Nudges are a way to steer people’s behavior through changes in how choices are presented. Nudge research has been incorporated into public policy in many countries, and nudge research, thus, has the potential to directly influence societies and individuals. As a result, research ethics for nudge research is needed to ensure that nudges developed are not instances of unethical manipulation of people. In this paper, I argue that two types of slippery slopes from ethically fine nudges to ethically problematic ones (...) can take place in nudge research. The conceptual slippery slope follows from (1) the broad way of defining nudges, (2) the multitude of different ways of understanding manipulation of people, (3) many manipulation definitions implying that some nudges are manipulative, and (4) some forms of manipulation of people being prima facie wrong. The empirical slippery slope rests, first, on the possibility of small steps from ethically acceptable to wrong nudges, and second, on the cognitive limits typical to human beings (including nudge researchers). Both slippery slope arguments imply the need to of nudge researchers to create so-called firebreaks. The firebreaks can take the form of ethical justifications. To avoid slippery slopes, certain types of arguments should be excluded from these justifications. (shrink)

Biomedical research, on the one hand, contributes to important goals from generation of knowledge about the human body to the development and testing of therapeutics of all kinds. On the other hand, it can produce serious and sometimes unforeseeable consequences. In the ethical analysis of these two aspects of biomedical research, two important argumentative strategies play a major role. First, slippery slope arguments are used to warn of potential risks and to highlight knowledge-based limitations. Second, a dual-use problem describes the (...) challenge that already established techniques can be used for both morally wrong and morally right purposes. These two argumentative strategies appear to share several similarities, which will be investigated in this article. For this purpose, the article will first provide clear working definitions for both types of argument. This lays the foundation for the further ethical analysis. In a second step, and in order to investigate the similarities and differences of the argumentative strategies with an example from current ethical debates, CRISPR-Cas9, a currently very promising tool of genome editing, will be examined. The extent to which the possible applications of this genome editing tool can be addressed by slippery slope arguments or the dual use problem will be investigated. For this purpose, selected studies involving the use of CRISPR-Cas9 will be examined. Based on this two-step, analytic and example-based comparison of slippery-slope argumentation and dual-use considerations, the article will detail the ethically relevant difference between the two argumentative strategies and at the same time contribute to the ongoing ethical debate about CRISPR-Cas9. (shrink)

According to the doctrine of informed consent medical procedures are morally permissible when a patient has consented to the treatment. Problematically it is possible for a patient to consent to or refuse treatment which consequently leads to a decline in her best interests. Standardly, such conflicts are resolved by prioritising the doctrine of informed consent above the requirement that the medical practitioner acts in accordance with the duty of care. This means that patient free choice is respected regardless as to (...) whether her choice leads to a decline in her best interests, since to disrespect patient choice would be an instance of ‘unwarranted’ paternalism. This thesis defends the claim that in cases where patient consent comes into conflict with her best interests, paternalistic interference is in fact justified. The ambition of the thesis is thus twofold: in the first place I argue that the doctrine of informed consent cannot be used as an ethical guarantor for medical decision making. Secondly I will conclude that hard paternalism is justified in medical practice, thereby calling for a reversal of the prioritisation of informed consent procedures over the medical practitioner’s duty of care. (shrink)