E. C. Tolman's 'purposive behaviorism' is commonly interpreted as an attempt to operationalize a cognitivist theory of learning by the use of the 'Intervening Variable' (IV). Tolman would thus be a counterinstance to an otherwise reliable correlation of cognitivism with realism, and S-R behaviorism with operationalism. A study of Tolman's epistemological background, with a careful reading of his methodological writings, shows the common interpretation to be false. Tolman was a cognitivist and a realist. His 'IV' has been systematically misinterpreted by (...) both behaviorists and antibehaviorists. For this reason, Tolman's alliance with modern cognitivism and his influence on its development have been underestimated. (shrink)

This paper is a conceptual analysis of the theory debate in psychology, as carried out by cognitivists and radical behaviorists. The debate has focused on the necessity of theories in psychology. However, the logically primary issue is the nature of theories, or what theories are. This claim stems from the fact that cognitivists and radical behaviorists adopt disparate accounts of the nature of theories. The cognitivists' account is closely akin to the received view from logical positivism, where theories are collections (...) of statements and theoretical terms are restricted to designate unobservable entities. Radical behaviorists also conceive theories as collections of statements, but restrict theoretical terms in psychology to designate observable entities. If each side approaches the necessity issue with its preferred account, both agree that theories are necessary in psychology. Hence, there is no disagreement over the necessity of theories in psychology per se, only over the nature of theories. The received view, however, has been shown to suffer from irreparable difficulties that have led to its total rejection in post-positivistic philosophy of science. Alternative accounts, like the structuralist and semantic views, do not raise the issue of whether theories are necessary in psychology. (shrink)

Abstract Psychology's goal has been to become a science, taking the modern natural sciences as the model. It has not been understood that each science undergoes a transition from early disunification to later unification, that a fundmental dimension is involved that differentiates sciences. Psychology is a modern disunified science, distinguished by its chaotic knowledge and ways of operating. A philosophy of science based on modem unified science, as philosophies generally are, is inappropriate as a means of understanding psychology or of (...) guiding its development. We need a philosophy to describe the special problems of theory construction of modern disunified sciences, and to advance paths by which to work on those problems. Theory tasks to be undertaken in large quantities range from articles to reduce artificial diversity to the construction of grand unified theory. Psychology must begin those tasks, and it must understand its characteristics as a modern disunified science, if it is to make good decisions concerning its development and organization. Otherwise it will continue on its path towards fragmentation, an impenetrable obstacle to full development as a science and a profession. (shrink)

In accepting the invitation of your society to discuss some aspects of the philosophy of science, particularly as they might bear on the problems of an experimental psychologist, I should like from the start to make it very clear that I do not consider myself a philosopher, not even an amateur one. Like most empirical scientists, particularly of the laboratory variety, I usually take it for granted that my world is real and that the things I perceive as existing in (...) it can be investigated by my empirical methods. I seem to get along quite well with this unpremeditated, common-sense realism, and, for the most part, I go along minding my own experimental business. As the psychologists among you may know, however, every once in a while I seem to have to abandon this happy, naive state and let myself get involved in questions about my science, the kinds of questions that are more properly the business of the philosopher of science. (shrink)