Do the ethical features of an artwork bear on its aesthetic value? This movie endorses misogyny, that song is a civil rights anthem, the clay constituting this statue was extracted with underpaid labor—are facts like these the proper bases for aesthetic evaluation? I argue that this debate has suffered from a false presupposition: that if the answer is “yes” (for at least some such ethical features), such considerations feature as pro tanto contributions to an artwork’s overall aesthetic value, i.e., as (...) merits or flaws which make something have more or less overall aesthetic value. As the case of ethically laden aesthetic evaluation makes clear, however, good aesthetic judgement is irreducibly multi-dimensional, e.g., “the movie has an engaging soundtrack, tasteful camera work, and takes a misogynistically purient perspective on its female lead.” Such a “non-summative” judgement refuses to reduce those various dimensions of aesthetic value to a single aggregate aesthetic evaluation, like “it’s a 6/10” or “it’s a pretty good movie!” I defend both the modest claim that such non-summative evaluations are not mistaken and the extremist claim that summative (i.e., unidimensional) aesthetic evaluation is defective by considering other domains of normative assessment in which summing seems inappropriate, notably including evaluations of people’s character. (shrink)

This essay aims to elucidate the so-called 'qua problem' often invoked in the debate on the interaction between moral and artistic values. The qua problem is currently understood as the failure to establish a direct value interaction. I argue that this way of understanding the qua problem is flawed because it does not make the qua problem a real problem, that is, a problem that makes an interactionist argument unsuccessful in virtue of having the problem. Instead, I propose that the (...) qua problem should be understood as the failure to show that the fact that an artwork is (im)moral (as opposed to other related facts, such as those that ground this fact) explains, whether directly or indirectly, the work’s artistic value (as opposed to being connected to the artistic value in some other way). (shrink)