A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their correlative duties, (...) while remaining neutral on substantive moral debates. I argue that socioeconomic-consideration human rights are satisfactorily claimable and sufficiently practical. (shrink)

Negative duties are duties not to perform an action, while positive duties are duties to perform an action. This article focuses on the question of who holds the positive duties correlative to human rights. I start by outlining the Universal Scope Thesis, which holds that these duties fall on everyone. In its support, I present an argument by analogy: positive and negative duties correlative to human rights perform the same function; correlative negative duties are generally thought to be universal; by (...) analogy, we have reason to think that positive duties are held by everyone. I then consider three disanalogies that challenge the above argument. To address these worries, I introduce the notion of ‘aggregative duties’ – duties that can only be adequately grasped when we focus on the aggregate effect of the actions and omissions of different agents. This framework allows me to refine the initial thesis and address the objections. (shrink)

The claimability objection rejects the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights because the duties thought to correlate with this right are undirected, and thus it is not claimable. This objection is open to two replies: One denies that claimability is an existence condition on rights. The second suggests that the human right to subsistence actually is claimable. I argue that although neither reply succeeds on the conventional interpretation of the human right to subsistence, an alternative ‘practical’ interpretation (...) provides a viable approach to vindicating this right. (shrink)

Can states permissibly enforce mandatory participation in the provision of public goods? Usual justifications of state action here appeal to the fact that such goods are very good for people. Arthur Ripstein argues that states can compel provision of public goods, but that the best explanation of this is grounded, not in the costs and benefits of the provision to the compelled parties, but in the parties’ moral status as independent agents. I argue that Ripstein’s alternative account poses more problems (...) than it solves. Our best hope in grounding mandatory cooperation is to do so with reference to the duties that we have to serve people’s interests, including interests in autonomy, welfare, and being respected on account of one’s moral status. (shrink)

Is it justified to hold that an agent S has a (moral) right to P if the duty-bearer is not specified? There is an intense ongoing debate on this question. There are two positions in the literature. On the one hand, O´Neill´s much-discussed account of rights holds that it is justified to say that an agent S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined – i.e. if and only if it is clear against (...) whom S may claim her right to P (O’Neill 1986, 1988, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2016). Call this, the ‘claimability condition’. On the other hand, interest-based theorists argue that it can be justified to say that an agent S has a right to P even if the duty-bearer is not sufficiently determined (Caney 2007; Griffin, 2008; Raz 1988; Tasioulas 2007; see also: Etinson, 2013; Ypi 2010). Who (if anyone) is correct in this fundamental discussion about the very nature of rights? In this paper, I provide an answer to this crucial question. Neither O´Neill nor interest-based theorists provide good reasons to justify their positions. However, I argue, the claimability condition is an existence condition of rights justified on the basis of their action-guiding character. The reason is that if the duty-bearer is not specified, the content of the right (its correlative obligation) does not sufficiently guide what the agent should do because it is indeterminate who is required to act (or refrain from acting). (shrink)

It is common to focus on the duties of the wrongdoer in cases that involve injustice. Presumably, the wrongdoer owes her victim an apology for having wronged her and perhaps compensation for having harmed her. But, these are not the only duties that may arise. Are other beneficiaries of an injustice permitted to retain the fruits of the injustice? If not, who becomes entitled to those funds? In recent years, the Connection Account has emerged as an influential account that purports (...) to explain cases such as Embezzlement. This account holds that benefiting from injustice can give rise to a corrective duty - that is, a duty of compensation - owed specifically to the victim of the injustice from which the recipient benefits. This duty is grounded in the connection between the victim and the beneficiary of a given injustice. This paper has two aims. First, I show that we must reject the Connection Account on the grounds that it risks failing correctly to identify those who become entitled to the fruits of injustice. I achieve this by developing and defending the fairness objection. Second, I offer an alternative account: the Moral Taintedness Account. This account states that, when identifying who is entitled to the fruits of injustice, the cause and the degree of the harm suffered by a victim are both relevant considerations, though it does not matter whether the victim is the victim of the injustice that gave rise to the fruits in question. This account avoids the problem associated with the Connection Account, and yields intuitive conclusions in an important range of test cases. (shrink)

According to the orthodox or humanist conception of human rights, individuals have a moral duty to promote the universal realization of human rights. However, advocates of this account express the implications of this duty in extremely vague terms. What does it mean when we say that we must promote human rights satisfaction? Does it mean that we must devote a considerable amount of our time and resources to this task? Does it mean, instead, that we must make occasional donations to (...) charities working to advance human rights realization? In this essay, I argue that this duty can only be constructed as imperfect. This means that it confers agent-relative discretion on us to decide when, how, and to what extent to advance the human rights of others. It also means that it is neither correlative with rights nor enforceable. As I will explain, the main reason for this is that any attempt to construct it as a perfect duty would infringe the dignity of the potential duty bearers and thereby undermine the very values that human rights practice aspires to serve. Finally, I will conclude by providing some guidelines for those who wish to comply with their imperfect duties to improve the situation of those whose human rights are in peril. (shrink)

Either a person's claim to subsistence goods is held against institutions equipped to distribute social benefits and burdens fairly or it is made regardless of such a social scheme. If the former, then one's claim is not best understood as based on principles setting out a subsistence goods entitlement, but rather on principles of equitable social distribution — a fair share. If, however, the claim is not against a given social scheme, no plausible principle exists defining what counts as a (...) reasonable burden for any of the available agents to secure subsistence. No justifiable principle exists implying generalised perfect duties any agent could clearly follow or clearly breach that secure subsistence conditions for others. At best we can justify rescue duties under very specific conditions, or general but imperfect duties to improve arrangements. Neither of these obviously correlates with human rights standards. Attempts in the literature to overcome the dilemma by claiming basic rights can correlate with imperfect duties or can generate duties to work towards institutions that ‘perfect’ our imperfect duties, are faulty. I then show how the dilemma can be avoided by accounts of human rights focusing on minimum respectful treatment rather than goods or interests. (shrink)

That there is a human right to subsistence is a basic assumption for most moral and political theorists interested in the problem of global poverty, but it is not one exempt from controversy. In this article, I examine four justifications for this right and suggest that it takes the form of a claim, that is, a right which creates correlative duties on others who are then taken to be the main agents in its fulfillment. I point to some criticisms made (...) against this conceptualization and offer an alternative approach that emphasizes the key importance of the moral and political agency of the needy. Two aspects of this approach are that the needy are seen as actors in their own right when it comes to poverty alleviation measures and their demands are no longer seen as demands for mere subsistence but ultimately for putting an end to their political marginalization and exclusion. Towards the end, I point to the complementarity of both views. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen’s critique of standard liberal interpretations of the difference principle has been very influential. According to Cohen, justice is not realized simply because the state’s tax policies and other distributive tools maximize the position of the worst off. Rather – possibly in addition to, but not to the exclusion of, certain state policies – justice requires talented people to improve the position of the worst off through their actions in their daily lives. Specifically, it prohibits talented people from (...) insisting on inequality-causing incentives. To this extent, Cohen’s view of distributive justice is anti-statist. On standard liberal interpretations, human rights are such that, logically, they can be violated only by states, not private individuals. An individual who tortures someone commits a moral wrong but does not violate the victim’s human rights. For this reason, the crime is less problematic than it would have been had a police officer done it on behalf of the state. To this extent the standard liberal understanding of human rights is statist. This parallel between liberal understandings of distributive justice and human rights raises two questions: Is the statist understanding of human rights vulnerable to Cohenian criticisms parallel to those that he canvasses against the statist understanding of distributive justice? If so, should we welcome an anti-statist understanding of human rights, or should we see it as a problem with Cohen’s critique of a statist focus in distributive justice that it commits us to an implausible anti-statist view of human rights? (shrink)

Der Beitrag entwickelt ein neues, machtbasiertes Verantwortungsmodell für die individuelle Verstrickung in globale strukturelle Ungerechtigkeiten. Er geht von dem Problem aus, dass die meisten Bedingungen für die Zuerkennung moralischer Haftbarkeitsverantwortung in Fällen der individuellen Verstrickung in globale strukturelle Übel nicht erfüllt sind: Wenn eine Person beispielsweise ein unter ausbeuterischen Bedingungen produziertes T-Shirt kauft, so ist diese Handlung für das Eintreten der strukturellen Ungerechtigkeit weder hinreichend noch notwendig, die Person hat die strukturell ungerechten Eff ekte ihrer Handlung häufi g nicht intendiert (...) und kann die Folgen ihrer Handlungen epistemisch nicht ausreichend gut überblicken. Nicht zuletzt ist ihre Partizipation an der kapitalistischen Weltwirtschaftsordnung unfreiwillig. Der Beitrag diskutiert, welche Lösung Iris Marion Young in ihrem Modell kollektiv geteilter Verantwortung für dieses Problem vorgeschlagen hat, und argumentiert, dass hier insbesondere in Hinblick auf das Kriterium der kausalen Relevanz Probleme bestehen bleiben. Davon ausgehend schlägt der Beitrag ein ergänzendes, machttheoretisch begründetes Modell der Zuerkennung moralischer Haftbarkeitsverantwortung vor: Verantwortung wird diesem zufolge nicht nur in Bezug auf einzelne Handlungen konzeptualisiert, sondern auch in Bezug auf die strukturell generierte und generalisierte Handlungsfähigkeit, die Personen aufgrund ihres Status in Regelsystemen gegenüber anderen Personen besitzen. In diesem Sinne wird einzelnen Personen Verantwortung nicht nur für die kausalen Eff ekte ihrer Handlungen, sondern bereits für die kausalen Eff ekte der Annahme ihrer sozialen Macht über andere übertragen. Ich argumentiere, dass Personen für ihre soziale Macht gegenüber anderen verantwortlich gemacht werden können, weil diese Macht die generalisierte Vorbedingung ihrer individuellen Handlungsfähigkeit darstellt und weil sie ihre sozial konstituierte Handlungsfähigkeit durch jegliches Handeln implizit annehmen. Soziale Macht wird Personen durch soziale Regeln übertragen: Auch dominierende Macht besitzt jemand, ohne dafür notwendigerweise etwas tun zu müssen. Sobald eine Person ausgehend von ihrer sozialen Macht handelt, reproduziert sie damit notwendigerweise die sozialen Konstitutionsbedingungen ihrer Macht über andere. Genauer stellt die Annahme ihrer sozialen Macht eine NESS-Bedingung in Hinblick auf die Reproduktion derjenigen strukturell ungerechten sozialen Regeln dar, die ihr Macht erst übertragen haben. Dabei können Personen meistens vorhersehen, dass die Annahme ihrer sozialen Macht, d.h. ihrer sozialen Statusfunktionen globale strukturelle Ungerechtigkeiten auf kausal relevante Art und Weise reproduziert. Obwohl die Annahme sozialer Statusfunktionen normalerweise unfreiwillig ist, kann Personen für diese kompensatorische Verantwortung übertragen werden, insofern sie die ungerechten Effekte dieser Annahme vorhersehen können. Da die Effekte unserer Statusannahme kausal und epistemisch kollektiv geteilt sind, schlage ich vor, diese Form der Verantwortung als eine kollektiv-geteilte zu verstehen. Um strukturellen Ungerechtigkeiten abzuhelfen, müssen Personen entsprechend dazu beitragen, handlungsfähige kollektive Akteure – d.h. gerechte politische Institutionen – zu bilden. (shrink)

I attempt first to disentangle three aspects of Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. There is the central distinction between principles of duty contrary to that which is contradictory in conception/consistent in conception but contradictory in will. There is also a distinction between essential and non-essential duties: those which cannot, or occasionally can, be passed over consistent with the requirements of morality. Finally, there is a distinction between duties that exhibit a scalar aspect – degrees of goodness or virtue (...) – and duties that do not. My aim is to show how these distinct considerations can be reconciled as aspects of a single distinction, and I conclude that the remarkable complexity of Kant’s perfect/imperfect distinction is actually a strength, rather than a weakness. (shrink)

The ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (Principles) that provide guidance for the implementation of the United Nations’ ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework (Framework) will probably succeed in making human rights matters more customary in corporate management procedures. They are likely to contribute to higher levels of accountability and awareness within corporations in respect of the negative impact of business activities on human rights. However, we identify tensions between the idea that the respect of human rights is a perfect (...) moral duty for corporations and the Principle’s ‘human rights due diligence’ requirement. We argue that the effectiveness of the ‘human rights due diligence’ is in many respects dependent upon the moral commitment of corporations. The Principles leave room for an instrumental or strategic implementation of due diligence, which in some cases could result in a depreciation of the fundamental norms they seek to promote. We reveal some limits of pragmatic approaches to coping with business-related human rights abuses. As these limits become more apparent, not only does the case for further progress in international and extraterritorial human rights law become more compelling, but so too does the argument for a more forceful discussion on the moral foundations of human rights duties for corporations. (shrink)

This paper challenges one line of argument which has been advanced to justify imposing risks of collateral harm on prospective beneficiaries of armed humanitarian interventions. This argument - the ‘Beneficiary Principle’ - holds that non-liable individuals’ immunity to being harmed as a side effect of just armed humanitarian interventions may be diminished by their prospects of benefiting from the intervention. Against this, I defend the view that beneficiary status does not morally distinguish beneficiaries from other non-liable individuals in such a (...) way as to permit exposing them to greater risks of being harmed. The argument proceeds in four steps. I first show that the BP can neither be grounded in liability-based nor in lesser-evil justifications for harming. I then argue that a standalone justification for unintended harming based on beneficiary status would face at least two critical challenges. The first concerns the BP’s applicability to collectives; the second questions the normative weight we can plausibly ascribe to beneficiary status when beneficiaries are such by virtue of being victims of wrongful threats of harm. I argue that standing to benefit is morally irrelevant when the benefit consists in the mitigation or prevention of wrongful harms, and consequently suggest that the BP may only serve as a distributive principle in allocating risks of harm if it is disambiguated in a number of critical aspects and applied in a more narrowlydefined set of circumstances. (shrink)

It is sometimes suggested that victims of unjust harm should take priority over victims of other forms of harm. We explore four arguments for this view: that victims of unjust harm experience greater suffering; that prioritizing victims of unjust harm would help prevent unjust harm in the future; that it is good for perpetrators that their victims be prioritized; and that it is impersonally better that victims of unjust harm are prioritized. We argue that the first three arguments fail but (...) that the fourth argument succeeds. Moral agents have a reason to prioritize victims of wrongdoing because this secures the impersonal value of corrective justice. However, this reason can be activated differently for different agents depending on how they are situated relative to the wrongdoing, and it may be outweighed by other factors, such as the extent of the harm that could be alleviated. (shrink)