A representation is a remnant of previous experience that allows that experience to affect later behavior. This paper develops a metatheoretical view of representation and applies it to issues concerning representation in animals. To describe a representational system one must specify the following: thedomainor range of situations in the represented world to which the system applies; thecontentor set of features encoded and preserved by the system; thecodeor transformational rules relating features of the representation to the corresponding features of the represented (...) world; themedium, or the representation's physical instantiation; and thedynamics, or how the system changes with time. In part because of the behaviorist assumption that the hypothetical, covert changes occurring in an organism during learning correspond to the overt physical changes that are observed, issues of representation in animal behavior have been largely ignored as irrelevant or misleading. However, it can be inferred that representations, acting as models of environmental regularities, operate at many levels of behavioral functioning, both cognitive and noncognitive. Objections to the use of this concept in explanations of animal behavior, based on the claim that it is indeterminate and on behaviorist considerations of parsimony, can be answered. Animal representations may be specialized in terms of tasks and species. Data from tasks involving spatial memory, delayed matching-to-sample, and sequence learning suggest some foundations for a general theory of animal representations. (shrink)

ABSTRACTGeneralisation in learning means that learning with one particular stimulus influences responding to other novel stimuli. Such generalisation effects have largely been overlooked within res...

. In this essay recently developed ideas from the social history of science, in particular the notion that there are historically conditioned „national professional styles” in science, are applied to the transfer of psychological theory - and of scientific psychologists - from German-speaking lands to the United States before and after 1933. After an overview of the scope and structure of the emigration in psychology, an analysis of the transfer process is offered focusing upon Gestalt theory.

We present a new theoretical construct labeled motivational readiness. It is defined as the inclination, whether or not ultimately implemented, to satisfy a desire. A general model of readiness is described which builds on the work of prior theories, including animal learning models and personality approaches, and which aims to integrate a variety of research findings across different domains of motivational research. Components of this model include the Want state, and the Expectancy of being able to satisfy that Want. We (...) maintain that the Want concept is the critical ingredient in motivational readiness: without it, readiness cannot exist. In contrast, some motivational readiness can exist without Expectancy. We also discuss the role of incentive in motivational readiness. Incentive is presently conceived of in terms of a Match between a Want and a Perceived Situational Affordance. Whereas in classic models incentive was portrayed as a first order determinant of motivational readiness, here we describe it as a second order factor which affects readiness by influencing Want, Expectancy, or both. The new model’s relation to its theoretical predecessors, and its implications for future research, also are discussed. (shrink)

In agreement with some of the ideas expressed by Perruchet & Vinter (P&V), we believe that some phenomena hitherto attributed to processing may in fact reflect a fundamental distinction between direct and reflexive forms of consciousness. This dichotomy, developed by the phenomenological tradition, is substantiated by examples coming from experimental psychology and lesion neuropsychology.

While I do not accept any current analysis of theoretical terms I also reject certain criticisms of them. Specifically, I reject the criticism that the paradoxes of material implication and the counterfactual problem eliminate the explicit definition view; and I also reject the criticism that explicitly defined theoretical terms do not refer to anything which "really exists" or do not have "excess meaning." I do argue, however, that the explicit definition view confuses and conflates the concepts of criterion and meaning (...) analysis. I also defend reduction sentences against the counterfactual difficulty, but show, too, how this view is already logically committed to the network or postulational view of meaning. Finally, I show how the concept of reduction sentences confuses in several ways the concepts of criterion and meaning analysis--although not in quite the same way as explicit definitions do. (shrink)

One of the initial obstacles to the study of the theory of value is the fact that practically every author whom the student consults on the subject characterizes value and valuation differently, and seems to trace them ultimately to a different source. For example, one writer will formulate a theory of value in terms of pain and pleasure ; another, in terms of feeling ; another, in terms of desires or wants ; still others, in terms of “requiredness”, of interest, (...) of striving ; and so on. (shrink)