This paper discusses a sequence of extensions ofNFU, Jensen's improvement of Quine's set theory “New Foundations” (NF) of [16].The original theoryNFof Quine continues to present difficulties. After 60 years of intermittent investigation, it is still not known to be consistent relative to any set theory in which we have confidence. Specker showed in [20] thatNFdisproves Choice (and so proves Infinity). Even if one assumes the consistency ofNF, one is hampered by the lack of powerful methods for proofs of consistency and (...) independence such as are available for use withZFC; very clever work has been done with permutation methods, starting with [18] and [5], and exemplified more recently by [14], but permutation methods can only be applied to show the consistency or independence of unstratified sentences (see the definition ofNFUbelow for a definition of stratification). For example, there is no method available to determine whether the assertion “the continuum can be well-ordered” is consistent with or independent ofNF. There is one substantial independence result for an assertion with nontrivial stratified consequences, using metamathematical methods: this is Orey's proof of the independence of the Axiom of Counting fromNF(see below for a statement of this axiom).We mention these difficulties only to reassure the reader of their irrelevance to the present work. Jensen's modification of “New Foundations” (in [13]), which was to restrict extensionality to sets, allowing many non-sets (urelements) with no elements, has almost magical effects. (shrink)

In this paper we consider some axiomatic systems of set theory related to the system NF (New Foundations) of Quine. In particular we discuss the possible relations of cardinality between a finite set x and its subset class SC(x) = {y | y ∩ x} and also between x and its unit set class USC(x) = {{y} | y ε x}. Specker [5] has shown that in NF the cardinal of a finite set x can never be the same as (...) the cardinal of SC(x). (shrink)

We characterize the 3-stratifiable theorems of NF as a 3-stratifiable extension of NF 3 ; and show that NF is equiconsistent with TT plus raising type axioms for sentences asserting the existence of some predicate over an atomic Boolean algebra.

A sentence of the usual language of set theory is said to be stratified if it is obtained by “erasing” type indices in a sentence of the language of Russell's Simple Theory of Types. In this paper we give an alternative presentation of a proof the ambiguity theorem stating that any provable stratified sentence has a stratified proof. To this end, we introduce a new set of ambiguity axioms, inspired by Fraïssé's characterization of elementary equivalence; these axioms can be naturally (...) used to give different proofs of the ambiguity theorem . MSC: 03B15, 03F50, 03F55. (shrink)

We prove a combinatorial result for models of the 4-fragment of the Simple Theory of Types , TST4. The result says that if is a standard transitive and rich model of TST4, then satisfies the 0,0,n-property, for all n≥2. This property has arisen in the context of the consistency problem of the theory New Foundations . The result is a weak form of the combinatorial condition that was shown in Tzouvaras [5] to be equivalent to the consistency of NF. Such (...) weak versions were introduced in Tzouvaras [6] in order to relax the intractability of the original condition. The result strengthens one of the main theorems of Tzouvaras [5, Theorem 3.6] which is just equivalent to the 0,0,2-property. (shrink)

Ambiguity is a property of syntactic expressions which is ubiquitous in all informal languages–natural, scientific and mathematical; the efficient use of language depends to an exceptional extent on this feature. Disambiguation is the process of separating out the possible meanings of ambiguous expressions. Ambiguity is typical if the process of disambiguation can be carried out in some systematic way. Russell made use of typical ambiguity in the theory of types in order to combine the assurance of its (apparent) consistency (“having (...) the cake”) with the freedom of the informal untyped theory of classes and relations (“eating it too”). The paper begins with a brief tour of Russell’s uses of typical ambiguity, including his treatment of the statement Cls ∈ Cls. This is generalized to a treatment in simple type theory of statements of the form A ∈ B where A and B are class expressions for which A is prima facie of the same or higher type than B. In order to treat mathematically more interesting statements of self membership we then formulate a version of typical ambiguity for such statements in an extension of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Specific attention is given to how the“naive” theory of categories can thereby be accounted for. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the way different axiom systems for set theory can be justified by appeal to such intuitions as limitation of size, predicativity, stratification, etc. While none of the different conceptions historically resulting from the impetus to provide a solution to the paradoxes turns out to rest on an intuition providing an unshakeable foundation,'each supplies a picture of the set-theoretic universe that is both useful and internally well motivated. The same is true of more recently proposed axiom (...) systems for non-well-founded universes, and an attempt is made to motivate such axiom systems on the basis of an old and respected ‘algebraic’ intuition. (shrink)

An instance of Stratified Comprehension ∀x₁ … ∀x n ∃y∀x (x ∈ y ↔ φ(x, x₁, …, x n )) is called strictly impredicative iff, under minimal stratification, the type of x is 0. Using the technology of forcing, we prove that the fragment of NF based on strictly impredicative Stratified Comprehension is consistent. A crucial part in this proof, namely showing genericity of a certain symmetric filter, is due to Robert Solovay. As a bonus, our interpretation also satisfies some (...) instances of Stratified Comprehension which are not strictly impredicative. For example, it verifies existence of Frege natural numbers. Apparently, this is a new subsystem of NF shown to be consistent. The consistency question for the whole theory NF remains open (since 1937). (shrink)

We consider the quantifier hierarchy of Takahashi [1972] and show how it gives rise to reflection theorems for some large cardinals in ZF, a new natural subtheory of Zermelo's set theory, a potentially useful new reduction of the consistency problem for Quine's NF, and a sharpening of another reduction of this problem due to Boffa.

We generalize Specker's theorem on typical ambiguity, that NF and TST + Ambiguity have the same stratified consequences, to the subschemes Amb(Γ) of ambiguity restricted to classes of sentences Γ with certain natural closure conditions.

In his recent book, Quine, New Foundations, and the Philosophy of Set Theory, Sean Morris attempts to rehabilitate Quine’s NF as a possible foundation for mathematics. I explain why he does not succeed.

We analyze the representation of binary relations in general, and in particular of functions and of total antisymmetric relations, in monadic third order logic, that is, the simple typed theory of sets with three types. We show that there is no general representation of functions or of total antisymmetric relations in this theory. We present partial representations of functions and of total antisymmetric relations which work for large classes of these relations, and show that there is an adequate representation of (...) cardinality in this theory. The relation of our work to similar work by Henrard and Allen Hazen is discussed. This work can be understood as part of a program of assessing the capabilities of weak logical frameworks: our results are applicable for example, to the framework in David Lewis’s Parts of Classes. (shrink)

Partial models of the theory New Foundations (NF) introduced by Quine have already appeared in the literature, but in every model the membership set of NF is missing. On the other hand, Jensen showed that "NF + Urelements" is consistent with respect to ZF and, in the model built there, the membership set of the theory exists. Here we build a partial model of NF from the one of Jensen in which the membership set exists.