- Individualism and Marr’s Computational Theory of Vision.Keith Butler - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.details
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Against eliminative materialism: From folk psychology to volkerpsychologie.John D. Greenwood - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.details
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What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach.Ori Hacohen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (4):701-720.details
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Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences.Thomas Heams, Philippe Huneman, Guillaume Lecointre & Marc Silberstein (eds.) - 2015 - Springer.details
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Computation vs. information processing: why their difference matters to cognitive science.Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):237-246.details
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(1 other version)Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits.Gilbert Harman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):417-428.details
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Aspects and algorithms.Andy Clark - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):601-602.details
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Searle's Freudian slip.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):603-604.details
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Intentionality in the visual cortex?Roland Puccetti - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):758.details
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How to Explain the Explanatory Gap.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):117-135.details
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A puzzle about mental self-representation and causation.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906.details
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Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.details
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Is the mind conscious, functional, or both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.details
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(1 other version)The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it is like to be a honey bee?Michael Tye - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.details
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Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
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Minimalism, Psychological Reality, Meaning and Use.Henry Jackman - 2007 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-sensitivity and semantic minimalism: new essays on semantics and pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Reflections on knowledge and its limits.Gilbert Harman - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):417-428.details
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Situations and representations.Janet Dean Fodor - 1985 - Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):13 - 22.details
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(1 other version)The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee? [REVIEW]Michael Tye - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.details
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Neural constraints in cognitive science.Keith Butler - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):129-62.details
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(3 other versions)Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 190-213.details
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Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?Marius Usher - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):241-248.details
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Content, computation, and individuation.Keith Butler - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):277-92.details
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(1 other version)Color, content, and Fred: On a proposed reductio of the inverted spectrum hypothesis.Jonathan Cohen - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.details
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On being accessible to consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):621-621.details
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(1 other version)Disjunction and distality: the hard problem for purely probabilistic causal theories of mental content.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7197-7230.details
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What is Tarski's Theory of Truth?Sher Gila - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):149-166.details
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Unconscious mental processes.Clark Glymour - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):606-607.details
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When functions are causes.Jonathan Schull - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):622-624.details
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(1 other version)Color, Content, and Fred.Cohen Jonathan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.details
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Two Forms of Dualism.David Sosa - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):307-313.details
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Teleology as higher-order causation: A situation-theoretic account.Robert C. Koons - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (4):559-585.details
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The duality of content.Jesse J. Prinz - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):1-34.details
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Sticky problems with Stampe on representations.Kevin Possin - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):75-82.details
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What is wrong with an atomistic account of mental representation.Melinda Hogan - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):307-27.details
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Content: Covariation, control, and contingency.J. Christopher Maloney - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):241-90.details
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Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy?Jason Bridges - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):522-547.details
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Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.details
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Kan maskiner tenke likevel? En kritikk av Einar Duenger Bøhns artikkel «Kan maskiner tenke?».Atle Ottesen Søvik - 2023 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 58 (4):225-235.details
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Radical embodied cognitive science and problems of intentionality.Eric Gordon Epstein - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):229-266.details
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Neural Representations Observed.Eric Thomson & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):191-235.details
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The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):192-223.details
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(1 other version)Access to the Abstract: Intuition as Mental Modelling.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2006 - SATS 7 (2).details
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Can We Infer Our Empirical Beliefs From Our Sense Experiences?Rinita Mazumdar - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Unintended thought and nonconscious inferences exist.James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.details
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Somebody flew over Searle's ontological prison.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):618-619.details
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Three Views of Language & the Mind.Submitted May - unknowndetails
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Functionalism without physicalism: Outline of an emergentist program.Robert C. Koons - 2003 - Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2 (3-3).details
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Mental representation from the bottom up.Dan Lloyd - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):23-78.details
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