Expressive-Assertivism, a metaethical theory championed by Daniel Boisvert, is sometimes considered to be a particularly promising form of hybrid expressivism. One of the main virtues of Expressive-Assertivism is that it seems to offer a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem. I argue, in contrast, that Expressive-Assertivism faces much the same challenges as pure expressivism.

La recherche empirique et philosophique récente remet en question l’idée selon laquelle raison et émotion sont nécessairement en conflit l’une avec l’autre. Pourtant, les philosophes des sciences ont été lents à réagir à cette recherche. Je soutiens qu’ils continuent à exclure l’émotion de leurs modèles du raisonnement scientifique, parce qu’ils considèrent qu’elle appartient typiquement au contexte de découverte plutôt qu’au contexte de justification. Je suggère toutefois, en prenant pour exemple le fiabilisme, que des travaux récents en épistémologie remettent en cause (...) l’autorité généralement accordée à la distinction entre ces contextes. On peut considérer que l’émotion joue un rôle fiable dans la formation des croyances scientifiques, ce qui pour le fiabiliste signifie également leur justification. (shrink)

In the aftermath of emotivism and behaviourism, cognitivist theories of emotion became current in both philosophy and psychology. These theories, though varied, have in common that emotions require propositional attitudes such as beliefs or evaluations. Accordingly, cognitivist theories characterize emotions themselves with features of such attitudes, including syntax, semantic meaning, and justifiability.

We aim to interrogate when the use of images in moral persuasion is legitimate. First, we put forward a number of accounts which purport to show that we can use tools other than logical argumentation to convince others, that such tools evoke affective responses and that these responses have authority in the moral domain. Second, we turn to Sarah McGrath’s account, which focuses on the use of imagery as a means to morally persuade. McGrath discusses 4 objections to the use (...) of imagery, and outlines responses that may be used to legitimate the use of imagery in moral arguments. Assuming that we accept her account and that the invocation of affect has authority in the moral domain, we, using McGrath’s responses, examine whether the use of foetal imagery in anti-abortion campaigns is a legitimate instance of this practice. (shrink)