Wolfgang Spohn's theory of ranking functions is an elegant and powerful theory of the structure and dynamics of doxastic states. In two recent papers, Spohn has applied it to the analysis of conditionals, claiming to have presented a unified account of indicative and subjunctive (counterfactual) conditionals. I argue that his analysis fails to account for counterfactuals that refer to indirect causes. The strategy of taking the transitive closure that Spohn employs in the theory of causation is not available for counterfactuals. (...) I have a close look at Spohn's treatment of the famous Oswald-Kennedy case in order to illustrate my points. I sketch an alternative view that seems to avoid the problems. (shrink)

And this paper is an attempt to say precisely how, thus addressing a philosophical problem which is commonly taken to be a serious one. It does so, however, in quite an idiosyncratic way. It is based on the account of inductive schemes I have given in (1988) and (1990a) and on the conception of causation I have presented in (1980), (1983), and (1990b), and it intends to fill one of many gaps which have been left by these papers. Still, I (...) have tried to make this paper self-contained. Section 1 explains the philosophical question this paper is about; in more general terms it asks what might be meant by objectifying epistemic states or features of them and to which extent epistemic states can be objectified. The next sections introduce the basis I rely on with formal precision and some explanation; section 2 deals with induction and section 3 with causation. Within these confines, section 4 attempts to give an explication of the relevant sense of objectification and section 5 investigates the extent to which various features of epistemic states are objectifiable. The two most salient results are roughly that the relation "A is a reason for B" cannot be objectified at all and that the relation "A is a cause of B" can be objectified only under substantial, though reasonable restrictions. What has all of this to do with probability? A lot. The paper trades on a pervasive duality between probabilistic and deterministic epistemology, between a probabilistic representation of epistemic states together with a theory of probabilistic causation and another representation of epistemic states which I call deterministic because it lends itself, in a perfectly parallel fashion, to a theory of deterministic causation. Here I explicitly deal only with the deterministic side, but the duality should pave the way for further conclusions concerning objective probabilities and statistical laws. This outlook is briefly expanded in the final section 6. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of some of the most important philosophical papers by Peter Gärdenfors. Spanning a period of more than 20 years of his research, they cover a wide ground of topics, from early works on decision theory, belief revision and nonmonotonic logic to more recent work on conceptual spaces, inductive reasoning, semantics and the evolutions of thinking. Many of the papers have only been published in places that are difficult to access. The common theme of all the (...) papers is the dynamics of thought. Several of the papers have become minor classics and the volume bears witness of the wide scope of Gärdenfors’ research and of his crisp and often witty style of writing. The volume will be of interest to researchers in philosophy and other cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Educating Reason: Critical Thinking, Informal logic, and the Philosophy of Education.

The paper proposes a unified analysis of the natural language connectives 'if', 'if … might', 'even if' (all of them with indicative and subjunctive mood), 'because' and 'though'. They are all interpreted as instances of universal (pro)conditionals, unconditionals, or counterconditionals. The paper imports the notion of relevance into the meaning of conditionals, viewing conditionals as close in meaning to explanations and statements about causal relations. The antecedent of a conditional is interpreted as being relevant for its consequent, thus avoiding the (...) general inference from A and B to 'If A, B'. The analysis is based on different variants of the Ramsey test (among them the 'Strong Ramsey Test') together with a fragment of the belief revision theory of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson. (shrink)

This paper explores the connective ‘because’, based on the idea that ‘CbecauseA’ implies the acceptance/truth of the antecedentAas well as of the consequentC, and additionally that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. To capture this idea of difference-making a ‘relevantized’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed that takes the antecedent to be relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is true/accepted in a state$$\sigma $$σjust in case (i) the consequent is true/accepted when$$\sigma (...) $$σis revised by the antecedentand(ii) the consequent fails to be true/accepted when$$\sigma $$σis revised by the antecedent’s negation. To extend this to a semantics for ‘because’, we add that (iii) the antecedent and (iv) the consequent are accepted/true in the state$$\sigma $$σ. We get metaphysical or doxastic interpretations of these clauses, depending on what we mean by a model and a state. We introduce several semantics known from suppositional conditionals, which we reinterpret for difference-making conditionals and ‘because’. We present a minimal logic for ‘because’ sentences and show how it can be extended in ways that parallel the hierarchy of extensions of the logic of suppositional conditionals. We establish correspondence results between axioms for ‘because’ and properties of states, and prove that the specified logics are sound with respect to the semantics. (shrink)

Discontented people might talk of corruption in the Commons, closeness in the Commons and the necessity of reforming the Commons, said Mr. Spenlow solemnly, in conclusion; but when the price of wheat per bushel had been the highest, the Commons had been the busiest; and a man might lay his hand upon his heart, and say this to the whole world, – ‘Touch the Commons, and down comes the country!’.

The analyses of explanation and causal beliefs are heavily dependent on using probability functions as models of epistemic states. There are, however, several aspects of beliefs that are not captured by such a representation and which affect the outcome of the analyses. One dimension that has been neglected in this article is the temporal aspect of the beliefs. The description of a single event naturally involves the time it occurred. Some analyses of causation postulate that the cause must not occur (...) later than the effect. If we want this kind of causality it is easy to add the appropriate clause to ( CAUS ). An alternative is not to rule out backwards causation or causal loops a priori , but expect that ( CAUS ), via the properties of the contraction P C - , will result in the desired temporal relation between C and E . One way of ensuring this is to postulate that when the probability function P is contracted to P C - , the probabilities of all events that occurred before C remain the same in P C - as in P . This means that all beliefs about the history of events up to C are left unaltered in the construction of the hypothetical state of belief P C - . In conclusion, I hope to have shown that, in spite of these limitations, ( EXP ) and ( CAUS ) provide viable analyses of explanation and causality between single events for the case when epistemic states can be described by probability functions. I have also shown that the two analyses can be used to explicate the close connections between the two notions. These analyses reduce the problems of explanation and causality, hopefully in a non-circular way, to the problem of identifying contractions of states of belief. (shrink)

As the paper explains, it is crucial to epistemology in general and to the theory of causation in particular to investigate the properties of conditional independence as completely as possible. The paper summarizes the most important results concerning conditional independence with respect to two important representations of epistemic states, namely (strictly positive) probability measures and natural conditional (or disbelief or ranking) functions. It finally adds some new observations.

Drawing inspiration from Lakatos’s philosophy of science, the paper presents a notion of intertheory explanation that is suitable to explain, from the point of view of a successor theory, its predecessor theory’s success (where it is successful) as well as the latter’s failure (where it fails) at the same time. A variation of the Ramsey-test is used, together with a standard AGM belief revision model, to give a semantics for open and counterfactual conditionals and ’because’-sentences featuring in such intertheory explanations. (...) Pre-theoretically described idealizing assumptions play a crucial role in this model, especially when the predecessor theory and the successor theory contradict each other. (shrink)

This paper deals with Hans Reichenbach's common cause principle. It was propounded by him in, and has been developed and widely applied by Wesley Salmon, e.g. in and. Thus, it has become one of the focal points of the continuing discussion of causation. The paper addresses five questions. Section 1 asks: What does the principle say? And section 2 asks: What is its philosophical significance? The most important question, of course, is this: Is the principle true? To answer that question, (...) however, one must first consider how one might one argue about it at all. One can do so by way of examples, the subject of section 3, or more theoretically, which is the goal of section 4. Based on an explication of probabilistic causation proposed by me in,, and, section 4 shows that a variant of the principle is provable within a classical framework. The question naturally arises whether the proved variant is adequate, or too weak. This is pursued in section 5. My main conclusion will be that some version of Reichenbach's principle is provably true, and others may be. This may seem overly ambitious, but it is not. The paper does not make any progress on essential worries about the common cause principle arising in the quantum domain; it only establishes more rigorously what has been thought to be plausible at least within a classical framework. (shrink)

First, ranking functions are argued to be superior to AGM belief revision theory in two crucial respects. Second, it is shown how ranking functions are uniquely reflected in iterated belief change. More precisely, conditions on threefold contractions are specified which suffice for representing contractions by a ranking function uniquely up to multiplication by a positive integer. Thus, an important advantage AGM theory seemed to have over ranking functions proves to be spurious.