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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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What desires are, and are not.Alan H. Goldman - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):333-352.details
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Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Folk psychology and mental concepts.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:4-25.details
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Do you have to be right to redescribe?Susan Goldin-Meadow & Martha Wagner Alibali - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):718-719.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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Why Semantic Properties Won’t Earn their Keep.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.details
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A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (7):475-495.details
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Redescription of intentionality.Norman H. Freeman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):717-718.details
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Explaining computation without semantics: Keeping it simple.Nir Fresco - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (2):165-181.details
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Arguments against linguistic “modularization”.Susan H. Foster-Cohen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):716-717.details
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A dichotomy sustained.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):187-211.details
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The red Herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes.Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1996 - Cognition 58 (2):253-70.details
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Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.details
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A Dual Proposal Of Minimal Conditions For Intentionality.Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho - 2022 - Synthese 200 (115):1-22.details
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Semantic externalism and the mechanics of thought.Carrie Figdor - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Developmental psychology for the twenty-first century.David Estes - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):715-716.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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Integrating computation into the mechanistic hierarchy in the cognitive and neural sciences.Lotem Elber-Dorozko & Oron Shagrir - 2019 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):43-66.details
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What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mind.M. Frances Egan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.details
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Folk psychology and cognitive architecture.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.details
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Individualism, computation, and perceptual content.Frances Egan - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):443-59.details
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In defence of narrow mindedness.Frances Egan - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.details
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Physics of brain-mind interaction.John C. Eccles - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):662-663.details
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Pluralistická odpověď na otázku obsahu lidové psychologie.Matěj Dražil - 2021 - Pro-Fil 22 (1):1.details
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Representation: Ontogenesis and phylogenesis.Merlin Donald - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):714-715.details
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Too much ado about belief.Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.details
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Semantic Naturalization via Interactive Perceptual Causality.John Dilworth - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (4):527-546.details
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Realistic virtual reality and perception.John Dilworth - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):23-42.details
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The distinction between conscious and unconscious cognition in David R. Shanks’s work: A critical assessment.Giuseppe Lo Dico - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):19-30.details
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Whither Experimental Semantics?Michael Devitt - 2012 - Theoria 27 (1):5-36.details
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Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.Murat Aydede - manuscriptdetails
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La naturalizzazione dell'epistemologia. Contro una soluzione quineana.Nicla Vassallo - 1997 - Franco Angeli.details
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Is there a role for representational content in scientific psychology?Frances Egan - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 14.details
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.Henry Jackman - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
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Cognitive values, theory choice, and pluralism : on the grounds and implications of philosophical diversity.Guy Stanwood Axtell - unknowndetails
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A Conceptual Map of Scientism.Rik Peels - manuscriptdetails
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Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Eliminative materialism.William Ramsey - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Computation in physical systems.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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