In Plato's Laws, the Athenian Visitor says that the best constitution is a mixture of monarchy and democracy. This is the theoretical basis for the institutions of Magnesia, and it helps the citizens to become virtuous. But what is meant by ‘monarchy’ and ‘democracy’, and how are they mixed? I argue that the fundamental relations in Plato's discussion of constitutions are those of authority and equality. These principles are centrally about the extent to which citizens submit to the judgment of (...) an authority and the extent to which they decide for themselves respectively—the extent to which they are ruled by themselves or ruled by another. The institutions of Magnesia reflect these principles in practice and provide a more nuanced way to understand Plato’s assessment of democratic institutions. (shrink)

In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion (πειθώ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Persuasion can be achieved by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια), which make the citizens more eager to obey the laws. Although scholars disagree on how to interpret the preludes’ persuasion, they agree that the preludes instill true beliefs and give citizens good reasons for obeying the laws. In this paper I refine this account of the preludes by (...) arguing that the primary purpose of the preludes is to motivate correct action, and that for citizens who lack rational-governance this is achieved via useful false beliefs. That is to say, in many cases, the prelude functions as a “noble lie” (γενναῖον ψεῦδος). (shrink)

La aceptación de la esclavitud es una de las cuestiones donde la Antigüedad muestra un mayor rezago en relación con el mundo contemporáneo; esto suele aducirse para criticar la filosofía griega. En este artículo se examina hasta qué punto el pensamiento de Platón en las Leyes puede caer bajo esta imputación o sustraerse a ella. Se plantea que en el autor se encuentra una dialéctica del esclavo, que consiste en mantener, por un lado, la función de la esclavitud dentro de (...) la estructura social y política propuesta, mientras que, por el otro lado, se cuestiona la existencia del esclavo como tal. Así, se hace primero una presentación general de la esclavitud en las Leyes y de la función que dicha institución cumple en la comprensión filosófica del propio diálogo y, después, se adelanta un examen detenido del pasaje central de 6.777d5-7. Se concluye que si bien, en clave histórica, Platón no logra eludir la tensión de esta dialéctica, en clave filosófica ofrece su resolución en el obrar del hombre verdaderamente justo. (shrink)

Plato’s theory of virtue in the Laws could be striking for someone who is more familiar with Aristotle’s ethics for conceptual complementarity between the two positions (contrary emotions, the ordering element of reason, virtue as a mean which lies between two forms of vice, typically linked to excessive actions, etc.). Plato’s theory, however, still differs from that of Aristotle in two crutial points. First, the source of emotional dynamism is, according to Plato, supraindividual as far as the psyche is a (...) cosmological principle. Only if it comes to be formed and ordered, it separates from the universal cosmic context and make up the emotional nature of an individual soul. But the soul is not, and this is the second point of difference, ordered by some external element (training or education, organized by a rational agent). Plato counts on a pre-arranged order of emotions at a particular ontological topos of the individual soul into which reason eventually descends. Emotions, on their part, seem to include a nexus between formable and forming that is chronologically and methodocally prior to that between the biological substratum and its rational organization, as assumed by Aristotle. (shrink)

In Laws 5, the Athenian argues in favour of virtuous over vicious lives on the basis that the former are preferable to the latter when we consider the pleasures and pains in each. This essay offers an interpretation of the argument which does not attribute to the Athenian an exclusively hedonist axiology. It argues for a new reading of the division of ‘types of life’ at 733c-d and suggests that the Athenian relies on the conclusion established earlier in the Laws (...) that we humans take pleasure in harmony and order. Virtuous lives exhibit just such harmony and order and are therefore always more pleasant than and preferable to vicious lives. (shrink)

La filosofía política platónica está atravesada por una marcada preocupación epistemológica, sobre cuya base Platón adopta el así llamado “intelectualismo socrático”, lo cual implica un rechazo tajante del actuar incontinente o _akrasía_. En el presente trabajo intentaremos mostrar que el propio Platón llevó adelante una revisión de dicha posición, ante todo debido a un cambio profundo en su concepción de la naturaleza humana en el diálogo _Leyes_.

Virtue and Law in Plato and Beyond, by AnnasJulia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. pp. 234.

La ciudad de amigos que Platón pretende fundar en Las Leyes tiene como pilares la eliminación de los extremos de la riqueza y de la pobreza, por una parte, y la educación de todos los sectores sociales, por otra. Si bien este basamento suele ser reconocido por los especialistas, la legislación sobre..