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  1. Transcendental Knowability, Closure, Luminosity and Factivity: Reply to Stephenson.Jan Heylen & Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2023 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 27 (1).
    Stephenson (2022) has argued that Kant’s thesis that all transcendental truths are transcendentally a priori knowable leads to omniscience of all transcendental truths. His arguments depend on luminosity principles and closure principles for transcendental knowability. We will argue that one pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the closure principle is too strong, while the other pair of a luminosity and a closure principle should not be used, because the luminosity principle is too strong. (...)
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  • Existence and Modality in Kant: Lessons from Barcan.Andrew Stephenson - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):1-41.
    This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the Barcan formulas, (...)
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  • Phenomenology, anti‐realism, and the knowability paradox.James Kinkaid - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1010-1027.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 3, Page 1010-1027, September 2022.
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  • Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
    In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of philosophy that limited creatures like us are capable of. In discussing this idea, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Formalizing Kant’s Rules.Richard Evans, Andrew Stephenson & Marek Sergot - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48:1-68.
    This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These (...)
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  • (1 other version)Formalizing Kant’s Rules.R. Evans, M. Sergot & A. Stephenson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):613-680.
    This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in theCritique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is therule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicatingwhich acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These acts are not (...)
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