Results for 'Mark Rowlands'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 2010, 249 Pages, ISBN 978-0-262-01455-7, £20.24. [REVIEW]Victor Loughlin - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):891-897.
    Andy Clark once remarked that we make the world smart so we don’t have to be (Clark, 1997). What he meant was that human beings (along with many other animals) alter and transform their environments in order to accomplish certain tasks that would prove difficult (or indeed impossible) without such transformations. This remarkable insight goes a long way towards explaining many aspects of human culture, ranging from linguistic notational systems to how we structure our cities. It also provides the basis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Review: Mark Rowlands: Can Animals Be Moral? [REVIEW]Florian L. Wüstholz - 2013 - Tierethik 6:184-189.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW]Michael Madary - 2011 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (1).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Memory and the Self by Mark Rowlands[REVIEW]Marina Trakas - 2017 - Phenomenological Reviews 3.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. "Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness" by Joseph Levine, "Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory" by Peter Carruthers, and "The Nature of Consciousness" by Mark Rowlands[REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2002 - Times Literary Supplement 5176:9-10.
    The Vienna Circle was a group of scientifically-minded philosophers, many physicists by training, who in the 1920s and 30s developed the cluster of philosophical doctrines known as Logical Positivism. Among the Circle’s most distinguished members were Rudolf Carnap and Herbert Feigl, each of whom emigrated to America during the Nazi era. It is said that Feigl, the author of an important 1958 monograph defending a materialist approach to the mind-body problem, once gave a visiting lecture on the problem of consciousness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Enactivism and Cognitive Science: Triple Review of J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science; Anthony Chemero, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science; and Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind”. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):209-228.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Epistemic Permissivism and Reasonable Pluralism.Richard Rowland & Robert Mark Simpson - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York, NY, USA:
    There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Animals as Reflexive Thinkers: The Aponoian Paradigm.Mark Rowlands & Susana Monsó - 2017 - In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 319-341.
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.
    Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  10. Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies.John Sutton & Evelyn Tribble - 2011 - Shakespeare Studies 39:94-103.
    ‘‘COGNITIVE ECOLOGY’’ is a fruitful model for Shakespearian studies, early modern literary and cultural history, and theatrical history more widely. Cognitive ecologies are the multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, communicate, imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on the fly, and in rich ongoing interaction with our environments. Along with the anthropologist Edwin Hutchins,1 we use the term ‘‘cognitive ecology’’ to integrate a number of recent approaches to cultural cognition: we believe these approaches offer productive lines of engagement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11.  29
    The Implications of the Second-Person Perspective for Personhood: An Application to the Case of Human Infants and Non-Human Primates.Pamela Barone, Carme Isern-Mas & Ana Pérez-Manrique - 2022 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):133-150.
    This paper proposes an intermediate account of personhood, based on the capacity to participate in intersubjective interactions. We articulate our proposal as a reply to liberal and restrictive accounts, taking Mark Rowlands’ and Stephen Darwall’s proposals as contemporary representatives of each view, respectively. We argue that both accounts fall short of dealing with borderline cases and defend our intermediate view: The criteria of personhood based on the second-person perspective of mental state attribution. According to it, a person should (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Interpreting and Developing Heidegger’s Analytic of Dasein as Philosophical Anthropology, with a Focus on the ‘Revelatory Moods’ of Anxiety, Boredom and Joy.James Cartlidge - 2021 - Dissertation, Central European University
    This dissertation articulates and defends a conception of philosophical anthropology by reading Martin Heidegger’s ‘analytic of Dasein’ as an exemplary case of it and developing its account of anxiety and boredom. I define philosophical anthropology in distinction to empirical anthropology, which I argue is concerned with specificity and difference. Anthropology investigates human beings and their societies in their historical specificity, situated in context, thereby contributing to the understanding of the differences between human beings and their societies across the world and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Moral Animals and Moral Responsibility.Albert W. Musschenga - 2015 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 10 (2):38-59.
    Albert Musschenga | : The central question of this article is, Are animals morally responsible for what they do? Answering this question requires a careful, step-by-step argument. In sections 1 and 2, I explain what morality is, and that having a morality means following moral rules or norms. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that some animals show not just regularities in their social behaviour, but can be rightly said to follow social norms. But are the norms they follow (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition, and the Extended Mind.John Sutton - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):281-289.
    I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Je´roˆme Dokic, Richard Menary, Jenann Ismael, Sue Campbell, Doris McIlwain, and Mark Rowlands. This paper explains the motivation for an alliance between the sciences of memory and the extended mind hypothesis. It examines in turn the role of worldly, social, and internalized forms of scaffolding to memory and cognition, and also highlights themes relating to affect, agency, and individual differences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  15. Moral Animals? [REVIEW]Dan Hooley - 2014 - Journal of Animal Ethics 4 (2):86-92,.
    In this article, I review Can Animals Be Moral? by Mark Rowlands. I outline the central arguments made by Rowlands in defense of his thesis that other animals can be moral subjects, and I compare this claim to others who have held that animals can act morally. I finish by raising a few worries about Rowlands’s arguments and note some areas for further inquiry and work.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The Philosophical Work of Mark Sharlow: An Introduction and Guide.Mark F. Sharlow - manuscript
    Provides an overview of Mark Sharlow's philosophical work with summaries of his positions. Includes references and links to his writings.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Richard Rowland - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  18. The Selected Writings of Mark Pettinelli.Mark Pettinelli - manuscript
    The best writing of Mark Pettinelli, about cognitive psychology, cognitive science, etc.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  39
    Research Notes of Mark Pettinelli.Mark Pettinelli - manuscript
    Research notes of Mark Pettinelli about cognitive science, cognitive psychology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. The Collected Works of Mark Rozen Pettinelli [2006-2015].Mark Pettinelli - manuscript
    This collection of articles is almost all of the psychological writings of Mark Pettinelli.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. The Unfinishable Scroll and Beyond: Mark Sharlow's Blogs, July 2008 to March 2011.Mark F. Sharlow - manuscript
    An archive of Mark Sharlow's two blogs, "The Unfinishable Scroll" and "Religion: the Next Version." Covers Sharlow's views on metaphysics, epistemology, mind, science, religion, and politics. Includes topics and ideas not found in his papers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. My Final Analysis of Everything - Including Emotions, Feelings and Thoughts - By Mark Rozen Pettinelli.Mark Pettinelli - 2020
    This article is one of the final works of Mark Pettinelli and discusses feelings, emotions and cognitive psychology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. What Someone’s Behaviour Must Be Like If We Are to Be Aware of Their Emotions in It.Rowland Stout - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):135-148.
    What someone’s behaviour must be like if we are to be aware of their emotions in it Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9224-0 Authors Rowland Stout, School of Philosophy, UCD Dublin, Dublin 4, Republic of Ireland Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  24. The Category of Occurrent Continuants.Rowland Stout - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):41-62.
    Arguing first that the best way to understand what a continuant is is as something that primarily has its properties at a time rather than atemporally, the paper then defends the idea that there are occurrent continuants. These are things that were, are, or will be happening—like the ongoing process of someone reading or my writing this paper, for instance. A recently popular philosophical view of process is as something that is referred to with mass nouns and not count nouns. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  25. The Life of a Process.Rowland Stout - 2003 - In Guy Debrock (ed.), Process Pragmatism. Rodopi.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  26. Seeing the Anger in Someone's Face.Rowland Stout - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):29-43.
    Starting from the assumption that one can literally perceive someone's anger in their face, I argue that this would not be possible if what is perceived is a static facial signature of their anger. There is a product–process distinction in talk of facial expression, and I argue that one can see anger in someone's facial expression only if this is understood to be a process rather than a product.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  27. Two Ways to Understand Causality in Agency.Rowland Stout - 2007 - In A. Leist (ed.), Action in Context.
    An influential philosophical conception of our mind’s place in the world is as a site for the states and events that causally mediate the world we perceive and the world we affect. According to this conception, states and events in the world cause mental states and events in us through the process of perception. These mental states and events then go on to produce new states and events in the world through the process of action. Our role is as hosts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  28. Moral Philosophy.Rowland Stout - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge.
    Despite being somewhat long in the tooth at the time, Aristotle, Hume and Kant were still dominating twentieth century moral philosophy. Much of the progress made in that century came from a detailed working through of each of their approaches by the expanding and increasingly professionalized corps of academic philosophers. And this progress can be measured not just by the quality and sophistication of moral philosophy at the end of that century, but also by the narrowing of some of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. From Outside of Ethics Richard, Mark . When Truth Gives Out . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 184. $55.00 (Cloth).Andrew Alwood & Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):805-813.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  60
    The Metaphysics of Trust.Rowland Stout - manuscript
    I argue against the claim that the fundamental form of trust is a 2-place relation of A trusting B and in favour of the fundamental form being a 4-place relation of A, by ψ-ing, trusting B to φ. I characterize trusting behaviour as behaviour that knowingly makes one reliant on someone doing what they are supposed to do in the collaborative enterprise that the trusting behaviour belongs to. I explain how trust is involved in the following collaborative enterprises: knowledge transfer (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. What You Know When You Know an Answer to a Question.Rowland Stout - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):392 - 402.
    A significant argument for the claim that knowing-wh is knowing-that, implicit in much of the literature, including Stanley and Williamson (2001), is spelt out and challenged. The argument includes the assumption that a subject's state of knowing-wh is constituted by their involvement in a relation with an answer to a question. And it involves the assumption that answers to questions are propositions or facts. One of Lawrence Powers' counterexamples to the conjunction of these two assumptions is developed, responses to it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  32. Adopting Roles: Generosity and Presumptuousness.Rowland Stout - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77:141-161.
    Generosity is not the same thing as kindness or self-sacrifice. Presumptuousness is incompatible with generosity, but not with kindness or self-sacrifice. I consider a kind but interfering neighbour who inappropriately takes over the role of mother to my daughter; her behaviour is not generous. Presumptuousness is the improper exercise of a disposition to adopt a role that one does not have. With this in mind I explore the idea that generosity is the proper exercise of the disposition to adopt a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear That She Thought It Was Chasing Her?Rowland Stout - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Arguing against the claim that beliefs are reasons for action.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Being Subject to the Rule to Do What the Rules Tell You to Do.Rowland Stout - 2010 - In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom. Routledge. pp. 145-156.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Mechanisms That Respons to Reasons.Rowland Stout - manuscript
    in O’Rourke, F. (ed.), Human Destinies (Notre Dame Press, forthcoming).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Can There be Virtue in Violence?Rowland Stout - 2013 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 265 (3):323-336.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Aristotle's Ontology of Change.Mark Sentesy - 2020 - Chicago, IL, USA: Northwestern University Press.
    This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. -/- Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one knows that they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  39. The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:108-137.
    Some standards, such as moral and prudential standards, provide genuinely or authoritatively normative reasons for action. Other standards, such as the norms of masculinity and the mafia’s code of omerta, provide reasons but do not provide genuinely normative reasons for action. This paper first explains that there is a similar distinction amongst attitudinal standards: some attitudes (belief, desire) have standards that seem to give rise to genuine normativity; others (boredom, envy) do not. This paper gives a value-based account of which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. On Shame – In Response to Dan Zahavi, Self and Other.Rowland Stout - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):634-638.
    In chapter 14 of Zahavi’s recent book, Self and Other, the notion of shame is discussed. In feeling shame one experiences oneself as experienced by others. For Sartre, that experience in itself is sufficient for shame, as one experiences oneself as determined in the experience of others and hence as shamefully not self-determining. But Zahavi introduces an extra condition for shame, which is a ‘global decrease in self-esteem’. This paper questions the need for this condition and argues that seeing oneself (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
    This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications of conciliationism for our moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  42. Form Without Matter: Empedocles and Aristotle on Color Perception.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Mark Eli Kalderon presents an original study of perception, taking as its starting point a puzzle in Empedocles' theory of vision: if perception is a mode of material assimilation, how can we perceive colors at a distance? Kalderon argues that the theory of perception offered by Aristotle in answer to the puzzle is both attractive and defensible.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  43. The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.
    This paper is about how moral disagreement matters for metaethics. It has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  44. Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):161–171.
    Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  45. In Defence of Good Simpliciter.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.
    Many including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philippa Foot, Peter Geach, Richard Kraut, and Paul Ziff have argued for good simpliciter skepticism. According to good simpliciter skepticism, we should hold that there is no concept of being good simpliciter or that there is no property of being good simpliciter. I first show that prima facie we should not accept either form of good simpliciter skepticism. I then show that all of the arguments that good simpliciter skeptics have proposed for their view fail (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  46. The Banathy Conversation Methodology.G. Dyer, J. Jones, G. Rowland & S. Zweifel - 2015 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (1):42-50.
    Context: Thirty years ago, members of the systems science community discovered that at their conferences, more was being accomplished in the breaks than in the sessions. Led by Bela H. Banathy, they cancelled the sessions and created a conversation methodology that has proven far more effective. Dozens of conversations have now been held around the world. Problem: At a recent conversation in Linz, Austria, a team devoted its inquiry to the Banathy Conversation Methodology itself, asking, in particular, how to develop (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  48. Ramsifying Virtue Theory.Mark Alfano - 2015 - In Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Routledge. pp. 123-35.
    In his contribution, Mark Alfano lays out a new (to virtue theory) naturalistic way of determining what the virtues are, what it would take for them to be realized, and what it would take for them to be at least possible. This method is derived in large part from David Lewis’s development of Frank Ramsey’s method of implicit definition. The basic idea is to define a set of terms not individually but in tandem. This is accomplished by assembling all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  49. Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.
    Our concepts of good simpliciter, good for, and good as a particular kind of thing must share some common element. I argue that all three types of goodness can be analysed in terms of the reasons that there are for a certain sets of agents to have pro-attitudes. To this end I provide new and compelling accounts of good for and goodness of a kind in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes that are more explanatorily illuminating than competing accounts and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000