal of this article is to focus on an unfamiliar aspect of his thought. The focus will be given to Ortega’s interpretation of the advancements in modern mathematics in general and Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers in particular. The main argument is that Ortega acknowledged the historical importance of the Cantor’s Set Theory, analyzed it and articulated a (...) response to it. In his writings he referred many times to the advancements in modern mathematics and argued that mathematics should be based on the intuition of counting. In response to Cantor’s mathematics Ortega presented what he defined as an ‘absolute positivism’. In this theory he did not mean to naturalize cognition or to follow the guidelines of the Comte’s positivism, on the contrary. His aim was to present an alternative to Cantor’s mathematics by claiming that mathematicians are allowed to deal only with objects that are immediately present and observable to intuition. Ortega argued that the infinite set cannot be present to the intuition and therefore there is no use to differentiate between cardinals of different infinite sets. (shrink)

לרציונליזם השפעה מרכזית על האופן שבו החברה המודרנית החלה לפרש רגעים של שתיקה בין-אישית כביטוי לשפה פרטית. ההגדרה החברתית של השתיקה כשפה פרטית היא עדות לתהליך ההתעצמות ההיסטורית של ניכור האדם מעצמו.

In many of his writings and lectures Ortega y Gasset criticized Darwinism on numbers of issues. In this paper I aim to reexamine his critique and to prove that in 1916 the harsh critique was designed to hide the similarity between his ideas and Darwin's idea of Natural Selection. The origins of Ortega's idea on the vocation of man can be traced in his dialogue with Darwin in the year 1916. In the historiography his Philosophy of Life is conceived as (...) a metaphysics that stands beyond biological and any other natural explanation. My contention on the other hand is that Ortega's concept of the vocation of man is an elaboration of Darwin's Natural Selection. I will try to show that in 1916 Ortega conceived the human character and the vocation of man as a product of Natural Selection. Instead of following Ortega's critiques on Darwin and his effort to show that there is no connection between his Philosophy of Life and Darwinism the article proposes to reconsider Ortega's thought as a constant dialogue with Darwin's theory of Natural Selection. The Change in Ortega's conception of Darwin's evolution came rather late in his thought and in the first section we will see how Ortega described technology in a manner that allows the human subject to change the environment in his favor. (shrink)

The ethics of Ortega y Gasset is described in the historiography as an imperative of his philosophical idea on human vocation. Ortega’s ethics is being analyzed as part of his philosophy of life or in other words as a part of his concepts such as human destiny, happiness and vocation. The contention of this article is that Ortega’s ethics can be better understood together with the reflections he had in regard to the Bourgeoisie culture. Emphasizing the importance of the moral (...) characteristics of the individual is meant to counterweigh what Ortega conceived as the bourgeoisie morality. The attention of Ortega was given to what he conceived as the necessity to acknowledge the importance of the qualities of human characteristics. He criticized the way in which modern culture depreciated the importance of the value of individual characteristics and maintained that money economy led to the historical decline of the ideal of noble distinction. Ortega believed that the decline of the historical ideal of noble distinction was caused by the fact that the possession of money became the final goal for human life. The quantitative criterion of money culture outweighed the qualitative criterion of assessment of the individual characteristics. In the 20th century culture, making money became the central goal (faena central) of human life. Ortega argued that too much attention to money possession overshadowed the moral imperative to improve one’s interior virtues (virtudes interiores). Following this line of interpretation of money culture as it was presented by Ortega can enable us to reconsider his ethics, his alternatives to the Bourgeoisie culture and also the way he evaluated the ethical theories of his time. (shrink)

[Multiple authors] In this paper, we propose a general architecture that is based on fast/slow solvers and a metacognitive component. We then present experimental results on the behavior of an instance of this architecture, for AI systems that make decisions about navigating in a constrained environment. We show how combining the fast and slow decision modalities allows the system to evolve over time and gradually pass from slow to fast thinking with enough experience, and that this greatly helps in decision (...) quality, resource consumption, and efficiency. (shrink)