Many sophisticated essays and books have been written about the topic of consciousness. My own contributions date back some twenty-five years in an essay entitled 'Problems concerning the structure of consciousness' (Pribram 1976), and five years before that in delineating the difference between brain processes that are coordinate with awareness and those that are coordinate with habitual behavior (Pribram 1971a). I have been intrigued by what has been written since and take this occasion to reassess a few of the major (...) issues that have arisen. (shrink)

David Bourget has raised some conceptual and technical objections to my development of von Neumann’s treatment of the Copenhagen idea that the purely physical process described by the Schrödinger equation must be supplemented by a psychophysical process called the choice of the experiment by Bohr and Process 1 by von Neumann. I answer here each of Bourget’s objections.

Because intelligent agents employ physically embodied cognitive systems to reason about the world, their cognitive abilities are constrained by the laws of physics. Scientists have used digital computers to develop and validate theories of physically embodied cognition. Computational theories of intelligence have advanced our understanding of the nature of intelligence and have yielded practically useful systems exhibiting some degree of intelligence. However, the view of cognition as algorithms running on digital computers rests on implicit assumptions about the physical world that (...) are incorrect. Recently, the view is emerging of computing systems as goal-directed agents, evolving during problem solving toward improved world models and better task performance. A full realization of this vision requires a new logic for computing that incorporates learning from experience as an intrinsic part of the logic, and that permits full exploitation of the quantum nature of the physical world. This paper proposes a theory of physically embodied cognitive agents founded upon first-order logic, Bayesian decision theory, and quantum physics. An abstract architecture for a physically embodied cognitive agent is presented. The cognitive aspect is represented as a Bayesian decision theoretic agent; the physical aspect is represented as a quantum process; and these aspects are related through von Neumann’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism. Alternative metaphysical positions regarding the meaning of quantum probabilities and the role of efficacious choices by agents are discussed in relation to the abstract agent architecture. The concepts are illustrated with an extended example from the domain of science fiction. (shrink)

David Bourget has raised some conceptual and technical objections to my development of von Neumann’s treatment of the Copenhagen idea that the purely physical process described by the Schrödinger equation must be supplemented by a psychophysical process called the choice of the experiment by Bohr and Process 1 by von Neumann. I answer here each of Bourget’s objections.