- (1 other version)Access to the Abstract: Intuition as Mental Modelling.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2006 - SATS 7 (2).details
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Searle's vision of psychology.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):608-610.details
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Zombies are people, too.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):617-618.details
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Somebody flew over Searle's ontological prison.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):618-619.details
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Conscious and unconscious representation of aspectual shape in cognitive science.Geoffrey Underwood - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):628-629.details
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Consciousness, historical inversion, and cognitive science.Andrew W. Young - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):630-631.details
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(1 other version)Access to the abstract: Intuition as mental modelling.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2006 - SATS 7 (2):86-105.details
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A puzzle about mental self-representation and causation.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906.details
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Two Forms of Dualism.David Sosa - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):307-313.details
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The Case against Stephen Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind.Kevin Possin - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (3):405 - 418.details
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Asymmetric Dependence, Representation, and Cognitive Science.Charles Wallis - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):373-401.details
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Thought and Language in the Tractatus.Donna M. Summerfield - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):224-245.details
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A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories.Mark Greenberg - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.details
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(1 other version)The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it is like to be a honey bee?Michael Tye - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.details
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(1 other version)Disjunction and distality: the hard problem for purely probabilistic causal theories of mental content.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7197-7230.details
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Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse.Karl Bergman - 2019 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism.Emmett L. Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.details
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What's it like to be a gutbrain?John Limber - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-615.details
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When functions are causes.Jonathan Schull - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):622-624.details
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The neurophysiology of consicousness and the unconscious.Christine A. Skarda - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):625-626.details
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The possibility of irreducible intentionality.Charles Taylor - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):626-626.details
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(1 other version)Color, Content, and Fred.Cohen Jonathan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.details
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Is the mind conscious, functional, or both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.details
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From Information to Intentionality.Barry Loewer - 1987 - Synthese 70 (2):287 - 317.details
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Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):157-180.details
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Kan maskiner tenke likevel? En kritikk av Einar Duenger Bøhns artikkel «Kan maskiner tenke?».Atle Ottesen Søvik - 2023 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 58 (4):225-235.details
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Can We Infer Our Empirical Beliefs From Our Sense Experiences?Rinita Mazumdar - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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The Mental Life of Some Animals.Mark Rowlands - 1994 - Between the Species 10 (3):4.details
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Searle's Freudian slip.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):603-604.details
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Is Searle conscious?John C. Kulli - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-614.details
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Unintended thought and nonconscious inferences exist.James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.details
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Information and the holism of intentional content.Robert Van Gulick - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):759.details
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(1 other version)Eliminacija eliminativizama.Davor Pecnjak - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):19-33.details
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Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.details
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Stalnaker on Inquiry.Michael Pendlebury - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (3):229-272.details
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Mental representation from the bottom up.Dan Lloyd - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):23-78.details
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On naturalizing the semantics of mental representation.Stuart Silvers - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (March):49-73.details
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Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states.Douglass Munro Smith - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (1):103-20.details
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Don't PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2001 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.details
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Teleología y semántica del contenido mental, una investigación sobre los problemas de la fijación del contenido desde presupuestos naturalistas.Andrés L. Jaume Rodríguez - 2011 - Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía 38:303-328.details
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Intension and representation: Quine’s indeterminacy thesis revisited.Itay Shani - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.details
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What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach.Ori Hacohen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (4):701-720.details
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In the beginning there was information?Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 80:101239.details
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Who is computing with the brain?John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.details
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Various senses of “intentional system”.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):760.details
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Three Views of Language & the Mind.Submitted May - unknowndetails
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Asymmetric dependencies, ideal conditions, and meaning.Martha Gibson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.details
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On the Very Idea of (Real) Content Derivation.Amir Horowitz - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):271-287.details
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12. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264-296.details
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What is wrong with an atomistic account of mental representation.Melinda Hogan - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):307-27.details
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