‘We’ is said in many ways. This paper investigates Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of different kinds of ‘we’, which is maintained to be one of the most sophisticated within classical phenomen...

Ever since its appearance in 1913, Reinach's work on a The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law has served as the principal representative of phenomenological, aprioristic and ontological/realist approaches to the philosophy of law. This annotated bibliography provides an overview of the reception of Reinach's thinking, which has been of influence also in the realm of speech act theory.

The paper investigates the role played by ethical deliberation and ethical judgment in Wittgenstein's early thought in the light of twentieth?century German legal philosophy. In particular the theories of the phenomenologists Adolf Reinach, Wilhelm Schapp, and Gerhart Husserl are singled out, as resting on ontologies which are structurally similar to that of the Tractatus: in each case it is actual and possible Sachverhalte which constitute the prime ontological category. The study of the relationship between the states of affairs depicted, e.g., (...) in the sentences of a legal trial and prior fact?complexes to which these may correspond suggests one possible connecting link between the logical and ontological sections of the Tractatus and the ethical reflections appearing at the end. It is argued that the latter can best be understood in terms of the idea of a ?last judgment? (with its associated ethical rewards and punishments) which would relate to the world as a whole as a penal trial relates to individual complexes of facts. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article argues that religious emotions are variations of general emotions that we already know from our everyday life, which nevertheless exhibit specific features that enable us to think of them as forming a coherent subclass. The article claims that there is an experience of joy, sorrow, regret, fear, and so on that is specifically religious. The aim is to develop an account that specifies what makes them “religious.” The argument is developed in three stages. The first section develops (...) a phenomenologically inspired account of the emotions by focusing on three of their moments: phenomenal quality, cognitive dependency, and intentionality. Drawing on this theory, section 2 distinguishes the class of religious emotions from similar phenomena. The third and final section examines the main features of religious emotions. (shrink)

The topic of the present reflection is Christian religious belief. Specifically, we will use Husserlian tools in order to examine the positional nature of this particular type of belief. We will be less interested in the question concerning the success conditions of this experience and more in its noetic structure. According to our proposal, to believe by faith supposes (although it is not exhausted by) accepting the existence of mundane evidence speaking against this fundamental belief. The believer acknowledges the existence (...) of this contradicting en-doxical basis and nevertheless believes what she believes. We will refer to this simultaneous movement of accepting and cancelling as the concessive structure of the religious attitude. The para-doxical movement of experiencing conflicting evidence as being subjectively ineffective is a key component of this attitude. At least some inchoative conflict with the world is required in order for the religious belief to be religious. Lastly, we will try to show that, with a distinctive terminology, the idea that the Christian religious attitude involves a conflict between subjectivity and world is present not only in Kierkegaard but also in phenomenological figures like Scheler and even Husserl. (shrink)